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JAMES G. REID, IS8 # 1372
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P. O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-27.73
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com

ZOOq NOV I 2 A II: ll?

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Case No. CV-2007-00885

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation;
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. REID

vs.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife;
Defendants.

JAMES G. REID, upon oath being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

That I am an individual over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal

knowledge of the facts set forth herein, believing them all to be true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief.
2.

That I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty

Company, in the above-titled litigation and make this Affidavit in such capacity.
3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of Employers Mutual
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Casualty Company's policy of insurance with Rimar Construction, Inc. which was in effect
during the years 2004 through 2005.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Amended

Verified Complaint in the Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County Case
No. CV-06-00445.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Order re:

Rimar's Motion in Limine in the case of Donnelly v. RimarConstruction, Inc., et al., Bonner
County Case No. CV 06-00445.
Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a true and correct copy of a portion of the

6.

jury instructions given in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner
County Case No. CV 06-00445
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the Special

Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County Case No.
CV 06-00445.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the Judgment on

Special Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County
Case No. CV 06-00445.
9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of the Order on Post

Trial Motions in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County
Case No. CV 06-00445.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy of the Amended

Judgment on Special Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al.,
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Bonner County Case No. CV 06-00445.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and correct copy of two reservation of

rights letters sent by EMC Insurance Companies to to Ivan Rimar.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "J" is a true and correct copy of the Settlement

Agreement entered into between Employers Mutual Casualty Company and Rimar
Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar dated August 17,2009.
13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "K" is a true and correct copy of Exhibit A in the

case of Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989) consisting
of the Mutual of Enumclaw'S insurance policy.
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED this

9

day of November, 2009.
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED

by:

Sworn to and subscribed before me this

cr
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day of November...-'l't'Jn-....

\,\!---..

*

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This does hereby certify that on the

day of November, 2009, he served the

foregoing document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid and properly addressed as follows:
Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, LedJin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
Marc A. Lyons
Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Honorable Steve Verby
215 S. 1st Avenue
Sandpoint, 10 83864
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145

200Q NOV 25 A 10: 2S

~
-_._..

r_'_r_'.<'

-.-

l
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.. ,

-

~:
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

Plaintiff,

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER

v.

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a) and 57(b) and move this court for its order permitting them
leave to serve the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim attached hereto.
This motion is made on the grounds that Rule 15(a) allows the Court wide and liberal
discretion to allow the parties to amend their pleadings when justice so requires and the
Donnellys are properly joined parties to the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action under Rule
57(b) and, as third-party creditors, have standing to pursue a counterclaim as set forth in the case
of Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989). In addition, the case is
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER - I
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not presently set for trial and this motion to amend is not made to cause any undue delay or
prejudice to the plaintiff and/or defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.
This motion is further supported by the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Amend Answer and the Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED

thiS~ day of November, 2009.
RAMSDEN & LYONS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

cf

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2 day of November, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method imtrcated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

v6sMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, W A 99201

VuSMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 263-0400
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~Mail

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

[PROPOSED)
AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COMES NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as
follows:

I. ANSWER
1.

Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set

forth in Plaintiffs' Petition unless specifically admitted herein.
2.

In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 and16 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants

are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the matters aileged therein
and therefore deny the same.

[PROPOSED] AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - I
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3.

In answer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the

4.

In answer to Paragraphs 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a

same.

contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder
of said Paragraphs.
5.

In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar

performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph.
6.

In answer to Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit

only that Plaintiffs' Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself.

Defendants deny the remainder of said

Paragraphs.
7.

In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of

Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants deny the same.

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

8.

Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained

ill

Paragraphs 1-7, above.
9.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

10.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean

hands, and in pari delicto.
11.

Plaintiff's claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel.

12.

Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent.

13.

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party.

14.

The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc.

and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy.
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III. COUNTERCLAIM

15.

At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company

("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State of Idaho.
16.

At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and

was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting
services in the State ofIdaho.
17.

At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly

("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real
property located in Bonner County, State ofIdaho.
18.

On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial

general liability policy no. 2DI-32-95-05 ("COL Policy") with the effective coverage dates
identified as October I, 2004, up and through October 1, 2005.
19.

On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims

arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC
COL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV-06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation").
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly'S
favor as against RCI on or about July 9,2008.
20.

On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On

Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate
against RCI in favor of Donnelly.

Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an

Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant
Rimar Construction, Inc. I Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total
amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,871.89.
[PROPOSED] AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 3
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21.

On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in

Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177.
Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the

22.

Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its
claim against RCI.
23.

On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated this action seeking a declaratory

judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part,
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12,2007, this action
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later
lifted on or about July 17,2009.
24.

Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the

Donnellys are judgment creditors ofRCI and have a claim, right or interest including ajudgment
lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against RCI.
25.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under

the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and,
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights,
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, for the
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the
entire judgment.
26.

To date, neither EMC nor RCI has made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court

in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains
unsatisfied.

[PROPOSED] AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4
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IV. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
27.

Defendants request a jury trial of all matters so triable.

IV. PRAYERFORRELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly demand:
1.

That Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing

thereby; and
2.

That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment finding that under the

EMC CGL Policy, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part,
the Donnelly judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including post-judgment interest
on the entire judgment amount; and
3.

That the Defendant Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as

incurred herein pursuant to I.e. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and
4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this _ _ day of November, 2009.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

By ____________________________
Michael A. Ealy, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of November, 2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

US Mail
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA99201

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 263-0400

Michael A. Ealy
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2
3
4

5
6
7

8

9

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
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STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM, ISB NO. 5127
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS
& SHELDON, PLLC
421 West Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, Washington, 99201
(509) 838-6055
(509) 625-1909 (Fax)
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11

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

12

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

13
14
15

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation,
Plaintiff,

16
17
18
19
20

21

NO.

CV -2007-00885

NOTICE OF NO CONTEST

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife,
Defendants.

22

COME NOW IVAN RIMAR and RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., and state as
23
24

follows:

25
26
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATTHEWS
&; SHELDON. PLLC

27

NOTICE OF NO CONTEST - 1

ATTORNEYS AT LAW
421 W. R!VEllSIDEAVE•• SUITE 900
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201.Q418
TELEPHONE (509) 838..(J()SS

28
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1

2

Employers Mutual Casualty Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this
matter dated November 9,2009. Neither Ivan Rimar, an individual, nor Rimar Construction,

3

Inc., oppose said Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
4

5

Dated this

2- day of December, 2009.
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS
& SHELDON, PLLC

6
7

8
9

Ste en . Phillabaum, ISB #5127
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc.
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16
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SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201-0418
TELEPHONE (509) 83UOSS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
2

3

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, true and correct copies of
foregoing document were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

4

5
6
7

James O. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
455 South Third Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773

[~ U.S. Mail

[ ]
[ ]
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax): (208) 342-4657
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9
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11
12

Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
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[]
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax): (208) 664-5884

DATED December 2,2009.
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JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P. O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-mail: dpc@ringertclark.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation;

Case No. CV-2007 -00885

Plaintiff,
vs.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife;

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE:
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through
its attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby provides notice of its nonopposition to the Defendant Donnellys' Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim, filed
with the Court on or about November 24,2009.

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
COUNTERCLAIM - 1

RE:

MOTION

218

TO

AMEND

ANSWER

AND

DATED this

L

day of December, 2009.

by:

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
COUNTERCLAIM - 2

RE:

MOTION

219

TO AMEND ANSWER

AND

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

7

This does hereby certify that on the

day of December, 2009, he served the

foregoing document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid and properly addressed as follows:
Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
Marc Lyons
Michael Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons
700 Northwest Blvd
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-1336

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION
COUNTERCLAIM - 3

RE:

MOTION

220

TO

AMEND

ANSWER

AND

1

3
4
5

6
7

8
9

BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
(208) 263-6866
(208) 263-0400 (Fax)
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STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM, ISB NO. 5127
PHILLABAUM, LED LIN, MATTHEWS
& SHELDON, PLLC
421 West Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, Washington, 99201
(509) 838-6055
(509) 625-1909 (Fax)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

13
14
15

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation,
Plaintiff,

16

17

NO.

CV-2007-00885

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE:
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

v.

18
19
20

21

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife,
Defendants.

22

COMES NOW RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., by and through its attorney of record,
23

24

Stephen D. Phillabaum and Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon, PLLC, and states as

25

follows:

26
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MAITHEWS
&; SHELDON. PLLC

27

NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION - 1

AlTORNEYS AT LAW
421 W. RIVERSIDE AYE•• SUITE 900
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 992014118
TELEPHONE (509) 838-6055

28
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1

2

Defendants Donnelly filed a Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim with the Court
on or about November 24,2009. Rimar Construction, Inc., does not oppose said Defendants'

3

Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim.
4

5

Dated this J!lday of December, 2009.
PHILLABAUM, LED LIN, MATTHEWS
& SHELDON, PLLC

6
7

8

9

tephen D. Phillabaum, ISB #5127
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc.
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ATTORNEYS AT LAW
421 W. RIVERSlnE AYE •• SUITE 900
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201-0418
TELEPHONE (509) 83B-«JSS

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

2

3

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, true and correct copies of th
foregoing document were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

4

5
6
7

James O. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
455 South Third Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773

8
9

10
11

Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
700 Northwest Boulevard
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur cfAlene, ID 83816-1336
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax): (208) 342-4657

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (Fax): (208) 664-5884
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DATED Decembed. 2009.
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS
DONNELL V'S MOTION TO
AMEND ANSWER

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife,
Defendants.
This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants Donnelly's Motion to
Amend Answer, and the Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company and Defendant Rimar
Construction, Inc. having each filed a Notice of Non-Opposition thereto and good cause
otherwise appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Donnelly's Motion to Amend Answer is
hereby GRANTED.
DATED this

!~y Of~re!L.

ORDER GRANTfNG DEFENDANTS DONNELLY'S MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER - I
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of
2009, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~~ail

James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 342-4657

-U;~ail

Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 664-5884

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, W A 99201

~·Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_
Facsimile (509) 625-1909

~SMail

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk
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· . RAMSDEN & LYONS,~
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMP ANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, and pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, move this court for an
Order for declaratory judgment in favor of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly.
This motion is further based on the documents and pleadings on file herein and upon
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of
Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof.
Oral argument is requested.
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226

DA TED this

I ~ day of December, 2009.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

BY~;t

Michael A. Ealy,
e~
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

P

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the! day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

~ Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773
Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, W A 99201

VUSMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

VuSMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400
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Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF

Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, and submit this memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and in
opposition to Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION

This case is a declaratory judgment action arising out of and related to the interpretation
and application of a Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy to the underlying case of
Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc. et al., Bonner County CV-2006-00445 (herein the
"Underlying Litigation"). In this action, Employers Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") seeks
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - I
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declaratory judgment against its insured, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI"), and David and
Kathy Donnelly, for the purpose of avoiding payment, in whole or in part, of the Donnelly
judgment entered against RCI in the Underlying Litigation. The Donnellys, however, seek to
hold EMC to its contractual promises to pay the Donnelly judgment, in whole or in part, on
behalf of its insured, RCI. Following the entry of a Settlement Agreement as between EMC and
RCI, EMC and Donnelly both move for summary judgment in this matter.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
I.

EMC undertook to insure RCI pursuant to a policy of insurance known as CGL

policy number 2DI-32-95-05 with effective dates from October 1, 2004, through October 1,
2005. (Reid Aff. Ex. A.) RCI renewed its CGL coverage under policy number 2DI-32-95-06
with effective dates from October 1, 2005, through October 1, 2006. (Ealy AtE Ex. A.) EMC
was RCI's CGL insurer from October 1, 1999, through January 17,2006. (Reid AtE Ex. I, p. 3.)
2.

In May of 2005, the Donnellys hired RCI to undertake a remodeling project on

their home located in Bonner County, Idaho. (Reid Aff. Ex. 's B, E). RCI performed its work
throughout 2005 and at all times within the effective dates of the EMCIRCI CGL policy. (Reid
AtE Ex. 's A, B, E) (Ealy AtE Ex. A).
3.
Litigation.

On March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI in the Underlying
In part, the Underlying Litigation arose out of and related to RCI's defective

workmanship while undertaking the Donnelly remodel project. (Reid Aff. Ex. B).
4.

By letter dated May 16, 2006, Donnelly tendered notice of the Underlying

Litigation to RCI's local insurance agent for tender to RCI's insurance carrier. (Ealy AtE at Ex.
B.) Following receipt of this letter, RCI's agent sent a General Liability Notice of

Occurrence/Claim to EMC on or about May 22, 2006. (Ealy Aff. Ex. C).
MEMORANDUM TN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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5.

In response to the Notice of Occurrence/Claim, on or about May 25, 2006, EMC

initially contacted RCI to discuss the DonneHy claim whereby RCI reported that, among other
things, RCI had "curt (sic) the heat mats underneath" the slate floor RCI was attempting to repair
and that the fayade engineered by RCI was "cracking". (Ealy AtE Ex. D). In addition, on May
25, 2006, EMC generated the first of three "reservation of rights" letters to RCI and/or Ivan
Rimar. (Ealy AtE Ex. E) (Reid Aff. Ex. I).
6.

By letter dated September 5, 2006, EMC followed up its May 25, 2006, letter by

further notifying RCI that it was undertaking a defense under a reservation of rights. (Reid AtE
Ex. I). In that letter, EMC represented to RCI that it "will be providing a defense and conducting
an investigation" in connection with the Underlying Litigation. (Reid Aff. Ex. I, p. 1). EMC
represented that it "will be providing a defense for Rimar Construction in this litigation

because there is a potential for coverage of bodily injury." (Id. at p. 2 emphasis added.) EMC
represented that the "Donnellys' allegations regarding delay may also infer a loss of use of

uninjured property which would be property damage." (Id. at p. 4 emphasis added.) EMC also
represented that "there appears to be an occurrence with regard to bodily injury. " (Id. at 5
emphasis added.)
7.

Following receipt of the Notice of Occurrence/Claim, EMC opened a claim file

and began to adjust the Donnellys' claim against RCI arising out of and relating to the
Underlying Litigation. (Ealy AtE Ex. F).

Having been on the claim for nearly a year, on or

about April 30, 2007, EMC had received notice or confirmation that mediation had been
scheduled in the Underlying Litigation for May 30, 2007. (Id. at p. 000031). EMC's chosen and
RCI's appointed defense counsel confirmed the same with mediator Peter Erbland by letter dated
May 1, 2007. (Ealy Aff. Ex. G). On that same date, EMC decided to file its declaratory
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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judgment action because it "sounds like a good idea" despite notice of the scheduled mediation
in the Underlying Litigation. (Ealy Aff. Ex. F, p. 000031, Ex. G).
8.

By letter dated May 22, 2008, the Donnellys first learned that they had been

named as Defendants in this action and, specifically, that EMC "wanted to advise you of these
matters in advance of the upcoming mediation." (Ealy Aff. Ex. H).
9.

On May 30, 2007, the Underlying Litigation was mediated by and between the

Donnellys and RCI. (Ealy Aff. Ex. G). Having undertaken a defense of RCI, EMC participated
in the mediation as RCI's CGL insurer.

The mediation failed to resolve the Underlying

Litigation.
10.

By letter dated June 4, 2007, EMC served a copy of the Summons and Petition

for Declaratory Judgment on Donnelly. (Ealy Aff. Ex. I).
11.

On July 9, 2007, an EMC claims supervisor noted and commented as follows:

"dec action???? ... I didn't know anything about this dec action filed in May.... How did this
come about?" (Ealy Aff. Ex. F at p. 000029).
12.

On July 31, 2007, the Donnellys filed their Amended Verified Complaint in the

Underlying Action. (Reid Aff. Ex. B). In part, the Donnellys' Amended Verified Complaint
alleged that RCI caused damage to the Donnellys' original structure and rendered portions of the
residence uninhabitable, unusable and unsafe, causing a loss of use of those portions of the
original home. (Id. at p. 6). The Amended Verified Complaint also added Ivan Rimar as a
Defendant. (Id. at pp. 1,2).
13.

By letter dated September 7, 2007, EMC once again notified RCI and Ivan

Rimar it was undertaking a defense under reservation of rights. (Reid Aff. Ex. I). The letter is
similar in form and substance to EMC's prior September 5,2006, letter and similarly represents
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and concludes that "[a]s you know, EMC has received information regarding carbon

monoxide poisoning which is "bodily injury" under the policy.

Therefore, EMC will be

providing a defense." (ld. at p. 7 emphasis added.)
14.

On December 12, 2007, this instant action was stayed by order of the Court

pending the resolution of the Underlying Litigation. (Order dated 12-12-07).
15.

From June 23, 2008 through July 9, 2008, the Underlying Litigation was tried to

a jury. (Reid Aff. Ex. F). On July 9, 2008, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of
Donnelly awarding damages in the total amount of $128,611.55. (Reid Aff. Ex.'s E, F). By
Special Verdict, the jury awarded the Donnelly's $126,611.55 in damages for breach of the
implied warranty of workmanship; $1,000 in damages for failure to provide required disclosures
pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and $1,000 in damages for other violations of
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. (Reid AfT. Ex. E, pp. 8-9).
16.

On August 14, 2008, Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of

Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Judgment") was entered in the Underlying
Litigation in the total amount of $128,611.55 to accrue post-judgment interest pursuant to Idaho
Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. Ex. F).
17.

On February 13, 2009, an Order On Post-Trial Motions was entered in the

Underlying Litigation finding the Donnelly's to be prevailing parties in the Underlying
Litigation as against RCI and awarding further costs in the amount of $19,871.89 and attorney's
fees in the amount of $277,062.00. (Reid Aff. Ex. G).
18.

On March 20, 2009, Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard to

Claim~'i}fPiaintiffs

And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Amended Judgment") was

entered in the Underlying Litigation in the total amount of $425,545.44 to accrue post-judgment
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interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. Ex. H). On March 30, 2009, the
Amended Judgment was recorded in Bonner County as record instrument number 769177. (Ealy
Aff. Ex. J).
19.

On or about August 17, 2009, EMC and RCI entered into a Settlement

Agreement. (Reid Aff. Ex. J). In effect, the Settlement Agreement is a "walk-away" whereby
EMC and RCI mutually release one-another from their respective claims and RCI agrees not to
contest EMC in this instant action and its effort to avoid payment based on the Donnelly
judgment against RCI.
20.

By letter dated October 1, 2009, Donnelly made demand upon EMC and RCI to

satisfY the Donnelly judgment including accrued interest to date in the total amount of
$446,841.76. (Ealy Aff. Ex. K).
21.

On or about November 10, 2009, a Writ of Execution ("Writ") was issued to the

Bonner County Sheriff for execution on the Donnelly judgment in the total amount of
$449,625.66. (Ealy Aff. Ex. L).
22.

On or about December 7, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff made a partial return

on the Writ in the total amount of $300.10. (Ealy Aff. Ex. M). After deducting its fees, the
Bonner County Sheriff issued a check payable to Donnelly in the total amount of $169.10. (Ealy
Aff. Ex. N).
23.

To date, neither RCI nor EMC has made voluntary payment to Donnelly in effort

to satisfY the Donnelly judgment or deposited with the Court any part of the judgment that is
within the applicable limit of insurance.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.c.P. 56(c). Where
the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues
and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact
that would preclude the district court from entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock,
133 Idaho 637,640, 991 P.2d 362,365 (1999) (citations omitted). However, the mere fact
that both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is
no genuine issue of material fact. Krornrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d
1321 (1986) (citations omitted). The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for
summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must
evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207,
998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000) (citations omitted).
LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A.

THE POLICY - ORGANIZATION AND LANGUAGE
The material policy provisions of the EMC COL policy are found in the

COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM number CO 00 01 1001,
pages 1 through 16. (Reid Aff. Ex. A) (emphasis added.) The policy is organized by "Sections."
Section I is labeled "COVERAGES" and includes four (4) capitalized and bold subparts
labeled COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY;
COVERAG~ B

PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILIY; COVERAGE C

MEDICAL PAYMENTS; and SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS-COVERAGES A AND
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B. (ld.) (emphasis added). Coverage "A" is further organized by two (2) subparts labeled 1.
Insuring Agreement and 2. Exclusions. It is this organization that lends the agreemenf to being
analogized as "swiss cheese" because the promise to insure (Le. the "cheese) found in the
Insuring Agreement is thereafter limited by the Exclusions (i.e. the "holes") found in subpart 2.
The policy language found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 1 a. provides as follows:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance
applies. We [EMe] will have the right and duty to defend the insured [RCI]
against any "suit" seeking those damages [Underlying Litigation ]. However, we
will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply.
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered
explicitly proved for under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and
B. [i.e. The coverage under Supplemental Payments is independent from the
promise to pay damages for bodily injury or property damage found in subpart 1
~

a.j
(Reid AfT. Ex. A.) (emphasis added.) The policy defines "suit" to mean " ... a civil proceeding in
which damages because of "bodily injury", "property damage" ... to which this insurance
applies are alleged." [i. e. The Underlying Litigation and the Donnellys' allegations of bodily

injury and/or property damage that triggered EMC's duty to defend RCI.] (Id. at Ex. A.)
(emphasis added.)
In addition, the policy language found in Section I provides as follows:
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B
1. We [EMe] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate, settle, or any
"suit" against an insured we defend [i.e. EMC defended RCI in the Underlying
Litigation.]:
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit. " [i. e. attorney sfees and
costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation.]
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

235

the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the
court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance.
[i. e. All interest on the foil amount ofthe Donnelly judgment.}
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [i.e. The obligation to
make supplementary payments is an independent promise from the promise to pay
damages for bodily injury or property damage.}
(Reid Aff. Ex. A.) (emphasis added.) As outlined above, EMC not only made promises to pay
under the plain policy language of Section I, Coverage A; but made independent promises to pay
under the plain language of Section I, Supplementary Payments.
B.

THE RULES - INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION
In Idaho, insurance policies are interpreted under general rules of contract

construction subject to certain special rules of construction. Arregon v. Farmers Ins. Co. of
Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008) (citation omitted.) In general, for a
policy to be ambiguous it must be reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id.
(citations omitted).

Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion--typically not

subject to negotiation between the parties-a special rule of construction is "that any
ambiguity that exists in the contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Id.
(citation omitted.) Therefore, a policy provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage
must be strictly construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citation omitted). This places the
burden on the "insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its
coverage." Id. Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question oflaw. Id.

C.

THE DISPUTE - TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY
1.

Damages for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship Were For
"Property Damage" That RCI Is Legally Obligated to Pay.
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In short, EMC's argument is that there is no "cheese" in the EMC policy for either RCI or
Donnelly because of the "hole" found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 2 b. Contractual
Liability excludes EMC's obligation to pay damages for RCI's breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship. EMC characterizes the damages for breach of implied warranty as contractual in
order to apply the exclusion.
The facts of the Underlying Litigation are that RCI contracted with Donnelly to provide
general contracting services in undertaking the Donnelly remodel. Having undertaken the work,
by operation of Idaho law, RCI also impliedly warranted that it would provide those services in a
workmanlike manner. See e.g. Hoffinan v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d
584, 589 (1975). And while the warranty is implied by operation oflaw, its beach is found in the
failing to meet the workmanlike standard of care imposed by the warranty. Hoffinan, 97 Idaho at
37 (citing Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service, 427 P.2d 833, 840-841 (Alaska
1967)). In this case, the jury found RCI breached both its contract and the implied warranty of
workmanship. However, the jury only awarded damages in the amount of $126,611.55 for
breach of the implied warranty.
In general, damages can be characterized as "bodily injury," "property damage" and/or
"economic loss." Economic loss has been held to "include the costs of repair and replacement of
defective property which is the subject of the transaction ...." Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194,
196, 983 P.2d 848, 850 ( 1999) (citing Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air. Co.,
97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306,309 (1975) (emphasis in original). This is distinguished from
property damage which includes damage "to property other than that which is the subject oj the
transaction." Id. (emphasis in original).
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Liability insurance, like that found in EMC COL policy, generally purports to insure for
"bodily injury" and/or "property damage" as those terms are defined in the policy. The EMC
policy defines "bodily injury" to mean "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person,
including death resulting from any of these at any time." The policy defines "property damage"
to mean "a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that
property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that
caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use
shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 'occurrence' that caused it." Therefore, the issue isn't
whether the damages for the breach of the implied warranty are "contractual" as opposed to
"tort" damages; the issue is whether the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty
were for "bodily injury" or "property damage" as defined in the EMC policy.
The Special Verdict entered in the Underlying Litigation does not itemize or otherwise
characterize the damage award. Since the Donnellys presented no evidence of 'bodily injury" at
trial, the breach of implied warranty damages were not compensation for "bodily injury."
However, the probable and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented at trial are
that the damages were compensation for "property damage" as defined by the policy and
included compensation for damages to property other than that which was the subject of the
DonnellylRCI transaction. Since there is no practical way to itemize the award after the fact, all
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of Donnelly and in favor of finding that the
award was for "property damage" that RCI became obligated to pay and to which EMC's policy
applies.
It is simple enough for an insurer, like EMC, to expressly exclude damages for breach of

the implied warranty. However, the policy is silent as to any specific exclusion. The exclusion
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found at Section I, Coverage A, Section 2 b. Contractual Liability provides the insurance does
not apply to: "Bodily injury" or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does
not apply to liability for damages: (1) That the insured would have in the absence of a contract or
agreement. ... " (emphasis added).
As applied, there was no "assumption" of liability by RCI. While the term "assumption"
isn't defined by the policy, it can been defined as " ... [t]he act or agreement or assuming or
taking upon one's self. The undertaking or adoption of a debt or obligation primarily resting
upon another, as where the purchaser of real estate "assumes" a mortgage resting upon it, in
which case he adopts the mortgage debt as his own and becomes personally liable for its
payment." Black's Law Dict., p. 123 (6 th Ed. 1990). In this case, RCI didn't "assume" any
liability by way of its contract or agreement with Donnelly. In fact, RCI vigorously contested its
alleged liability through trial. The holding cited and relied upon by EMC in Magic Valley Potato
Shippers v. Continental Insurance, 112 Idaho 1073, 1076-1077, 739 P.2d 372, 375-376 (1987)
was made in dicta; was based on a breach of contract claim to purchase potatoes; and doesn't
address application to a breach of implied warranty claim.
In addition, the exclusion doesn't apply for liability RCI would have in the absence of the
contract or agreement. As applied, RCI would still have liability for breach of the implied
warranty of workmanship in the absence of its contract with Donnelly. This is because there is
no dispute RCI undertook the work and the jury found that work to be below the standard of care
required for it to be workmanlike. A lack of contractual privity does not bar recovery for
"property damage" as opposed to "economic loss" for breach of thHmplied warranty. See
Melishar v. State Farm, 143 Idaho 716, 722, 152 P.3d 587, 593 (2007) (citing Salmon Rivers, 97
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Idaho at 36, 539 P.2d at 588) (citing the rule that "privity of contract is required in a contract
action to recover economic loss for breach of the implied warranty.")
Because the reasonable inferences are that the compensatory award for breach of the
implied warranty was made for and included a compensatory award for "property damage" that
RCI became legally obligated to pay, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of
Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that the award is not excluded by operation of Section
I, Coverage A, Subpart 2 b and that EMC is obligated to pay on behalf ofRCI.

2.

Damages for Breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act Were For
"Property Damages" that RCI is Legally Obligated to Pay.

The Special Verdict awarded the Donnellys $1,000.00 for RCI's failure to make the
residential disclosure required by Idaho Code § 45-525 et seq.

The failure to make these

disclosures is per se violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act subject to a minimum
statutory penalty of$I,OOO.OO.

I.e. §§ 45-525(4); 48-608(1).

In addition, the jury awarded the

Donnellys another $1,000.00 for violation of "other provisions" under the Act. This portion of
the award is not specific as which or what "other provisions" were violated.
The jury was instructed "[t]he Donnellys have suffered an injury under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act if they have suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property, real
or personal. The Donnellys have the burden of proving such loss." (Reid Aff. Ex. D,

n #68).

The jury was further instructed "[i]f the Donnellys have proven that they suffered any
ascertainable loss of money or property resulting from a violation of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act, they may recover actual damages resulting from the unfair or deceptive act or
practice, or One Thousand Dollars ($1,000), whichever is greater." (Id. at Ex. D, JI #70).
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The award was not made to compensate "bodily injury."

However, based on the

instructions and resulting award, one reasonable inference is that the jury found that the
Donnellys had suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal. Since the
award is not itemized as the loss of money versus property, it is reasonable to infer the award
was for a loss of property and, therefore, "property damage." This is "property damage" that
RCI has in the absence of any contract or agreement with Donnelly and it's not expected or
intended by RCI for the purposes of EMC seeking to apply the exclusion found at Section I,
Coverage A, Subpart 2 a Expected or Intended Injury. Therefore, the Court should draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that the award is not
excluded by operation of either Section I, Coverage A, Subparts 2 a or b and that EMC is
obligated to pay on behalf ofRCI.

3.

EMC Has An Independent Duty To Pay Under SUPPLEMENTAL
PAYMENTS - COVERAGES AAND B.

The EMC CGL policy is unambiguous with respect to EMC's independent promise to
make Supplemental Payments under the policy. Under the plain language of the policy as set
forth above, EMC promised to pay, with respect to any claim it investigates or any "suit" it
defends, all costs taxed against its insured in the "suit" and all interest on the full amount of any
judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment and before EMC has made any offer to pay. It
is undisputed that EMC "investigated" the Donnellys' claim.

It is undisputed that EMC

defended RCI against the Donnellys' "suit". It is undisputed that EMC provided a defense to
RCI based on allegations of or the known potential for allegations of "bodily injury" and/or
"property damage" to which the policy applied. It is undisputed that a judgment including costs
was taxed against ReI and entered in the Underlying Litigation and that judgment accrues post-
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judgment interest. And it is undisputed that EMC has never made an offer to pay any portion of
the judgment.
EMC's argument to avoid its duty to make Supplemental Payments can be read to say
that its duty isn't independent, but is instead dependent on the policy applying to "cover" the
Donnellys' underlying claims. EMC cites State Farm v. Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 (Cal Ct.
App. 2009) as persuasive authority for its arguments and argues Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey,
115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989) is neither controlling nor persuasive authority on point.
Mintarsih is a California Court of Appeals decision from District 3 of the Second
Division. Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d at 845. In the underlying case, Mimin Mintarsih sued
Dennis and Dina Lam for false imprisonment arising from her employment as a domestic
servant.

Id. at 848.

State Farm defended Lam in the underlying action under both a

homeowner's and umbrella policy. Id. at 850. Mintarsih prevailed and obtained a judgment
against Lam. Id. at 848. Lam later assigned its rights under both policies to Mintarsih. Id. at
848-849. State Farm later sought declaratory judgment to avoid payment on the underlying
judgment. Id. In the declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined the State Farm
policies covered $87,000 in compensatory damages and the award of $161,591.05 in costs, but
State Farm had no duty to pay the attorney's fees awarded against Lam based on wage and hour
claims for which the policies provided no coverage and no potential for coverage. Id. at 851.
Both Mintarsih and State Farm appealed the decision. Id. at 848. On appeal, State Farm never
challenged the finding that it had a duty to pay the $161,591.05 in costs plus interest on that
amount awarded against Lam. Id. at 852.
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part.
Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d at 858. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding State
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Fann liable for $87,000 in compensatory damages. In part, the Court followed prior California
case law that rejected a literal interpretation the policy language: "any 'suit' against an insured
we defend," to conclude that the duty to pay could arise only if the insurer had a duty to defend
the insured. Id. at 854-855 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

The Court reasoned that the

"contractual duty to defend extends only to those claims for which there is a potential for
coverage under the policy." Id. at 855. In part, the Court concluded that the Lams' misconduct
toward Mintarsih was "willful" and, therefore, application of California Insurance Code § 533
precluded any obligation to indemnify or pay by State Fann. Id. at 856.

EMC relies on

Mintarsih for its policy argument that if insurers, like EMC, had to pay costs taxed against its
insureds, like RCI, it would prevent insurers like EMC from providing a defense when coverage
was in doubt. EMC's invitation to follow Mintarsih is an invitation to error based on the Idaho
Supreme Court's holding in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey and its obvious precedential
application and value to this case.
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Havey, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed the
independent duty of an insurer to make supplemental payments under a homeowner's policy for
costs and post-judgment interest taxed against its insured arising from an underlying suit the
insurer had defended. Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1009. In Harvey, Floyd Harvey d/b/a Hell's Canyon
Excursions ("HCE") sued Bruce Oaks and others seeking damages for property owned by HCE.
Id. at 1010. Mutual of Enumclaw defended Oaks through trial pursuant to a homeowner's
policy in effect at the time. Id. Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of HCE and
jointly and severally against Oaks and a co-defendant in the amount of $219,200 plus
$45,444.00 in costs which included $35,000.00 in attorney's fees. Id. HCE made demand on
Mutual of Enumclaw to pay the costs due under the policy. Id. Mutual of Enumclaw declined
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and instead filed an action seeking declaratory judgment. Id. HCE answered and counterclaimed
seeking declaratory judgment that Mutual of Enumclaw had a duty to pay the costs taxed against
Oaks including attorney's fees and interest as well as interest on the entire judgment amount of

$264,644.01. Id. at 10 11.
Harvey later moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. Harvey, 115 Idaho at
1011.

The trial court issued declaratory judgment in favor of Harvey and ruled "Mutual of

Enumclaw must pay all interest on the entire judgment, verdict plus costs, from the date of the
entry of the Order re: Costs and Attorney Fees until it has paid, tendered, or deposited in court
costs, and interest accrued to the date of that tender." Id. at 10 14-10 15. The trial also awarded
Harvey attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839. Id. at 1015. On appeal by
Mutual of Enumclaw, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and adopted, in substantial part, then
district judge Schroeder's opinion.
On appeal, Mutual of Enumclaw raised the same argument as EMC-namely, that it
owed no duty to make supplemental payment in the absence of coverage on the underlying claim
and that it undertook the Oaks defense subject to a reservation of rights. Harvey, 115 Idaho at
1011. Like Donnelly, HCE argued that the duty to make supplemental payments is independent
from the obligation to pay for the conduct of Oaks and the reservation of rights didn't absolve
Mutual of Enumclaw's duty to pay. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted Judge Schroeder's analysis and HCE's argument that
the plain language of the supplemental payments provision and its placement under coverage
section implied that the "provision contained therein are separate from and in addition to the
basic policy coverage and, therefore, ... Mutual of Enumclaw's obligation to pay such costs is
unaffected by the fact that the policy does not cover Oakes' intentionally tortuous conduct." Id.
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at 1012. Judge Schroeder succinctly reasoned that the "[l]anguage in the policy of this case does
not indicate that payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the policy
covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy says that the Company will pay all
costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company." Id.

Judge Schroeder

further reasoned that "since the Company has the right to control the defense, including the
power to refuse settlement, it should also hear the consequences of its case management
decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the opponents costs
against its insured." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise, Judge Schroeder made
short order of Mutual of Enumclaw's argument that its reservation of rights exonerated it from its
duty to make supplemental payments holding that "[t]the fact that the company reserved its
contractual rights before undertaking a defense in no way dissipates its obligation to pay such
costs." Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1Ol3.
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Judge Schroeder's analysis and holding
that the term "costs" includes attorney's fees. Id. at 1Ol3. Further, Judge Schroeder rejected
Mutual of Enumclaw's argument that it had no duty to pay interest on the judgment because the
costs were not part of the judgment or, alternatively, that its obligation ceased upon a tender of
policy limits which was zero. Id. After considering the applicable policy language and finding
the case law offered by HCE persuasive in the interpretation of the language, Judge Schroeder
held that Mutual of Enumclaw "must pay all interest on the entire judgment." Id. at 1014. In
doing so, Judge Schroeder noted the purpose of the "interest-on-judgment" clause "is to the
insurer an incentive -to discharge its obligation promptly." Id. (citation omitted).

Judge

Schroeder further noted that to ffiterpret the policy otherwise would give an insurer, like Mutual
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of Enumclaw, "little incentive to settle its obligation for costs promptly, a situation that runs
contrary to the interest clause's intent." Id. at 1014.
The Court should follow Harvey. While Harvey addressed a duty to make supplemental
payments under a homeowner's policy, there is no significant factual or legal distinction to be
made between this case the Harvey. Like Harvey, the language of the EMC policy indicates
that EMC's duty to make supplemental payments is independent from any duty to pay based on
RCI's conduct. Like Harvey, the duty to make supplemental payments is found under Section I
- Coverages of the CGL Coverage Form and any supplemental payments made are independent
of the applicable liability limit. Like Harvey, EMC had and exercised the right to control the
defense of RCI, including the power to refuse settlement including the obvious undermining of
the DonnellylRCI mediation and, therefore, it should rationally bear the consequences of its case
management decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the opponents
costs against its insured in the underlying action. In short, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
Harvey is on point and controls this case. Therefore, the Court should find as a matter of law
that EMC has a duty to make, at a minimum, supplemental payment of the costs taxed against
RCI in the total amount of $296,933.89 inclusive of $19,871.89 in costs and $277,062 in
attorney's fees and post judgment interest on the entire judgment accruing, having accrued since
August 14, 2008.

D.

ATTORNEY'S FEES -APPLICATION OF IDAHO CODE § 41-1839
Idaho Code § 41-1839 provides as follows:
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety,
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action
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thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery
under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount
as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action.
(2) In any such action, if it is alleged that before the commencement thereof, a
tender of the full amount justly due was made to the person entitled thereto,
and such amount is thereupon deposited in the court, and if the allegation is
found to be true, or if it is determined in such action that no amount is justly
due, then no such attorney's fees may be recovered.
To receive fees under the statue, a party must first prevail in the litigation. Harvey, 115
Idaho at 1015 (citations omitted). Where an insurer, like EMC, denies liability, "it waives the
requirement that a proof of loss be furnished as a prerequisite to the recovery of attorney fees."
Id. (citation omitted). In a declaratory judgment action, persons like the Donnellys entitled to an
amount justly due under the policy "may recover attorney fees at the trial level.. .. " Id. (citation
omitted).
In this case, Donnelly made demand for payment justly due under the policy. EMC
refused to pay. Accordingly, in the event the Court should make declaratory judgment in favor
of the Donnellys, the Donnellys are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant
to Idaho Code § 41-1839.

CONCLUSION
In the Underlying Litigation, EMC exercised its right to undertake and control the
defense of RCI. ReI vigorously contested the Donnellys' claims through a twelve (12) day
trial.

EMC's transparent strategy of undermining the DonnellylRCI mediation to coerce

settlement; force the matter through trial; then attempt to escape any duty to pay by
declaratory judgment violates common notions of fair play and, therefore, EMC should bear
the rational

co~ences

of its case management decisions including the duty to make

supplemental payment to Donnelly. To rule otherwise will simply encourage insurers, like
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EMC, to continue to make poor case management decisions grounded on the placement of
their own financial interests above those-of their insureds and their insureds' judgment
creditors.
DATED this

19 day of December, 2009.
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CY -07-00885

Plaintiff,
v.

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAELA. EALY
IN SUPPORT MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAYID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO
County of Kootenai

)
)ss.
)

Michael A. Ealy, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows:
I.

I am one of the attorneys for Defendants Donnelly in the above-referenced

matter and have full knowledge of the matters set forth herein.
2.

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Change

Endorsements to the EMC policy effective October 1, 2005, to October 1, 2006, under
~ilumber

2DI-32-95-06.
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3.

Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May

16, 2006, from attorney Michael Schmidt to Harris Dean Insurance, Sandpoint without a
copy of the referenced attached Complaint.
4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the General

Liability Notice of Occurrence/Claim dated May 22, 2006, from Harris Dean Insurance to
Employers Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") as produced by EMC in discovery in the
Underlying Litigation.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a computer print

screen dated May 25, 2006, from the EMC claims file as produced by EMC in discovery in
the Underlying Litigation.
6.

Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May

25, 2006, from EMC to Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") titled "Reservation of Rights" as
produced in discovery in the Underlying Litigation.
7.

Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the

EMC claims investigation file as redacted by EMC prior to being produced by EMC in
discovery in the Underlying Litigation.
8.

Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May

1, 2007, from attorney Chris Hansen to mediator Peter Erbland confirming mediation on
May 30, 2007, in the Underlying Litigation. The letter is copied to EMC adjuster Kristen
Ziegler.
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9.

Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of a cover letter dated

May 22, 2007, from EMC attorney David Claiborne to RCI attorney Brent Featherston and
then Donnelly attorney Michael Schmidt informing them of EMC's declaratory judgment
action. The letter is attached hereto without its referenced enclosures.
10.

Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of a cover letter dated

June 4,2007, from EMC attorney David Claiborne to attorney Michael Schmidt without its
referenced enclosures.
11.

Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the cover page to the

Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs and Defendant
Rimar Construction, Inc. showing a filing dated of March 20, 2009, and a recordation date
of March 30,2009, as Bonner County record instrument number 769177.
12.

Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of the letter drafted by

me to RCI attorney's Brent Featherston and Stephen D. Phillabaum and EMC attorney
James G. Reid calculating the then due interest on the Donnelly judgment and making
demand on EMC and/or RCI to satisfy the judgment. In this letter, I advised EMC of the
Idaho holding found in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009 (1989).
13.

Attached hereto as Exhibit L is a true and correct copy of the Writ of

Execution issued on November 10, 2009, to the Bonner County Sheriff in effort to collect on
the Donnelly judgment in the Underlying Litigation.
14.

Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of the partial return on

the Writ of Execution dated December 7, 2009, issued to me from the Bonner County
Sheriffs Department.
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15.

Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of check number

26177 issued from the Bonner County Sheriff payable to David Donnelly in the amount of
$169.10.
16.

To date and to my knowledge, neither EMC nor ReI has made any effort or

attempt to make voluntary payment on the Donnelly judgment in the Underlying Litigation
despite the Donnellys' demands for the same.
17.

To date and to my knowledge, after entry of the Donnelly judgment, EMC has

not paid, offered to pay, or deposited in court part of the Donnelly judgment that is within
the applicable limit of insurance.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT.
DATED this

I

Yday of December, 2009.
By

~____~~~____~+-_______
1

Attorneys for Defendants

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

1f1 of December, 2009.
y

~f£I
PblIc for Idaho
Residing at ho<.«1. d
My commission expires

=i

'~ (
~

(SEAL)
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thetf..day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

vUsMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201

l/6SMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

L<s"Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 263-0400
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.EMCInsurance ..AlIllpanies
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY

END 0 R S E MEN T

C HAN G E
POLICY PERIOD:
N A M E D

FROM

r

10/01/05

TO

*

2 D 1 - 3 2 -

-*

*

9 5---06

*

*------------------------*

N SUR E D

PRO D U C E R :

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC
ARBOR PROPERTIBS LLC
PO BOX 692
SANDPOINT ID 83864-0692

HARRIS/DEAN INSURANCE
706 W SUPERIOR ST STE A
SANDPOINT ID 83864-1659

AGENT: AP-6043-S
AGENT PHONE: 208-265-9690

DIRECT BILL

T HIS

*---------------------*
POLICY NUMBER

10/Ol/06

END 0 R S E MEN T
P LEA S E R E A D

C HAN G E S T H E
POL ICY.
I T
CAR E F U L L Y.

*---------------------------------------------------*
* ENDORSEMENT EFFECTIVE DATES: 10/01/05 TO 10/01/06 *
*---------------------------------------------------*
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDITIONAL PREMIUM
THE FOLLOWING CHANGBS ARB APPLICABLB TO THIS POLICY:
CLASS 87763 HAS BEEN DELETED AND CLASS 87765 HAS BEEN
ADDED AS PER THE ATTACHED SCHBDULB. ALSO FORM CG7480
HAS BEEN DBLETBD FROM THE LIST OF FORMS AND FORM
CG7482(12/00) HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST OF FORMS.

ADDITIONAL PREMIUM:

$

201. 00

AUDIT FREQUENCY: ANNUAL
PLACE OF ISSUE: BISMARCK.
DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05

FORM: IL1201A (ED. 01-86)

~~

COUNTERSIGNED BY:
015
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(CONTINUED)
JF

EXRIBlr----602

,

.
IEMCInsuranre. .mpames
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC

POLICY NUMBER: 201-32-95---06
EXP DATE: 10/01/06i

EFF DATE: 10/01/05

G ENE R A L L I A B I LIT Y
POL ICY
DECLARATIONS
ENDORSEMENT SCHEDULE
FORM

EDITION
DATE
DBSCRIPTION/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PREMIUM

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------10-01 COMMERCIAL GEN LIABILITY COV FORM

CGOO01
CG0062
CG0300

CG2147
CG21S0
CG2167
CG2170
CG2176
CG2280
CG7001A
CG7003
CG7185
CG7191
CG731S
CG7422
CG7474
*CG7482
CG7S22.4
CG7523
IL0021
IL0204
IL7028
IL7130A
* IL7131A
IL7137
IL8383.2
IL8384A
IL8530

12-02
01-96

WAR LIABILITY EXCLUSION
DEDUCTIBLE LIABILITY INSURANCE
APPLICATION OP ENDORSEMENT (LIMITATIONS) :
NONE
07-98 BXCL-EMPLOYMBNT RELATBD PRACTICBS
09-89 AMENDMENT/LIQUOR LIABILITY EXCLUSION
04-02 FUNGI OR BACTBRIA EXCLUSION
11-02 CAP/LOSSES FROM CERT ACTS/TERRORISM
11-02 EXCL PUNITIVE DMGS ACTS OF TERRORISM
07-98 LIMITED EXCL-CONTRACTOR PROF LIAB
01-86 GENERAL LIABILITY SCHEDULE
10-01 GL QUICK REFERENCE (OCCURRENCE)
08-99 EXCLUSION - LEAD
10-01 COMH'L GENERAL LIABILITY AMENDMENT
10-01 CONTINUOUS OR PROGRESS INJ/DMG BXCL
08-00 EXCL INJ/DAMAGE FROM BARTH MOVBMENT
10-01 TRANSFER RIGHTS/RECOVERY AGAINST OTH
12-00 BLANKET AI-CONST CONTRACT-VICAR LIAB
06-02 EXCLUSION - DESIGNATED WORK
03-02 EXCLUSION - DBSIGNATED WORK
07-02 NUCLEAR ENERGY LIAB EXCL/BROAD FORM
07-02 ID CHANGES - CANCBLLATION/NONRENEWAL
08-99 ASBESTOS EXCLUSION
04-01 NAMBD INSURED ENDORSEMENT
04-01 COMM'L POLICY ENDORSEMENT SCHEDULE
08-04 EXCL MIXED DUST PNEUMOCONIOSIS
09-04 DISCLOSURE NOTICB OF TERRORISM COVG
PREMIUM THROUGH 12/31/05
PREMIUM BEYOND 12/31/05
09-04 TERRORISM NOTICE
12-04 IMPORTANT NOTICE TO POLICYHOLDERS

PORMeS) DELETED WITH THIS TRANSACTION:
CG7480
10-00

DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05
FORM: IL7131A (ED. 04-01

255

$

$

37
111

EMCInsUl"3ll<E

mpanies

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LOCATION 001

!$

87763

ADDITIONAL INSURED-OWNERS, LESSEES
~ CONTRACTORS-SCHEDULED PBRSON OR
ORGANIZATION-VICARIOUS LIAB
PREMIUM BASIS:
PER SA COV
BXPOSURE:
:2
(SUBLINB
/334)

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

LOCATION 001
87765

!$

350

BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS - VICARIOUS
LIABILITY - SEE FORM CG7482
PREMIUM BASIS:
FLAT CHARG
BXPOSURE:
IF ANY
(SUBLINE
/334)

------------------------------------------------------ -----------------------TOTAL PREMIUM FOR CHANGES $

201. 00

--------------------------------------------

(1) OTHER THAN NOT FOR PROFIT
(2) NOT FOR PROFIT
(3) INCLUDING PRODUCTS AND/OR COMPLETED OPBRATIONS UNLESS OTHBRWISE EXCLUDED
(4) PRODUCTS-COMPLETED OPERATIONS ARB SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL AGGREGATE LIMIT

(5) A $250 PD DEDUCTIBLE PER CLAIM APPLIES TO CUSTOMERS AUTOS UNLBSS
OTHERWISE DESIGNATED BY THIS CLASSIFICATION CODS
(6) FOR SPRAY PAINTING OPERATIONS, A PD DEDUCTIBLB OF $250 PER CLAIM APPLIES
UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED BY THIS CLASSIFICATION CODE
LOCATION OF ALL PREMISES OWNED, RENTED OR OCCUPIED:
RATED LOCATIONS:
LOC 001

1707 CULVBRS DR
SANDPOINT, ID 83864-7276

DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05 BPP
FORM CG7001A ED.Ol-56 BPP

08 22 OS

015
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JF

2D13295

I

DELETED'

0602

COMMERCIAL GENERAL. L.IABILITY

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULI.Y.

ADDITIONAL INSURED - OWNERS, LESSEES OR
CONTRACTORS - SCHEDULED PERSON OR ORGANIZATION VICARIOUS LIABILITY
.
This endorsement modifies Insurance provided under the following:

COMMERCIAl.. GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
SCHEDULEName of P ....O" or Organization:

Project:

Location of Project:

-If no entry appears above, Information required to complete this endorsement will be shown In the Declarations as
800licabie to thl. endorsement.
._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _---'
A.

B.

SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED i. amended
to Include as an additional Inaurad the peraon or
organiZation shown In the Schedule, but only with
respect to "bodIly Injury". "PI'O~rty damage- or
"peraonal and advertising Injury caused, In whole,
by:
1. Your acta or oml$$lons; or
2. The acta or omls.lona of \hoee actIng on your
behalf In the performance of your ongoing
operations for the additional insured at the
location dealgnated above.
Wth reapecl to the Insurance efforded to this
addltloneilneured, the following exclualona apply:
This Inaurance do•• not apply to :
1, "Bodily Injury", "property damage" or "personal
and advertising Injury" r_ultlng from any act
or omlaalon by, or willfUl misconduct of the
additional Insured shown In the SChedule,
whether the sole or a contributing cau_ of the
loes. The covtar.-ge afforded to the addltlonal
insured Is nmlted solely to the additional
Inaurad's 'vlcarlous liability" that Is It specifiC
and direct result of your conduct .

CG1<430(S·M)

I.OO/~OO

2.

"VIeatlous
liability·
aa
u.e"
In
this
endorsament mean. lJabUlty that Is Imposed
on the additional Inaurad aolely by virtue of Its
relatlonahfp with you, and not due to any act
or omlaalon of the addltlonal Inaured.
This Insurance do.a not apply to "bodily
Injury" or "property damage" occ:urring after:
•. All work, InCluding material a, parla or
equIpment furnished In connection with
such work, on the project (other than
service, malntenanca or repairs) to be
performed by or on behalf of the
addltlonal Inaure(s) at the location of the
covered operation a has been completed;
or
b. That portion of ·your work" out of which
the Injury or damage erise. has been put
to Ita Intended use by any p ....on or
organization other than another contractor
or subcontractor engaged In performing
operations for a prlncJpal .a a part of the
sama proJect.

Ineluda. copyrig"tad matarial of ISO Properties, Ine. with tis p.rmlulon .
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COMMERCIAL. GENERAL. UABIL.ITY

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED - CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Thl.s endONl.,.,.,ent modIfies the Insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABIUTY COVERAGE PART

A. SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED Is amended

to Include _ an adcUtional insured any person or
organization for whom you are performing
operations when you and such person or
orgenlzetlon heve agreed In writing In a contract
or agreement that auch person or organlzatlon be
added a. an addltJonal Insured on your polley.
Such person or orga~tlon I. an additional
Insured only With respect to liability for "bodDy
Injury: ·property demage" or "personal and
adv~ng Injury" caused, in whole, by:
1. Your acts or oml.alona; or
2. The acta or omlaalont. of those acting on your
behalf;
in the performance of your ongoing operations for
the additional Insured.
A peraon'. or organization's atatus as an
additional Insured under thla endorsement ends
when your operation. for that additional insured
ere completed.
S. VVlth re.pect to the insurance afforded to theae
additional InltUred., the following additional
exclualona apply:
Thl.s Insurance does not apply to:
1. -Bodily Injury: "property damag." or "personal
and edvertl.slng Injury" reSUlting from any act
or omls.lon by. or willful mleconduct of the
addltlonel InltU red , whether the aole or a
contributing cau_ of the loea. The coverage
afforded to the additional Insured la limited
solely to the additional Inaured'a "vlcerfoUlS
liability" that is a speclfic and direct result of
your conduct.
"Vlcarioua
liability"
as
used
In
this
endoraament m_ns liability that la Imposed
on the additional '"ltUred solely by virtue of Ita
r.,ationehip with you, and not due to any act
or omlsaJon of the additional Insured.
2. "Sodlly injury" or ·property damage" occurring
after:
a. All work, InCluding materials. parts or
equJpment furnished In connection with
such work. on the project (other than
.ervlce, maintenance or repairs) to be
performed by or on behalf of the
additional insured{s) at the location of the
covered operatlona has been completed;
or

CG7.. S2 (S'()5)

That portion of "your wor1<" out of which
the l'\Jury or damage art_a haa been put
to Ita intended use by any person or
organization other than another contractor
or aubcontractor engaged in performing
oparatlona for a principal aa a part of the
.ame project.
3. "Bodily l'\Jury,- "property damaga- or "personal
and advertl.slng InJUty" arlaJng out of the
rendering Of, or failure to rander, any
profesaJonal, erchltectural, engineering or
surveying _rvlcea InclUding:
•• The preperlng, aPPf'Ovlng. or failing to
prepare or approve mapa, shop draWings,
opinions. reports, aurveys, field orders,
changa
ordera
or
drawings
and
speclfication.; or
b, Supervlao'Y. Inspection, architectural or
engineering actlvitl...
C. The limits of inaurance applicable to the additional
Inaured .,.. tho •• apeclfled In the Oeclaratlona of
this policy or In the written contract or wrttutn
a",,_ment, whichever I. lower. Th_a limit. of
Insurance ara Incfualv. of and not In addition to
the limits of Inaurence shown in the DeclaratiON.
O. Any coverage provided heraunder Shall b. excaaa
over any other valid and collectible Insurance
avaUable to the addltlona' Inaured Whether that
Insurance I. primary, exceas, contingent or on any
other basla, unle. . you and the additional Inauntd
have spac/fleetly agreed In a written contract or
written agreemant that thIs insurance be primary.
Vllhen coverage is provided on a primary baal. we
will not s_k contrlbutlon from any other Insurance
available to the additional Insured If a written
contract or written agreement requires that this
insurance be nonconlrlbutory.
E. All other terma and conditiona of this policy remaln
unchanged.
b.

Page 1 011
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL UABIUTY

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED - CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS VICARIOUS LIABILITY
This endorsement modifies the insurance provided under the following:
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART
SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED is amended to
include as an additional insured any person or organization for whom you are performing operations when
you and such person or organization have agreed in
writing In a contract or agreement that such person or
organization be added to your policy and where a
Certificate of Insurance showing that person or organization as an additional insured has been issued.
The written contract or agreement must be:
(a) currently in effect or becoming effective during
the term of this policy; and
(b) executed prior to the "bodily injury" or ·property damage:
The insurance provided to the additional insured is
limited as follows:

1.

That person or organization is an additional insured only to the extent that you are held liable for
your ongoing operations performed for that additional insured. A person's or organization's status
as an additional insured under this endorsement
ends when your operations for that additional insured are completed.

2.

This insurance does not apply to any "bodily injury" or ·property damage" resulting from any act
or omission by, or willful misconduct of the additional insured shown in the Schedule, whether the
sole or a contributing cause of the loss. The coverage afforded to the additional insured is limited
solely to the additional Insured's "vicarious lIabll-·
ity" that is a specific and direct result of your
conduct.
"'Vicarious liability" as used In this endorsement
means liability that is Imposed on the additional
insured solely by virtue of Its relationship with you,
and not due to any act or omission of the additiona/Insured.

3.

With respect to the insurance afforded to these
additional insureds, the foflowing exclusion Is
added:

This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury" or
"property damage" occurring after:

(1) All work, Including materials, parts or equipment furnished in connection with such work,
on the project (other than service, maintenance or repairs) to be performed by or on
behalf of the additional insured(s) at the site of
the covered operations has been completed;
or
(2) That portion of ·your worl( out of which the
injury or damage arises has been put to its
intended use by any person or organization
other than another contractor or subcontractor
engaged In performing operations for a principal as a part of the same project.
4. The limits of insurance applicable to the additional
insured are thOse specified in the Declarations of
this policy or in the written contract or agreement.
whichever is lower: These limits of insurance are
inclusive of and not in addition to the limits of insurance shown in the Declarations.
5. The insurance provided to the additional Insured
does not apply to "bodily injury; "property damage" or "personal and advertising injury" arI&lng
out of an architect's, engineer's, or surveyor's
rendering of or failure to render any professional
services including:
a. The preparing, approving, or failing to prepare
or approve maps, drawings, opinions, reports.
surveys, field orders, ohange orders or design
andspedfications;and
b. Supervisory, inspection, architectural or engineering activities.
6. Any coverage provided hereunder shall be excess
over any other vaIld and colectlble Insurance
available to the additional Insured whether primary, excess. contingent or any other basis,
unless a contract specificaUy requires that 1hJs insurance be primary, or you request that It apply on
a primary basis.
7. All other terms and conditions of this policy remain
unchanged.

Includes copyrighted material of ISO Proper1Ies. Inc. with Its permission.
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LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S.

250 NORTIfWESTBLVD, Sn 102
GaEUl D'ALENE, 10 83814-2971

ATTORNEYS

OFFICE (208) 667'()Sl1

I FAX (208) 66+4125

MICHABL O. SCHMIDT
Admitted In: Idaho and Washington
Bmail address: mschmidt@1ukins.com

May 16,2006

Harris Dean Insurance, Sandpoint
Ms. Angela Potts
Ms. Carol Bethel
706 W. Superior, Suite A
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Re:

Donnelly 'Y. Rlmar Construction

Dear Ms. Potts and Ms.Bethel:
Enclosed is a copy of the Complaint filed against Rimar Construction, Inc. I understand that
Rimar Construction Inc. and/or Ivan Rimar may be insured through your office. If so, please
forward this claim to the policy issuer. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free
to contact me.
Very truly yours,

)J.~
MICHAEL O. SCHMIDT
MGS:mgs
Enclosure
cc:
Clients
Brent Featherston

L:\D\DONNSLL02S129\OOOO/\coRR.ESPOTHER\HARRISDEANINS.LTR·OS/6Q6.W.os.MOS.DOC
SPOKANE

•

COEUR D'ALENE'

MOSES

LAKE

WWW.LUKINS.COM

2soEXHIBIT~

May ( 06 ) - 029

"

. ) -- -- ------ ---' _c;;,;J'Ac£;j. j !
GENERAL LJABILITY NOTICE OF OCCUR~"E~CElCLAIM

Dav1.d 5 Jeathy Donne11y

3662 Cocolalla Loop R4
Cocolalla
m
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• ACORD

:nON US•

,,

PA68-Zl8336154

C14bt:

Hote date: 851'25,186
Category: I nsW"ed

EntPy elate: 851'25,186 Author: KRISTIN-Z
Entry by: KRISTlH-Z
4
Note nWlber:
With: Rt.ar Construction Inc

Hotes ar.: Inhous.
Contact date: 851'25/2886

Tb.e:

.

Method of contact:

Pint contact d.layed? No
Call.d the I on Tu.sday and discussed the cla~, h. said
that he was serv.d awhile ago and that he hiPed an attny on
hia own because he didn't think that he has insurance
coverage. he said that he was hired by the C to r • .od.1
their hollt.... It stAl"ted out as doing aiding .tc .. and as they
went along they continued to add to the pPOject.
the I was the general and also did a lot of the work with
his
own crew. he worked on a t~e and ~terials basis and there
waa no contract with the C.
work included:

..kti...

sidin,

c.;gJ-' addit10n on the fPOnt of the hoe
~

porch

I...:::::!:::.. slate flooring
they subbed out electrical and HUAC.
Th. I said that they also had a heating type stoue on one of
the POOIU and the H'1AC person said it couldn- t be installed.
Th.y C insisted ... as so he w.nt ouer and hooked it up and
they ran it once and then disconn.ct.d due to fir.box
proLlellls.
The I said that they cORpl.t.d the project and that they had
SOIlQe handrails to put up and that
they went to do it and
the C wouldn't let then on the pl"Operty. He said that they
were upset but that he was unawaPe of why.
The I said that dUl"ing the construction PI"OC.ss that they
put in a slat. floor. he said that the lJPOut start.d to
, co.... loose and that his elqllo~e was att ....pting to cut out
the tile an.d that he curt the heat aats underneath. they
were going to repair it but the C wouldn't let thelll. The
I
cost to Npair is about 8800.88 and the cost to replace is
V ~ aPOund 18.818.88 the 1 did this install with their own crew •
.f) 7,. ,,. .
1he facade on the f:t-Ont of the building is hav ing proble ...s.
Vf ~ . The I said that he engineered this hbas.lE. He said that
it is cr.ckin9".
H. said the porch on the backsid. if fine for snow loads and
-it doesn't have to fteet code ads there are no cod•• in his
county .(1 CNW did this)
he said his crew did the roof and that there is nothing
wrong with the roof except that they didn't like how on. of
the valleys are. he offuped to fix.
the I has hir.d his own attny and they aPe defending at this
point he belieues they Ar. in the discovery phase.
fI
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EXHIBIT

D

(

May 25, 2006
CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
IvanRimar
Rimar Construction, Inc.
PO Box 692
Sandpoint ID 83864
RE:

Our Claim No. : 3361.54 KZ
: Rimar Construction, Inc.
: 05105105
Date of Loss

Our Insured

Reservation of Rights
Dear Mr. Rimar:
We have received a notice of claim under your Rimar Construction, Inc. policy of insurance.
This claim notice was received in our office on May 23, 2006. The notice was sent to us by
Harris-Dean Insurance, Sandpoint, Idaho.
From reviewing the claim notice and the attached Summons and Complaint, it appears that
David and Kathy Donnelly are pursuing a claim against Rimar Construction, Inc. The
information provided indicates that they have filed a lawsuit arising out of alleged construction
defects.
This claim has been submitted for our consideration under your policy of insurance policy #2D 123-95 Commercial General Liability policy. Your Commercial General Liability policy provides
a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit. There is also a $250 property damage deductible. In
reviewing the information provided, it appears your project began in March of 2005 and ended in
October of 2005, which is during the effective dates of your general liability policy, October I,
2004 through October 1, 2005. It appears that EMC Insurance continued to insure you through
January of2oo6.
From my review of your Commercial General Liability policy, as well as initial information
provided, it appears there may be certain exclusions in your policy to exclude coverage.
However, I have requested additional information from your attorney, Brent Featherston. Upon
receipt of additional information, we will have coverage reviewed and advise.
You should understand that it is the intention of this letter to preserve all the rights of Rimar
Construction, Inc. and EMC Insurance Company and to allow investigation or defense of the
alleged Joss, injury or damage and the amount thereof without in any way effecting, impairing, or
adding to the liability of EMC Insurance Company under said policies, or waiving any of its
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rights thereunder. No act of EMC Insurance Company shall be construed as an admission of
liability or coverage, and EMC Insurance Company hereby expressly reserves its right to deny
such liability or coverage.
We regret any inconvenience this may cause, and will resolve the coverage issue as soon as we
receive additional infonnation from your attorney. If you have any questions regarding this
matter, please feel free to contact me at 1-800-472-2117, extension 5073.
Sincerely,

Kristin Ziegler, AlC
Senior Adjuster
Ext 5073
KZ:ec
Copy: Featherston Law Finn - 113 South 2nd Avenue, Sandpoint ID 83864
PLEASE NOTE: The State of Idaho requires the fonowing fraud warning to be placed OD
all elaims related correspondence.

"Any person who knowingly and with intent to defraud or deceive any insurance company, files
a statement containing any false, incomplete, or misleading infonnation is gUilty of a felony."
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View Notes Result

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z003S7636
10/26/07 #001
10/26/07
CHARLES-D

Category : Activity

CHARLES-D

Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
10/24/07 #001
10/24/07
CHARLBS-D

CHARLES-D
Inhouse

Category : Investigation
reviewed deposition materials
-clmnt
damage estimate totals $328,052.54 however the clmnt atty
indicated to atty Reid that the real damages total closer to
$4S0,OOO--reviewof the damage est indicates that in
addition for work done to correct the ins mistakes, there
are some items including sale of a collector car, atty fees,
excess interest rate, and a loan included--no totals are
given for the excess interest or the loan--also claiming
damages for inefficient labor which resulted in the job
taking longer--not sure how this would have made the job
cost other than the extra rental for dumpsters and
scaffolding included separately in the estimate
also documentation of "questionable invoicing" the ins
allegedly did for items never delivered or items that have
no explanation--clmnt looking for $12,099.18 including
adding in a 21' contractors fee
review of the engineers reports outlines various problems
with the porches including the fact that they were secured
to the home through stucco, which affects their structural
soundness--expert hired by Rimar indicates that the porch
problems could be repaired without significantly disrupting
the rest of the porch--Rimar expert (Bonnett) saw no visible
signs of structural distress, sagging or settlement of the
front porch or the side porch--the other Rimar expert
(Maloney) indicates no structural problems with th roof
covering and that structural problems with the roof can be
fixed without having to remove it
appears the propane stove which caused the carbon monoxcide
poisoning was installed by NU-Tech Services at Rimars
direction, not by Rimar Contruction

============= __ ===_==a====================_========================.-:-====================

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 1D
Entry by
Note Is

category : Activity

PC60-Z00357636
10/16/07 #002
10/16/07
SUE-H
SUE-H
Inhouse

supplemental answers to defendant
From SUE-H
to CHARLES-D
on 10/16/07 at 14:11:16
supplemental answers to defendant

I

_=._=c==~==.a_==~==.=.======-_.======================._

PC60-Z00357636
Claim
Entry date: 10/16/07 #001
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

Category, Activity

10/'16/07
LISA-S
LISA-S

Inhouse
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=_==._=========~==========c======s

Auther~-I4;)

CHARLES-O
CHARLES-O
Inhouse

Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

I

PC60-Z003S7636
09/10/07 #001
09/10/07
I
CHARLES-D
CHARLEB-D
Inhouse

Category : Activity

I
Rimar's atty indicates we mischaracterized the counterclaims
asserted--feels we unreasonably delayed our covg
determination, placed our financial intrests ahead of
Rimar's, by failing to engage in good faith settlement
negotiations against Rimar, by intentionally interfering
with Rimar's settlement negotiations and by failing to keep
Rimar informed of it's covg investigation so Rimar could
make informed decisions

=====_===._c=_a_== __ =====mc======. __ =_._a_c=:===== •••• _==_=====_.= __ =a_===zaa===s==_==_===:
Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author IO
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
09/06/07 #001
09/06/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-O
Inhouse

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author IO
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
08/21/07 #001
08/1S/07
LISA-S
LISA-S
Inhouse

I

Category : Activity

I

II
Category : Plan of Action
contingent liability
From LISA-S
to DAWN-S
on oa/lS/07 at 10:01:14
One has been requested but I don't recall seeing it come
through yet. I can put a hold on it?
CC:CHARLES-D

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author IO
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z003S7636
08/16/07 #001
OS/16/07
SUE-H
SUE-H
Inhouse

Category : Activity
HO Covg acknowledgment
From SUE-H
to CHARLES-O
HO Covg acknowledgment

on Oa/16/07 at 10:02:18

=== ~ == ;= ~=== = ==:====. - ==~==--==== = =========== = ======================================== ~ *==~

C~aim

Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by

PC60-Z003s7636
OB/ls/07 #003
OS/lS/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D

Category : Coverage
rcv voicemail from Dawn Siebe.rt at HO- -wanted to make sure
Jim Reid had approved HO Covg doing the covg review

000025
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Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636 .,
07/20/07 #001
07/20/07
SUE-H
SUE-H

Inhouse

Category : Activity

II

clmnt Answer
From SUE··H
clmnt Answer

to CHARLES-D

on 07/20/07 at 15:07:32

~=._az.==============~=======·=.==a======:============ =======_=_==========================

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636 "
07/11/07 #001
07/11/07

CHARLES-D
CHARLES-O
PRIVILEGED

Category : Investigation

I

reviewed amended complaint--appears pltffs added Ivan Rimar
as an individual

,

under para 10 it appears they are saying that the improperly
const addition and porch has compromised the original
structure in that it is buckling walls, breaking windows,
causing the roof line to sag and other problems--this is new
info

I
I

clmnt is alleging that the improper workmanship has led to a
diminution in value to the home and that parts of the home
are unsafe to the point of being uninhabitable, loss of use
and also lists other non-specific damages
alleges that Kathy Donnelly became violently ill as a result
of carbon monoxide poisoning due to improper installation of
a propane stove
also alleging the ins did not conform with the clmnt
specifications for the construction and non-conformance to
plans

=======~._.==_=~=================~=z=

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636 ,
07/10/07 #004
07/10/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-D

•• =._.==._c __

====_==_.=====~==a==.=c========~=========

Category : Investigation
rev copy of amended complaint-

Inhouse

===z=== •• ===_======================_ ••• == •• m==z======m_=======_==_==.== ••••• ============c.=

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

Cl.aim
Entry date:
Note date
Author, ID
Entry by

PC60-Z00357636
07/10/07 #003
07/10/07
CHARLES-O

Category : Investigation

CHARLES-O
Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
07/10/07 #002
07/10/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D

Category : Activity

000028
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Note Is

: PRIVILEGED

__ ==_======;==a=============_=======c========================================:========_===

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636 /
07/10/07 #001 /
07/10/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
PRIVILEGED

Category : Activity

I

spoke to Kristin--atty Chris Hansen has informed her that
the pltffs have amended their complaint--includes naming the
insured individuallY and adding BI allegations

========-===--==-=======================================================-==============-==
Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
07/09/07 #006
07/09/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
PRIVILEGED

Category : Activity

===.-.===========================-==========================-=============================:
Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

Category : Supervision

PC60-Z00357636
07/09/07 #005
07/09/07
DAWN-S
DAWN-S
Inhouse

dec action????
From DAWN-S
to CHARLES-D
on 07/09/07 at 12:05:37
I didn't know anything about this dec action filed in May.
Please have Jim cc me on everything going forward. How did
this come about? Dawn
CC:WAYNE-U

== __ ===3=._======================= __ ==_========================= ••• =_===_==================
I

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

I

PC60-Z00357636
07/09/07 #004
07/09/07
TONY-B
TONY-B
/
Inhouse

category: Sys gen:Inbox-Pay OVer limit

Check C File Response
From TONY-B
to CHARLES-D

APPROVED
APPROVED
on 07/09/07 at 11:22:21

I

_=_===_==a===============_============_========================= __ == __ z=_==================
Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
07/09/07 #002
07/09/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
Inhouse

I

I

II

Category: Sys gen:Inbox-Pay OVer limit
C File check authorization request
From CHARLES-D
to TONY-B
on 07/09/07 at 11:05:39

I

=====_===_============================================ ==================a=================~

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

category : Activity

PC60-Z00357636
07/09/07 #001
07/09/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
Inhouse

--

---

-

=======_========a=_=====o===========================_= ======================= •• =====~=====~
Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

I

PC60-Z00357636 I
07/06/07 #003
07/06/07
CHARLES-D
/'
CHARLES-D
Inhouse

I

Category : Activity

I

000029
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Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
06/12/07 #003
06/12/07
SYSTEMUSER
SYSTEMUSER
Inhouse

I
II

I

Category: Sys gen:Inbox-Sent Message
New Assignment - Superintendent
From SYSTBMUSER to DAWN-S
on 06/12/07 at 13:46:17
This claim was changed to a major file.
User manually marked this file as major.
You have been assigned as the Superintendent.

=======S=========2_.=_._==.a.===================a.=~=_a====~=.===================._=======

Claim
Bntry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-ZQ0357636
05/3J./07 #001
05/31/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
Inhouse

Category : Acti vi ty .

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
OS/24/07 #001
OS/24/07
SUE-H
SUE-H
Inhouse

Category : Activity
e-mail reg mediat.
From SUB-H
to CHARLES-D
e-mail reg mediat.

on OS/24/07 at 15:22:30

.=._==~_.====================E=====.==_._=._===========~===-=====--=.====-==============a=:

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Bntry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
OS/22/07 #001
OS/22/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D
Inhouse

Category : Investigation

===========e= __ ===3=============a •• 2 ••••••• a •••==== _____ msa ___ a== •• === ••• 2 ••• _C====C=======
.'

PC60-Z00357636
Cl.aim
Entry date: OS/21/07 #002
OS/21/07
Note date
CHARLES-D
Author ID
CHARLES-D
Entry by
PRIVILEGED
Note I s

Category : Activity
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-

=.=====.===_._.Da.====================._.=.~==================~====s=a=.===_&=========_===

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author IO
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z003s7636
OS/21/07 #001
OS/21/07

CHARLES-O
CHARLBS-O

Inhouse

PC60-Z003s7636
05/03/07 #001
05/03/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-O

II

Category : Investigation

I••••••••••
...

I

Category : Coverage

Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
05/01/07 #001
05/01/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-D
PRIVILEGED

Category : Activity

spoke to Wayne--he agrees that a DJ sounds like a good idea
as well and that we should proceed as such unless the depo's
provide info to the contrary
= __ ======= •• == __ =__ e • • ====== •••••••••••• _.======= ••• __

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z003S7636
04/30/07 #001
04/30/07
CHARLES-D
CHARLES-D

Inhouse

=_~~====.==_

•• ==.=_==========.=======

Category : Investigation
informed by Kristin that~~t~h.eIY. .h.a.v.eilsliiiiiliil"
t his file for May 30th-

S

(

View Notes Result

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author 10
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
04/20/07 #001
04/19/07

I

Category : Investigation

CHARLES-O
CHARLES-O

Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
04/17/07 #002
04/17/07
CHARLES-O

Category : Activity

CHARLES-O

Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
04/17/07 #001
04/17/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-O

Inhouse

PC60-Z00357636
04/05/07 #001
04/05/07
CHARLES-O
CHARLES-D
PRIVILEGED

I

Category : Activity
spoke to wayne--apparently the atty on the main file has
scheduled depositions for next week, April 23 & 24--Wayne
feels that we need to get our own coverage atty involved on
the claim--atty may not need to attend depots but if he does
we need to get him up to speed quickly--recommends Jim Reed

Category : Reserves
reviewed file on diary--at this time the interrogatories on
the companion file have not been received--a new atty was
hired and that has slowed things down somewhat--until that
is received and there is clarification as to whether a BI
claim will be presented as well as a breakdown of the
actual amount of property damage the plaintiff is alleging,
it is difficult to post a meaningful rsv amount
Reserve: CONTINGENT RSRV NO COV
Gross Reserve: $5000

Claimant: 03

Type: L

_._======a.====zz_=~==============m===========.~====~===~=====_=======================:~===

Claim
Entry date:
Note date
Author ID
Entry by
Note Is

PC60-Z00357636
02/16/07 #001
02/16/07
CHARLES-D

CHARLES-D
Inhouse

Category : Investigation
no interrogatories have been received--apparently our
insured is firing his atty and the file will be taken over
by atty Chris Hanson or one of his associates--we are going
to attempt to vacate the trial and push it back to a later
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ANDERSON, JULIAN" HULL LLP
A lTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW

Robert A. ADdcnon
Brian K. Julian
AlanK. Hull
am. H. Hansen
Phillip 1. CoUacr
Michael P. Stefanic
AmyG. White

lustin P. Aylsworth
MarIe D. Sebastian
Matthew O. Pappas
Rachael M. O'Ber
Davis F. VanderVelde
Stephen L. Adams
R.obctt A. Mills

C. W. Moore Plaza
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700
Post Office Box 7426
Boise, Idaho 83707·7426
Telephone: (208)344-5800
Facsimile: (208)344-.5.510
e-mail: ajb@ajblaw com
Web Site: www.ajblaw.com

K.eIIncth D. Nyman

Wido AItan1I)Il Lice...t III l'nIcIice in
NO. NV • OR, PA ad WA

(ofeou-t)

Idaho, AZ..

co.

May 1. 2007
VIA TELEFAX
Peter Erbland
•Paine Hamblen
. 701 Front Avenue. Ste. '101:
P.O.SoxE
,Coeur d'Alene. Idaho· 83816·0328.
Re:

Donnelly v. Rima, Construction
Our File No. 792-83

Dear Mr. Erbland:
This letter confirms the scheduling of the mediation In above-entitled matter. The
mediation is scheduled for:May 30, 2OQ7 at your office In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. As you
know, this firm and Brent Featherston represent Rlmar Construction. Dave and Kathy
Donnelly are represented by Mike Schmidt and Bill Hyslop. It Is my intention to have the
insurance adjuster attend by telephone.
I appreciate your wUJlngness to assist the parties in this matter.
Very truly yours,
~H.H~

Chris H. Hansen

C.09P'PlER

CHH:dt
Cc:

rMAY 0.-(20071
'I b(1t...~~~//t114",/·

Michael Schmidt
William Hyslop
Brent Featherston
Ivan Rimar
Kristen Ziegler

e00004
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RECEIVED

RlNGERT
-CLARK

MAY 2,( 2007

CHARTERED
LAWYERS

LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S:
May 22, 2007

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law
113 S. 2nd Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Lau." E. Burri
Jeffrey R. Ovtslenson
David P. Claiborne
D. Blalr Oark
S. Bryce FarriS
JanC. Gould
DavId Hammcrquisl
Charles L. HonsInger
James P. Kaufman
Jcmller Reid Mahoney
Jamcs G. ReId
Daniel V. Steenson
wuuam F. Ringer!. of Counsel
Allyn L. Sweeney of Counsel
samuel Kaufman II Q21·1 D861

Michael Schmit
William Hyslop
Lukins & Annis, P.S.
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814-2971
Re:

Employers Mutual CasualtY Company v, Rimar Construction, Inc .. and
David and Kathy Donnelly

Dear Messrs Featherston and Schmit:
This office is representing Employers Mutual Casualty Company relative to a declaratory
judgment action that is being filed to resolve issues as to the obligation of EMC to pay damages
pursuant to policies of insurance issued to Rimar Construction, Inc., as it relates to Rimar's dispute
with David and Kathy Donnelly, In this action, Rimar Construction and Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly are
named as Defendants. Enclosed you will find a copy of the Petition that has been forwarded to the
Bonner County Court for filing, as well as copies of the Summonses that we are requesting be issued.
We wanted to advise you of these matters in advance of the upcoming mediation. Once we receive
the issued Summonses and filed Petition, we will contact your office to request acceptance of
service, If you are not willing or authorized to accept service, please advise.
Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you have any questions or concerns, please
do not hesitate to contact me.
Very truly yours,
RINGERT ClARK CHARTERED

David P. Claiborne
DPC/krm
Enclosure
cc: Charles Doppler wi encl.
Chris Hansen wi encl.
455 South Third Street. P.O. Box 2773 • BOise. Idaho 83701
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R1NGERT
'.CLARK
CHARTERED
LAWYERS

June 4, 2007

RECEIVED

O.BIalrClark

JUN 0 6 2007
LUKINS & ANNlS. P.5.

Michael Schmit
William Hyslop
Lukins & Annis, P.S.
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2971
Re:

Laura E. Burri
Jeflrey R. Chrlslenson
DaVId P. Claiborne
S. Bryce FIIrrIS

Jon C. 00uId
DaVId HammerqulSl
Charles I... liOnSlnger
James P. Kaufman
Jennifer Reid Mahoney
James 0. Reid
Daniel V. Steenson
WlDlam F. Ringen. of Counsel
Allyn I... sweeney 0( Counsel
samuel Kaurman (192 (·1086,

Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Rimar Construction. Inc .. and
David and Kathy Donnelly
Bonner County Case No. CV-2007-00885

Dear Mr. Schmit:
Enclosed please find a Summons directed at David and Kathy Donnelly, together with a filestamped copy of the Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed in the above-referenced action.
Additionally, please find an Acceptance of Service for Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly. Please
execute the Acceptance of Service and return it to our office. If we do not receive the Acceptance
within 10 days, we will assume you are not authorized to accept service and we will make
arrangements for personal service upon Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly.
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me.

Very truly yours,
RINGERT ClARK CHARTERED

David P. Oaiborne
DPC/krm
Enclosures
cc: Chris Hansen wI encls.

455 South Third Street • P.O. Box 2773 • Boise, Idaho 8370 I
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MICHAEL G. SCHMiEYi:{:ISB#<691 I

. WlLLIAMD: HYSLopi.ISB#· 7141

.LUiaNs&·ANNlS,P~S.
,'2S0'Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102
.~

'

'Coeurd'Alcm~;ID 8j8l~29jl

.

. T~lephone: (208) 667·..()SJ 7
Anomeys for ·Plaintiffs
IN TIlE.'DISTIuCTCO.1JRT:·OF nmFIRST ruDICIAL.mlSmICT OF 11IE
STATEQF IDAHO,iN ~FOJt"1HE.COUNTY;'OF·BONNER

..

.h

..

PAVID DONNELLY and.KA1l.fY
PONNELLY, Husband and Wife;
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim :~,en~tS; .~.

.

..

NO. CV-()6..()044S

. vs..
~

r;

i

.

•

,)UMAR CON.STRUCTION, "INC., Btt1ldaho
·Corporation~ IVAN RIMAR.
DefendarttslCounterclaiIfi. Plaintiffs

AMENDED·:JliDGMENT ON
SPECIAL VERI>ICr Wrm: REGARD
TOC4lMS·.Of pLAINTIFFS AND
OE~&.NT·~

CONStRUm;ION, .INC•
.

.

.'c.

RULE.,S4(b).eERTIFICATE

this·may:t~r was tr.ied.befote .tjury-commencing on June ,23, ~OO8 and the jury baying
,

,.

to.

.

..

•

•

heard the eviden~ and havjpg tep4eted. a verdict on July 9, 2Q.08, iQ)' way of Special Verdict,
IT IS HEREBY oRDaRED.~'A.DJtJDGED
AND DECri'EaD:thatjudgment be entered as
,
follows:

•

,~'~;,' ...~. _" : <:;,
.

.

'.

~

-t,.

·n..lWitlu~g~d~·the
DoMellys' claim of breach of"con~ against Rimar
.

:--.
•
'.' • '..
bms.~iion,jInc., the jUry found a, breach of contract, .but ,awarded Zero (so.ooi dollars
it· •
"
..
:...
.
'

•

.

t,

..

:.

~

~

2. That with respect to the.:DoMeUys' chum of express warranty against Rimar
Coilstr.ucliOn, ibt¢.; th(l Jur>.: did not find any suchbreacb, aIid therefore Judgment is
~dCi:eft:.ii1:fa~otlot.Rimat:CQnStruction, Inc.

3. That Wit~l;Il:'s~i'to·the
Donnellys' claim of breach
ofimpl~ed w~ty Qfworkmansbip,
...,
.
the Jury (ound>such _breach and awarded the sum ofS126~61 i.SS, ~d Judgment is

;.
: r •

.

~,

'-'-"-_:"-'

AMENDBD'JUl:,)(3MENTkit:~;: ~4(b) CERTIFICATE
L:\dIdonneIl02S);z9\OOOOJ\P.~n..\Jud~~~~ ~909·MGS.SCN,dacx
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN'
MARC A. LYONS·
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE'
MICHAEL A. EALY"
TERRANCE R. HARRIS
APRIL M. LINSCOTT
RUDY j. VERSCHOOR
JENNIFER L. DAHLSTROM"
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBER'T
V I RGINIA McNULTY ROBINSON

P.O. BOX 1336
COEUR D' ALENE, lD 83816-1336

STREET ADDRESS:
700 NORTHWEST BLVD
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814

TELEPHONE: (208) 664-5818
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884
E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com
WEBSITE: www.r.msd~nIyons.com

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO
• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON

WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL

October 1, 2009

VIA FACSIMILIE ONLY
Brent C. Featherston
113 S. 2nd Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Fax: (208) 263-0400
Re:

Stephen D. Phillabaum
421 W. Riverside, Ste 900
Spokane, WA 99201
Fax: (509) 625-1909

James G. Reid
455 S. 3rd Street
Boise,ID 83701-2773
Fax: (208) 342-4657

EMCC v. Rimar Construction Inc. et aI., Bonner CV-07-00885
Donnelly v. Rimar Construction et aI., Bonner CV-06-00445

Gentlemen:
This firm has been retained by David and Kathy Donnelly with regard to the abovereferenced matters. Following entry of judgment against Rimar Construction on August 14,
2008, and on March 20, 2009, the Donnellys have accrued interest at the applicable statutory
rates as follows:
Judgment Amount
Interest on Judgment
InterestlYr
DaysNr
Per Day Rate
Days
Total Interest

$128,61l.55
0.07625
$9,806.63
365
$26.87
218
$5,857.11

$431,402.55
0.07625
$32,894.44
365
$90.12
102
$9,192.42

$440,594.97
0.05625
$24,783.47
365
$67.90
92
$6,246.79

Total with Interest
Fees and Costs
Total March 20, 2009

$134,468.66
$296,933.89
$431,402.55

$440,594.97

$446,841.76

412
$21,296.32

Therefore, as of October 1, 2009, the Donnellys are owed a total of $446,841.76 including
accrued interest. Presently, interest on the judgment continues to accrue at $67.90 per day.

276

EXHIBIT

K

Brent C. Featherston
Stephen D. Phillabaum
James G. Reid
October 1, 2009
Page 2
Under the circumstances, it is probable that, at a minimum, EMCC has a duty to
indemnify Rimar Construction under the Supplementary Payments provision of the policy.
This conclusion is supported by the holding in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho
1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989). While the case involved interpretation ofa Homeowner's policy
as opposed to a CGL policy, its on-point regarding the interpretation and application of a
supplementary payment provision like that found in the EMCC CGL policy. Therefore, at a
minimum, EMCC has a duty to pay a significant portion of the Donnelly judgment including
interest accrued to date.
At this time, I understand EMCC has offered or communicated that it would offer
$150,000.00 toward settlement. This offer is too low considering that EMCC and Rimar
Construction forced the matter to trial resulting in the Donnellys incurring significant
attorney fees and costs to prosecute the underlying case. EMCC's transparent strategy of
offering no money at mediation and leaving its insured to defend through trial with the intent
to fall back on a declaratory action to get off the loss will likely not be lost on the Court and
the Mutual of Enumclaw decision provides authority for the Court to hold EMCC responsible
to pay a significant portion of the Donnelly judgment, including accrued interest.
In short, EMCC and Rimar Construction put the Donnellys to their proof and the
Donnellys prevailed. EMCC can hardly be surprised that the Donnellys now want what they
are owed. Therefore, I make demand on behalf of the Donnellys that EMCC and/or Rimar
Construction immediately satisfy the judgment including accrued interest in the amount of
$446,841.76. Otherwise, the Donnellys will begin proceedings to execute on the judgment
against Rimar Construction.
Thank you for your attention to these matters. I look forward to hearing from you
shortly.

MAE:dr
cc:
David and Kathy Donnelly
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
DAVID DONNELLY and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-06-00445

WRIT OF EXECUTION
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
R1MAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
DefendantiCounterclaimant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER
GREETINGS:
WHEREAS on the 20th day of March, 2009, plaintiff recovered an initial Judgment on
Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. in
the initial amount of $128,611.55 plus interest at the legal rate (7.625%) as entered on August
14,2008, and final Amended Judgment on Special Verdict \Vith Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs
and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. in the amended amount of $425,545.44
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 1
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to accrue

L.
EXHIBIT----

interest at the legal rate (7.625% to July 1, 2009 and 5.625% after July 1, 2009) as entered on
March 20, 2009 in the District Court of the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, against the
defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc., for the total sum of$449,625.66, plus interest accrued at the
legal rate from entry of the initial judgment on August 14,2008 up and until November 10, 2009
as follows:

Judgment Amount
Interest on
Judgment
InterestlYr
DaysIYr
Per Day Rate
Days
Total Interest
Total with Interest
Fees and Costs
Total March 20,
2009

Note:

$128,611.55

$431,402.55

$440,594.97

0.07625
$9,806.63
365
$26.87
218

0.07625
$32,894.44
365
$90.12
102

0.05625
$24,783.47
365
$67.90
133

$5,857.11

$9,192.42

$9,030.69

~134,468.66

$440,594.97

$449,625.66

$24,080.2
2

$296,933.89
$431,402.55

Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 7.625% effective July 1,2008
Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 5.625% effective July 1, 2009

AND, WHEREAS, that fmal Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to
Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. was duly filed in the Clerk's office
of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Bonner, on March 20, 2009 and that Judgment was duly recorded as a judgment lien with the
Bonner County Recorder on March 30, 2009;
NOW, you, the Sheriff of Bonner County, are hereby required to satisfy said Judgment,
with the accrued interest as aforesaid, out of the personal property of the defendant Rimar
Construction, Inc., the judgment debtor, or if sufficient property of said debtor cannot be found,
then out of the real property in Bonner County belonging to said judgment debtor on the date of
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 2
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service of this writ, and make return of this writ within sixty (60) days after the receipt,hereof,
with what you have done endorsed thereon.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this

n

day of

Marie Scott, Clerk

B

WRIT OF EXECUTION - 3
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~I ooem bee2009.

State of IDAHO
Bonner County Sheriff's Office
Civil Division
4001 N. Boyer Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Defendant
Disposition:
Rimar Construction
1707 Culvers Dr; PO Box 6 Sandpoint, ID

83864

Disposit,ion: SRU Served, returned unsatisfied
Garnishee
Mountain West Bank
201 E Superior St
Sandpoint, ID 83864
by Peasha, J
Served on: 13th day'of November, 2009
Served to: Cassidie Spinney
Manager
Sandpoint, ID 83864
201 E Superior St
Bank of America
402 N 2nd Ave
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009
by Peasha, J
Served to: Lynn Jennings
Assistant Manager
402 N 2nd Ave
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Panhandle State Bank
414 Church St
Sandpoint, ID 83864
by Peasha, J
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009
Served to: Kelly Glenn
Manager
Sandpoint, ID 83864
414 Church St
Plaintiff
Disposition:
David Michael Donnelly
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road Cocolalla, ID

83813

Attorney
Disposition:
Michael A Ealy Atty
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID
Process Number: C09-01949

83814

Court Number: CV06-44S

I, Daryl D Wheeler, Sheriff of Bonner County Sheriff's Office do hereby certify
that I received the foregoing Writ of Execution on the 12th day of November,
2009.
Dated the 7th day of December, 2009
Fees:
Service:
Mileage:
Other
Total

75.00
1.00
224.10
300.10

IDAHO

Comments
11/17/09 Mailed instructions to defendant.
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26177

BONNER COUNTY SHERIFF • Ci~il Account· Sandpoint, Idaho 83864

Check Number:
26177
Process Number: C09-01949

$169.10

PAYEE: David Michael Donnelly
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road
Cocolalla, ID 83813
PAYOR:

.. . .. . ;;~.~~:Y··>
92~360/12317o'1

DAlE

26177

, . .

AMOUNT

~~~E

HuNDRED SIXTY NINE and 10/100*****************12/
David Michael Donnelly tl~
. . .------i~~~~~~#,~~~~~~~
TOmE
3662 Cocolalla Loop Roa~
ORDER OF
Cocolalla, . ID 8381~ .
.

.

.

Le·
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
CASE NO.CV-07-00885

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED ANSWER AND
COUNTERCLAIM

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as
follows:
I. ANSWER
1.

Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set

forth in Plaintiffs Petition unless specifically admitted herein.
2.

In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 andl6 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants

are without sufficient infonnation to fonn a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged therein
and therefore deny the same.

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - J
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3.

In answer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the

4.

In answer to Paragraph 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a

same.

contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder
of said Paragraph.
5.

In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar

performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph.
6.

In answer to Paragraphs 10. 11 and 12 of Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants admit

only that Plaintiffs Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself.

Defendants deny the remainder of said

Paragraphs.
7.

In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 and 28 of

Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants deny the same.

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

8.

Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained

In

Paragraphs 1-7, above.
9.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

10.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean

hands, and in pari delicto.
11.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel.

12.

Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent.

13.

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party.

14.

The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc.

and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy.

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2
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III. COUNTERCLAIM

15.

At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company

("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State ofIdaho.
16.

At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and

was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting
services in the State of Idaho.
17.

At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly

("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real
property located in Bonner County, State of Idaho.
18.

On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial

general liability policy no. 2D 1-32-95-05 ("CGL Policy") with the effective coverage dates
identified as October 1,2004, up and through October 1,2005.
19.

On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims

arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC
CGL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV-06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation").
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly's
favor as against RCI on or about July 9, 2008.
20.

On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On

Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate
against RCI in favor of Donnelly.

Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an

Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant
Rimar Construction, Inc. / Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total
amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,871.89.
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 3
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21.

On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in

Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177.
22.

Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the

Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its
claim against RCI.
23.

On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated tltis action seeking a declaratory

judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part,
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12, 2007, this action
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later
lifted on or about July 17,2009.
...

24.

Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the

~..:.

Donnellys are judgment creditors of RCI and have a claim, right or interest including a judgment

.'f:.

lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against ReI.
25.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under

the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and,
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights,
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, for the
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the
entire judgment.
26.

To date, neither EMC nor RCI has made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court

in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains
unsatisfied.

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 4
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IV. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
27.

Defendants request a jury trial of all matters so triable.

IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Wherefore, Defendants David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly demand:
1.

That Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing

thereby; and
2.

That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment finding that under the

EMC CGL Policy, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part,
the Donnelly judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including post-judgment interest
on the entire judgment amount; and
3.
.'t:,'

That the Defendant Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as

incurred herein pursuant to I.e. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and
4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this :J-)-day of December, 2009.

RAMSDEN & LYONS

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jrctay of December, 2009, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

vUS Mail

James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, W A 9920 I

VuSMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400

AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 6
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~Ie (509) 625-1909

STATe: efl8AHO

coutU V OF BONNER

JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P. O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com
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Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation;

Case No. CV-2007-00885
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife; and IVAN
RIMAR, an individual;
Defendants.

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through its
attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and submits this memorandum in OPPOSITION to
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on or
about December 18,2009.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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I. INTRODUCTION.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff s _Motion for Summary Judgment, which is opposed by
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, but which is not opposed by Plaintiffs insureds, Rimar
Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. Plaintiffs argue that there is no basis for coverage under a policy
of insurance written by Plaintiff to cover claims made by Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly
against Plaintiff s insureds, Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. Plaintiff s insureds agree there
is no coverage. Defendants David and Kathy Donnely dispute the same, and have advanced their
own motion for summary judgment, arguing the claims are covered by the insurance policy. For the
reasons argued herein, the Court should conclude there is no coverage and enter summary judgment
on all issues in favor of Plaintiff.
II. RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS.

Plaintiff explained in its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment (filed November 12,2009) the relevant and material facts, which are really not in dispute.
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly have added additional facts in support of their motion, with
which Plaintiff does not quarrel- however, many of the facts raised are not germane to the instant
motion and have no materiality with respect to disposition (e.g., facts concerning mediation in the
underlying litigation, claim notes made by Plaintiffs employees, and collection efforts postjudgment in the underlying litigation). Plaintiffs contend the following represent the facts that are
not in dispute, and which are material to resolution of the pending motions.
The parties to this action include Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (herein
"EMC" or "Plaintiff'), Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. (herein "RCI"), Defendant Ivan Rimar
(herein "Ivan"), and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly (herein "Donnelly"). Statement ofFacts
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFE"N'DANT DONNELLy1S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2

Re: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009), at ~ 1.
A.

The Applicable Insurance Policy.

On September 14, 2004, EMC and RCI entered in to an agreement of insurance known as
a Commercial General Liability policy, identified as Policy No. 2Dl-32-95-05, whereunder EMC
was the insurer and RCI was the insured (herein "the Applicable Policy"). Id., at ~ 2. The effective
dates of coverage under the Applicable Policy began October 1,2004 and ended October 1, 2005.
/d., at ~ 3. The coverage limits under the Applicable Policy are $1,000,000 per occurrence. Id., at

B.

The Underlying Litigation.

Relevant to this action is certain underlying litigation between Donnelly, as Plaintiff, and RCI
and Ivan, as Defendants, in Case No. CV-06-00445 (Bonner County, Idaho), the proceedings of
which were conducted before this Court (herein "the Underlying Litigation"). Id., at

~

5. The

Underlying Litigation was commenced on March 7,2006. Id., at ~ 6. In the Underlying Litigation,
Donnelly alleged damages were owed to it from RCI and Ivan based upon remodeling construction
work performed on the Donnelly home in 2005. Id., at ~ 7. The legal theories ofliability alleged
by Donnelly included breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud, nondisclosure, professional
malpractice, negligence, breach of warranties , violation ofthe Idaho Consumer Protection Act, quiet
title, and for a declaratory judgment. Id., at ~ 8.
Part of Donnelly's claim was one allegation that bodily injuries had been suffered by reason
of carbon monoxide poisoning from the improper installation of a propane stove. Id., at ~ 9. Before
trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court ruled that Donnelly's claim regarding bodily injuries (i.e.
the carbon monoxide poisoning) could not be presented to the jury at triat Id., at ~ 10.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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At trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court instructed the jury on applicable law,
including the following notable instructions •

That Donnelly's claim that RCI failed to perfonn in a workmanlike manner is a claim
implied by operation of law; and

•

That a necessary element of proof of the implied warranty claim included proof
of the existence of a contract between ReI and Donnelly.

Id., at ~ 11 (emphasis added). The trial in the Underlying Litigation concluded with entry by the jury
of a Special Verdict on July 9,2008. Id., at ~ 12. Based on the Special Verdict, it was detennined
that RCI breached its contract with Donnelly, including breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship, and also violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Id., at, 13. Based on the

Special Verdict, it was detennined that RCI and Ivan did not breach any warranties, did not commit
fraud, and did not engage in professional negligence. Id., at ~ 14. The jury awarded Donnelly the
sum of$126,611.55 for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and an additional $2,000.00
for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Id., at, 15.
As a result of the foregoing, a judgment was entered on August 14,2008 requiring RCI to
pay the sum of $128,611.55 to Donnelly for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship
($126,611.55) and for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ($2,000.00). Id., at

~

16.

Post-verdict, the Court in the Underlying Litigation awarded to Donnelly costs as a matter of right,
and attorney fees, and in so holding did so on the basis that •

$126,611.55 in damages accounted for compensation to Donnelly for construction
defects on their home, and an additional $2,000.00 for Consumer Protection Act
violations;

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
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•

The basic issue litigated in the Underlying Litigation was whether or not the
construction was completed in a workmanlike manner;

•

Donnelly prevailed by proving RCI failed to substantially perform the work it
contracted to perform;

•

The contract between Donnelly and RCI constituted a commercial transaction;

•

The construction contract was breached by RCI by not completing the work it
contracted to perform in accordance with its agreement with Donnelly, or pursuant
to sound construction practices in a workmanlike manner; and

•

The gravamen of the action involved construction defects.

Id., at, 17 (emphasis added). An Amended Judgment was consequently entered on March 20, 2009

awarding Donnelly an additional $277,062.00 for attorney fees and $19,871.89 for court costs as a
result of a contract-based commercial transaction, for a total recovery by Donnelly of$425,545.44.
Id., at, 18.
C.

The Declaratory Judgment Action.

In the Underlying Litigation, EMC provided a defense against the suit, throughout its entirety,

under reservation of rights, which was reflected in a letter to RCI on September 5, 2006 and in a
letter to Ivan on September 7, 2007. Id., at, 19. On May 24, 2007, EMC instituted this action
(herein "the Declaratory Judgment Action"). Id., at, 20. EMC seeks a declaratory judgment from
the Court holding that under the Applicable Policy EMC has no duty or responsibility to pay all, or
any portion, of the damages then claimed by, now awarded to, Donnelly relative to the Underlying
Litigation. Id., at, 21. In this Declaratory Judgment Action, RCI originally made a counterclaim
against EMC alleging bad faith, violation of the Consumer Protection Act and breach of contract.
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
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!d., at ~ 22.

On December 12, 2007, the Court entered an order staying the Declaratory Judgment Action
until such time as the Underlying Litigation was concluded. Id., at

~

23. Once the Underlying

Litigation was concluded, this Court lifted its stay of the Declaratory Judgment Action, which was
effective on July 17, 2009. Id., at

~

24. Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered into

between EMC, RCI and Ivan, the terms of which effectuate the following•

That EMC has no duty, responsibility or legal liability to satisfy the judgments
entered in the Underlying Litigation, and has no duty to indemnify RCI from the
same;

•

That RCI and Ivan agree that their counterclaims alleged in the Declaratory Judgment
Action ought to be dismissed with prejudice;

•

That RCI and Ivan release and discharge EMC for and from and all liability
whatsoever that EMC may have to RCI or Ivan in relation to the Underlying
Litigation and the Declaratory Judgment Action;

•

That RCI and Ivan do not contest the Declaratory Judgment Action and they further
admit all of the allegations made by EMC in the Declaratory Judgment Action.

Id., at ~ 25.
Now pending before the Court is the question of whether, given the above facts and
circumstances, and through application of controlling law, EMC has a duty to pay any portion ofthe
judgment obtained by Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation. Id., at ~ 26.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.
Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56, IDAHO RULES

OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE. The

standard of review for a summary judgment motion, as articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court, is
as followsSummary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .
. .. [The] Court should liberally construe all facts in favor ofthe nonmoving party and
draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party.
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. If the
moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that
no genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party
to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact ...
[t]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue
of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue.
Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133 (2002) (internal citations omitted).

IV.

ARGUMENT.

A.

The pertinent provisions of the Applicable Policy.

There appears to be no dispute between the parties that the following are the relevant and
material provisions of the Applicable Policy:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages
because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies.!
This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property damage" only if:
(1)
The "bodily injury" or property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that
takes place in the "coverage territory"; [and]
(2)
The "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy period[.]2
The Applicable Policy defines as bodily injury as follows:
ISee Section I. La. of the Applicable Policy.
2See Section I. Lb. of the Applicable Policy.
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"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person,
including death resulting from any of these at any time. 3
The Applicable Policy defines property damage as follows:
"Property damage" means:
a.
Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that
property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the
physical injury that caused it; or
b.
Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that caused
it. 4
The Applicable Policy defines an occurrence as follows:
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions. 5
The Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows:
This insurance does not apply to:
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intended from the standpoint of
the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the use
of reasonable force to protect persons or property. 6
The Contractual Liability Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows:
This insurance does not apply to:
"Bodily injury or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This
exclusion does not apply to liability for damages:

3See

Section V.3. of the Applicable Policy.

4See Section V.l7. of the Applicable Policy.
5See

Section V.l3. of the Applicable Policy.

6See

Section I.2.a. of the Applicable Policy.
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(1)

r

That the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement [.

Additionally, the Applicable Policy contains a Supplementary Payments Provision which provides
as follows:
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS -COVERAGES A AND B
1.
We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit"
against an insured we defend:
a.
All expenses we incur.

e.

All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit."s

Relative thereto, the Applicable Policy defines "suit" as "a civil proceeding in which damages
because of 'bodily injury', 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' to which this
insurance applies are alleged. 9
B.

Damages awarded in the Underlying Litigation for breach of the implied warranty
of workmanship are not covered under the Applicable Policy.

Donnelly contends that all the damages awarded in the Underlying Litigation for breach of
the implied warranty of workmanship are property damages, for which coverage is afforded under
the Applicable Policy. This argument lacks merit for two reasons.
First, even assuming these damages are included within the coverage portions of the
Applicable Policy, coverage fails because of application of the contractual liability exclusion. As
pointed out in Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support ofPlaintifJ's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed
November 12, 2009), the contractual liability exclusion applies to the implied warranty of
workmanship claims for the simple reason that those damages could not even have been awarded

7See Section 1.2.b. of the Applicable Policy.
sSee Section I.Supp. Pmt. of the Applicable Policy.
Q

See Section V.l8. of the Applicable Policy.
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by the jury in the Underlying Litigation without first determining that a contract existed between
Donnelly and RCI. That is, but for the existence of a contract, no damages could have been awarded
in the Underlying Litigation for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. A simple review
of the jury instructions, and the special verdict form itself, reveal this reality. Moreover, the fact that
damages were allowed based on the economic nature of Donnelly's claims in the Underlying
Litigation reveals that the claims were contract-based as no recovery could have been had if the
claims were tort-based. This Court's decision and reasoning relative to the taxation of attorney fees
in the Underlying Litigation further exemplifies an understanding that the damages were based on
a contract claim. The Applicable Policy does not cover claims based on contract - plain and simple.
Therefore, as a matter oflaw, there is no coverage for the damages awarded based on the implied
warranty of workmanship.

Second, even ifthe contractual liability exclusion is inapplicable, summaryjudgment in favor
of Donnelly is not proper at this point because a trial will be necessary to determine what, if any,
portion of the alleged "property damage" is covered by the Applicable Policy. Unfortunately, the
jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation does not provide any explanation as to the damages
awarded. Several categories of damages claimed by Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation would
not be covered under the Applicable Policy because ofthe policy's definition of"property damage,"
and because of other policy exclusions.
For instance, the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion lO provides that there is no coverage
for any property damage that is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. Under the

IOThis exclusion provides that "[tJThis insurance does not apply to: ... "property damage" expected or
intended from the standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the use
of reasonable force to protect persons or property." See Section 1.2.a. of Applicable Policy.
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policy, an employee is an insured. As such, property damage that is expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured's employees is excluded from coverage.

There were facts in the

Underlying Litigation demonstrating that ReI's employees might have expected Donnelly's injury
to occur.
Also, the Damage to Your Work Exclusion!! provides that there is no coverage for any
property damage to the insured's work that arises out of, in whole or in part, the work ofthe insured,
provided said work is included within the products-completed operations hazard. This exclusion
does not apply to work performed on the insured's behalf by a subcontractor. In essence, this
exclusion provides that there is no coverage for property damage to any work actually performed by
the insured after the completion of operations, but that there is coverage for any property damage to
any work performed by a subcontractor after the completion of operations. Donnelly's claims in the
Underlying Litigation that they were due damages to repair or replace defective work performed by
ReI. The actual work of ReI is not covered under the Applicable Policy, only the work of its
subcontractors or resultant damage to other property that occurs as a result of ReI' s defective work.
If, for example, it was claimed that ReI defectively built a patio and it must be replaced, the
Applicable Policy would not cover damages assessed the replace the patio. The claims of Donnelly
in the Underlying Litigation clearly reveal they asked the jury to award them damages to
repair/replace ReI's actual work - a type of damage clearly not covered by the policy.
Because of these circumstances, a trial in this action will be necessary to determine whether

!!This exclusion provides that "[t]his insurance does not apply to: ... "Property damage" to "your work"
arising out of it or any part of it and included in the "products-completed operations hazard", This exclusion does
not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behulfby a
subcontractoL" See Section I.2.m. of Applicable Policy,
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the damages legally recovered by Donnelly are actually subject to coverage.
C.

Damages awarded for violation of the Consumer ProtectiowAct were statutory
damages, not property damage.

Donnelly contends that the jury award of $2,000 represents an award of further property
damages by the jury. This is an incorrect interpretation. The $2,000 award does not represent
economic damages, property damages, or bodily injury - rather, it represents a statutory damage, or
penalty. This award is not "property damage" as that term is defined by the Applicable Policy, and
therefore there is no coverage. Moreover, as explained in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009), the $2,000 statutory award
is not covered because the that damage was expected or intended from the standpoint ofthe insured.
For Donnelly to prevail on this its claim of violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, it had
to establish that RCI knowingly violated the provisions of the Act. This means that RCI would
reasonably have expected damage to occur ifit violated the Consumer Protection Act. There is no
basis of coverage for the statutory penalty of $2,000.

D.

The Applicable Policy does not cover payment ofattorney fees awarded against an
insured resultingfrom ajudgment against the insured based solely upon claims not
covered by the Applicable Policy, and where the insurer's defense ofthe insured was
under a reservation of rights.

EMC previously advised the Court of persuasive reasons why it has no obligation to pay the
costs, attorneys fees and accrued post-judgment interest awarded in the Underlying Litigation. Those
points were set forth and briefed in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009). Of important note is the fact that the express terms
of the Applicable Policy vary from the language interpreted by the Court in Mutual of Enumclaw v.
Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009 (1989). The Applicable Policy indicated that payment ofcosts, attorney fees
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR
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and interest is a payment supplemental to other payments already provided or obligated to provide
because of coverage being afforded to a claim. In Harvey, the covera2e itself was supplemental not the payment. This is a crucial distinction because the Harvey Court made it a point to explain
that "[tlhe results in the cases depend 'upon the lan2ua2e employed by the parties in their
contract[.1 '" Id. at 1012 (emphasis added). Under the Applicable Policy, because no other coverage
is provided, there is no supplemental coverage obligation oOn the part ofEMC to pay costs, attorney
fees and interest.

E.

Donnelly's request for attorney fees is premature.

Included within Donnelly's motion is a request for attorney fees incurred in this action based
on IDAHO CODE § 41-1839. This request is premature in that it is made before entry of judgment.
If judgment is entered in Donnelly's favor, it can then petition for fees and provide supporting
authority. At this point, there is no need to brief this issue. The premature request for attorney fees
ought to be denied.

v.

CONCLUSION.

For the above and foregoing reasons, and for those reasons set forth in Plaintiffs

Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009),
Defendant David and Kathy Donnelly's Motion for Summary Judgment ought to be DENIED.
DATED this 5 th dayofJanuary, 2010.
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED
by:

C?-\AC~---~:::=::::.-=-:::..
~.
_ -::::::z:'
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
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Attorneys fOl" Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY. an Iowa Corporation,

Plaintiff,
VS.

CASE NO.CV-07-0088S
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION

RlMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife,
Defendants.
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record t and submit dlis memorandum in reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant Donnelly's Motion For SummalY Judgment. The Donnellys stand on their prior
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and address the Plaintiff's
Memorandum in Opposition herein.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A.

Damaees for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship were for
"Property Damage" tbat ReI is Legally Obligated to Pay.

EMe argues that even if damages for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship
were cllroperty damage" as defined by the policy, they are excluded by the contractual liability
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exclusion and/or a genuine issue of fact is created, preventing summaI}' judgment. The jUly
awarded a specific sum of $126,611.55 for breach of the implied walTanty; not breach of
contract. However, the damages were never further itemized or characterized by the jUlY. EMC
nevet1heless asks the COU11 to characterize the damages as "conttllctllal" in order to exclude them
from coverage on the gro'unds that "[t]he Applicable Policy does not cover claims based on
contract-plain and simple." (pla.'s Memo. In Opp. p. 10).
Since insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, they are subject to cer."tain special
mles of constmction. Arregon v. Falmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 PJd
498) 500 (2008) (citation omitted.) Specifically. any policy provision that seeks to exclude
coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured, Id, (citation omitted). Therefore,
the EMC policy must necessarily have clear and precise language to restrict the scope of its
coverage to expressly exclude damages for breach of the implied Warlllnty. Id.
In this case, the EMC policy doesn't specifically exclude damages for breach of the
implied walTanty of workmanship, Insurers, like EMC, are sophisticated enough to write
unambiguous exclusionary language into their contracts of adhesion and they aloe
sophisticated enough to write exclusions specifically addressing an insured's potential breach
of the implied walTanty of workmanship. Since there is no specific exclusion that applies to
the damages awarded for breacb of the implied warranty of workmanShip, the policy should
be strictly construed in favor of Donnelly (and ReI) for coverage because the EMC policy
fails to expressly exclude the damages for breach of the implied wan'anty from its scope of
coverage.
EMC's general argument appears to be that anytime a general contractor, like RCI,
has a contract with an owner, like Donnelly, that its policy would always exclude coverage
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMBNT - 2
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based on the fact of privity created by the general contractor/owner contract. EMe's
argument apparently rests on an application of the contractual liability exclusion as follows:
"This insurance does not apply to: '[b]odily injtuy' and 'property damage' for which the
insured is obligated to pay damages [Le. Donnelly judgment] by reason of assumption of
liability in a contract or agreement [i.e. Donnelly/RCI contract.]."

This superficial

application of the exclusion would effectively render the policy and its stated coverage to be
illusory because thel'e is almost always an express contract, if not implied in fact or implied
at law, between a general contractor and owner.
In this case, EMe ignores or reads out the limiting language found in the exclusion
which applies as follows: "[t]his exclusion [i.e. the prior exclusionary sentence] does not
apply to liability for damages [i.e, Donnelly judgment]: (1) That the insured [RCl] would
have in the absence of the contract 01' agreement [Donnelly/RCI contract]".," This limiting
language is obviously intended to limit the scope of the exclusion. It doesn't make sense to
read the limiting language to mean that, on one hand, the policy provides coverage in the
absence of a contractual relationship between Donnelly and RCI but, on the other hand,
provides no coverage in the event there is a contl'actual relationship between Donnelly and
RCI. This is because the exclusion was and is intended to prevent insureds, like ReI, fi'om
obligating themselves-and their insurer-to pay damages through the "i\Sslmmtion of
liability in a contract or agreement" and not the mere factual existence of a contract or
agreement. This gives plain meaning to the word "assumption" and explains the need for and
presence of the limiting language. Otherwise the limiting language becomes and is rendered
meaningless. The policy should be read in a manner that gives meaning to the limiting
language and not in a manner that renders it meaningless. The mere fact that a contract exists
MeMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 3
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between Donnelly and RCI does not exclude coverage under the policy.. If this were the
case, then insurers, like EMC, would take their claims investigations no further than a factual
detennination of a contractual relationship to deny coverage and, thereby avoid any ft1l1her
duty to defend or otherwise indemnify their insureds.
At bottom, the argument is really whether the implied walTanty damages were
compensatory for "economic lossu-i.e. the cost to repair and replace RCI"s defective work
which was the subject of the transaction, or uproperty damage"-i.e. the physical injury to
tangible property (including loss of use) or loss of use of tangible property that is not
physically injured that was not the subject of the transaction. EMC argues the damages were
compensatory for "economic loss" and, therefore, not covered. The Donnellys argue the
damages were compensatory for "propetty damages" and. therefore, covered. Since the jury
didn't itemize the award, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of DonneUy and
against EMC and in favor of coverage under the policy, as there was evidence that there was
physical injury to tangible propetty (i.e. cut heat mats) and a loss of use of property not
subject to the transaction. It is important to note that EMC recognized this very "potential"
for coverage at the time it undeltook its defense of RCI when it represented to ReI that
"Donnelly's allegations l'egarding delay may also infer a loss of use of injured property
which would be property damage," Effectively. the jury found RCI breached the standard of
care required by a contractor to build in a workmanlike fashion and awarded damages
accordingly. A reasonable inference is that these damages were for ''property damages" as
defined in the EMC policy and, therefore, EMC is legally obligated to pay for those damages,
B.

Damages (01' Breach ef the Idaho Consumer Protection Act
Damages" tllat ReI Is Legally Obligated to Pay.
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The jUly was instructed "[t]he Dormellys have suffered an injUly under the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act if they have suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property, real
or personal. The Donnellys have the burden of proving such loss." (Reid Aft: Ex. D,

n #68)

(emphasis added), The DonneJlys met their burden and the jury awarded $2,000 based on two
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Like the damages for breach of the implied

wananty, these damages are not itemized or characterized as compensation for a "loss of money'
as opposed to a loss of "property, real or personal." Therefore, one reasonable inference is that
the awat'd was for a loss of property, real or personal, as opposed to money

and~

therefore.

"propeJ.ty damage."
This is "property damage" that RCI has become legally obligated to pay in the absence of
any contract

01'

agreement with Donnelly and it's not expected or intended by RCI for the

pUlposes of EMC seeking fillther '1101es" in the policy. Under the circumstances, the COUl1
should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that
the award is not specifically excluded by the policy and, therefore, EMC is obligated to pay on
behalfofRCl.
C.

EMC Has An Independent Duty To Pay Under SUPPLEMENTAL
- COVERAGES A AND B.

PAYMENTS

£Me argues that its policy language differs that that in Mutual of Enumclaw v. H81vey,
because its policy "indicate[s] that payment of costs, attomey fees and interest is a payment
supplemental to other payments ah'eady provided or obligated to provide because of coverage
being Afforded

to

a claim." (pla.'s Memo. Opp. p. 12-13) (emphasis in Oliginal) (emphasis

added). In other words, EMC reads its supplemental payments promise as being "dependent" on
coverage. However, this isn't what the policy says.
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The plain·language of the policy can be read and applied as follows:
SECTION I - COVERAGES

COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY
1.

Insuring Agreement
a. We [EMCI will pay those sums that the insured [RClJ becomes legally
obligated to pay as damages [Donnelly judgment] because of "bodily injury" or
"property damage" to which this insurance applies. We [£Me] will have the right
and duty to defend the insured (RClj against any "suit" seeking those damages
[the Underlving Litigation sQught those damages]. Howevel~ we will have no
duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily injU1'Y"
or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply. [EMC undertook
the defense -ofRCI through the Ullderlylng Litigation.]
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or sClVices is covo'ed
unless e~licitly proved for under Supplementary Payments-Covca:ues A and
A [i.e. EMC isn ~ going to "cove,." any other obligation. liability to pay sums. or.
perform acts or services unless provided for under its supplemental payments
"coverages A and B and, therefore, EMC's supplemental payments promises or
"coverage" is independent from and opposed to dependent on its promises to
((cover damages for bodily injury or property damage under Coverages A and
II

II

D.]

COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY
COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS

SUPPLEMENTARYPAYMENTS-COVERAGESAANDB
1. We [EMCl will R,ax. [i.e. mOlley] with respect to any claim we investigate,
[EMC investigated the Donnelly claims] settle, or any "suit" against an
insured we defend [EMe d€fe,nded RCI through the UnderlYing Litigation.):

e. All costs taxed against the il1sur~ in the "suit." [RCI was taxed costs and
attomey ~ fees in tile U"de1'lying Litigation defended by EMC.]
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment tPa! ICCl11es after entty of
the judgment [Donnelly judgment first entered on August 14, 2008] and before
we have paid. offered to pay, or depOSited in the court the 1.@1 of the judgment
that is within the applicable limit of insurance.JEMC has never paid, offered
to pay, or deposited in the court any part ofthe judgment on behalfofRCI]
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These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [The obligation to make
suppJemelltalY payments is an independent promise fi'om the promise to pay
damages for bodily injury or property damage since those supplemental payments
are 1Jot applied to reduce the limits of coverage available under coverages A and

B.J
The Mutual of Enumclaw ("MOE") policy, like the EMC policy, is organized with similar
capitalized and bold headings and can be read and applied as follows:
SECTION II
COVERAGES

COVERAGE E - PERSONAL LIABILITY
This company [MOE] agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured [Bruce Oaks] all
sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of bodily injury or property damage, to which this insurance applies, caused by an
occurrence. This Company shall have the right and duty, at its own expense, to
defend any suit against the Insured seeking damages on account of such bodily
injuJY or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit aloe
groundless, false or :fraudulent, but may make such investigation and settlement
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. This Company shall not be obligated
to pay any claim or judgment or defend any suit after the applicable fund of this
Company's liability has been exhausted by payment ofjudgmenrs or settlements:

EXCLUSIONS

....

SUPPLEMENTARY COVERAGES
· t ••

2. Personal Liability Claim Expenses: This Company [MOE] will pay:
a. all ~xpenses incurred by this Company and all costs taxed against the
Insured [Oah] in any suit defended by this Company. [MOE defended Oaks
through trial and costs in the 011l0Wlt of $45.444.00 including $35,000.00 ill
attorney'sfees were taxed against Oab.]
all inteJ.-est on the entire amount of any judgment which accrues after entry
of the judgment and before this Company has paid or tendered or deposited in
court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the limit of this Company's
liability thereon ....
c.

(Reid Aff. Ex. K).
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As a cursOlY review of the language and organization of each policy demonstrates that

when read as a whole) EMC's alleged distinction doesn't exist because the promise to make
supplemental payments-whether in the EMC or MOE policy-.is a promise that is
"independent" li:om other promises to pay regardless of whether the supplemental promise is
titled "Supplementru.y PaYments" as opposed to "Supplementary Coverages."
As then District Judge Schroeder succinctly reasoned, the "[l]anguage in the policy of this
case does not indicate that payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the
policy covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy says that the Company will pay
all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company." Hatvey, 115 Idaho at
1011. This plain application of the language found in the MOE policy isjust as applicable to the
EMC policy as set forth above.
It is likewise important to consider that EMC, like MOE, exercised its right to control
the defense ofRCI and made case management decisions in defense ofRCI. In consideration
of the same, Judge Schroeder reasoned that "since the Company has the right to contl'ot the
defense, including the power to refuse settlement, It should also hear the consequences of
its case managemellt decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the
opponents costs against its insured."

rd. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Judge

Sclu'oeder's reasoning is as applicable to this case as it was to the H8.1vey decision. Having
controlled the defense of ReI and having exercised its power to refuse settlement (EMC's premediation and mediation conduct speaks for itself), EMC sholud hear the consequences of its
case management decisions since it was foreseeable that the Donnellys would be awru:ded costs
and attomey's fees by prevailing. The Harvey decision is on-point and it is persuasive, if not
controlling authOlity, on this case. Therefore) the Court should find as a matter of law that EMe
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has a duty to make, at a minimum, supplemental payment of the costs taxed against RCI jn the
total amount of $296,-933 .89 inclusive of $19, 871.89 in costs and $277,062 in attorney's fees and
post judgment interest on the entire judgment accruing, having aCClued since August 14,2008.
Through its introduction, EMC soft sells the concept that RCI concedes there was no
"coverage" based on the parties' settlement agreement. Of course, the Coun can take notice of
the fact that ReI had sued EMC f01" "bad faith.. arising out of its poor case management
decisions. Regardless, the DonnelIys, as judgment creditors of RCI, had a judgment lien that
arose and was recorded against any of RCI's tangible assets that could have satisfied the
judgment-including the right to proceeds from the EMC policy. The EMCIRCI settlement
agreement, to the extent it seeks to avoid the Donnelly judgment lien, is void because RCI
couldn't give away or otherwise release the Donnellys' judgmeut lien right to the Donnellys'
detriment and the benefit of RCI and EMC. To the extent EMC argues as much, then the
settlement agreement is unenforceable as a fraudulent transfer in accord with Idaho Code §§
55-901, 55-905. and 55-906. To the extent EMC intends to rely on the EMC/RCI settlement

agreement to "get off the loss, "then the Donne11ys necessarily must ask the COUlt to find the
agreement void to the extent it operates as a fi'8udulent transfer against the Donnellys as
judgment creditors of ReI.
CONCLUSION

EMC made the case management decisions that put the Donnellys through a
vigorously contested trial at

gr~at

expense and ultimately led to a judgment against its

insured, RCI. Despite having made those case management decisions, it now asks the Court
to protect it from the financial consequences of its case management decisions. In other
words, EMC wants to "throw punches" without getting "hit." Just as Judge Schroeder saw
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through the MOE arguments in 1989, this Court should see through the EMC arguments and
hold EMe accountable for case management decisions that have caused obvious harm to the
Donnellys.

DATED this

if-

day ofJanuary, 20 10.
RAMSDEN&LVQ
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of January, 2010, I selved a true and coneet
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clali< Ch811ered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, ID 83701-2773

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~acsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin. Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside. Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Finn
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint. ID 83864

US Mail
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Michael A. Ealy
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JAMES G. REID, IS15-# 1372
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P. O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Telephone: (208) 342-4591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657
E-mail: dpc@ringertc/ark.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
Case No. CV-2007-00885

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation;
Plaintiff,

REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM

vs.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Employers Mutual Casualty Company
(hereinafter "EMC"), by and through counsel of record, and replies to the Counterclaim as
follows:
FIRST DEFENSE

I.
The Counterclaim fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

REPL Y TO COUNTERCLAIM - 1
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·SECOND DEFENSE

II.
EMC denies each and every allegation of the Counterclaim not specifically admitted
herein.

III.
EMC admits paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of the Counterclaim.

IV.
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 and 20, EMC admits that
Donnellys filed a lawsuit against RCI and that they obtained a judgment in the action. All
other allegations are denied.

V.
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 25, such allegations do not
appearto require a response. To the extent a response is reqiured, EMC denies the same.

VI.
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 26, EMC admits it has not
paid any money to the Donnellys. As to the remaining allegations in paragraph 26, EMC
does not have sufficient information so as to admit ordenythe same and, therefore, denies
the same.

VII.
With respect to the allegations alleged in paragraph 27, EMC asserts that no
matters in the Counterclaim are matters that, under Idaho law, can be tried to a jury.
WHEREFORE, EMC prays as follows:
1.

That the Counterclaim be dismissed in its entirety and Counterclaimant take
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nothing thereby;
2.

That EMC be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to

applicable provisions of Idaho Code;

3.

For such other relief as to the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this

/'f-1day of .:::ral?ll47 ,2010.
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED

by:
James G. Reid
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This does hereby certify that on the

of -::;;il1uP/Y
-I~ay
/

,2010, he served the

foregoing document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid and properly addressed as follows:
Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
Marc A. Lyons
Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & Lyons
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336

~~-Fer~

James G. Reid
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation
Plaintiff,

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885
ORDER DENYING CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Differing conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the insurance
policy. Therefore, based on the facts presented in this case, the parties' cross motions for
summary judgment are denied.

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 2009, Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter,
"Employers Mutual") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment
holding that under Employers Mutual's Commercial General Liability Policy (hereafter,
"Policy"), Employers Mutual has no duty or responsibility to pay any of the damages awarded to
David and Kathy Donnelly in the underlying litigation, Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et

ai., Bonner County Case No. CV -2006-0445.
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On December 21, 2009, David and Kathy Donnelly filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, requesting that Employers Mutual be ordered to pay the Donnellys' judgment, in
whole or in part, on behalf of its insured, Rimar Construction.
The parties' cross motions for summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on
January 20,2010.
II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS
As it relates to the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, a review of the court
file reveals the following uncontested facts:
Plaintiff Employers Mutual filed this action against its insured, Defendant Rimar
Construction, Inc., (hereafter, "Rimar") and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, seeking to
avoid any duty to defend and/or indemnify Rimar based on the claims of the Donnellys against
Rimar.

This action was stayed pending completion of the underlying litigation in which

Employers Mutual provided a defense to Rimar in a suit prosecuted by the Donnellys.
A trial in the underlying litigation resulted in a judgment in favor of the Donnellys
against Rimar. On August 14, 2008, the Court entered a "Judgment on Special Verdict" in the
initial amount of $128,611.55, plus post judgment interest in favor of the Donnellys. On March
20, 2009, the Court entered an "Amended Judgment on Special Verdict" in the total amount of
$425,545.44, which includes the judgment amount of $128,611.55, plus attorney's fees in the
amount of $277,062.00, and costs in the amount of $19,871.89. The Amended Judgment was
properly recorded on March 30,2009, in the Bonner County records, as Instrument No. 769177.
To date, neither Employers Mutual nor Rimar has made any payment to the Donnellys in an
effort to satisfy. the judgment.
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Once the underlying litigation was concluded, the Court lifted the stay of this action.
Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered between Employers Mutual, Rimar
Construction, and Ivan Rimar, in which the parties agreed that: (l) Employers Mutual has no
duty to indemnify Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar as a result of any issues surrounding the
collection and enforcement of any judgments entered in the underlying litigation; (2) Rimar
Construction and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims alleged in this declaratory judgment action would
be dismissed with prejudice; (3) Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar release and discharge
Employers Mutual from all liability that Employers Mutual may have to Rimar Construction or
Ivan Rimar in relation to the underlying litigation and this declaratory judgment action; and (4)
Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar do not contest this declaratory judgment action and they
admit all of the allegations made by Employers Mutual in this action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the standard for granting summary judgment.
Rule 56 provides, in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law....
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
I.R.C.P. 56 (c), (e).
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise Tower Associates, LLe v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,
215 P.3d 494 (2009), states:
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On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally
ruling on the motion. P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144
Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
is on the moving party. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212,
1216 (2008). However, if the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient
showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall be
granted to the moving party. Id This Court will liberally construe all disputed
facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be
drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id If
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting
inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper.
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112, 206 P.3d 473,
476 (2009).
215 P.3d at 499.

IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
A.

Employers Mutual's Arguments
Employers Mutual claims that the Policy provides no coverage for any of the damages

awarded to the Donnellys in the underlying litigation. Specifically, Employers Mutual argues
that the damages which were awarded based upon Rimar's breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship are not recoverable. Employers Mutual contends that the Contractual Liability
Exclusion in the Policy excludes contract based damages from coverage.
Likewise, the damages that were awarded based upon Rimar's violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act are not covered because those damages are not "property damage," as
defined by the Policy. Alternatively, those damages are excluded because they were expected or
intended by Rimar, and thus, are subject to the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion.
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Employers Mutual also asserts that the attorney's fees and court costs awarded to the
Donnellys are not covered because those costs and fees cannot be supplemental to any other
award of damages, and thus, are not covered under the Supplemental Payments provision of the
Policy. Lastly, Employers Mutual contends that none of the damages awarded in the underlying
litigation are covered because Rimar, a party in privity with Employers Mutual, agreed in its
Settlement Agreement with the insurer that none of those damages are covered.
B.

The Donnellys' Arguments
The Donnellys maintain that the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of

workmanship were not based on the contract, but were for property damage. Employers Mutual
is required to indemnify Rimar for property damage.
obligated to pay the judgment.

Thus, Employers Mutual is legally

Similarly, the damages awarded for breach of the Idaho

Consumer Protection Act were also for property damage.

The Donnellys point out that

Employers Mutual has an independent duty to pay some of the judgment pursuant to the
Supplemental Payments provision of the Policy. The Donnellys believe they are also entitled to
recover reasonable attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839, which governs the allowance of
attorney's fees in suits against insurers.
V. DISCUSSION
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Therefore, in order to prevail, each party
carries the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Porter v.
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). In matters involving contracts of

insurance, "[t]he dividing line between legal and factual questions is not always a clear one ... "
Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 66, 685 P.2d 802,807 (1984). In Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut.
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Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100, 936 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals

explains the distinction:
While questions of contract interpretation and meaning may become
questions of fact only where there has been found to be ambiguity in the contract,
questions of application of insurance policy language to specific situations
necessarily must always be questions of fact, to be decided on a case-by-case
basis, whether or not the provisions themselves are found to be ambiguous. Foster
v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806. Furthermore, an insurance
policy will generally be construed so that the insurer bears the burden of proving
that the asserted exclusion is applicable. Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501
P.2d 706 (1972); Harman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 Idaho 719,
429 P.2d 849 (1967).
Id at 102-103, 936 P.2d at 1344-1345.

Concerning each party's motion, when all inferences are resolved in favor of the adverse
party, there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the Donnellys were
property damage or contract based damages. For a claim of property damage, Rimar (and its
insurer, Employers Mutual) would be obligated to pay. For damages based on the contract, the
Contractual Liability Exclusion may apply. Neither party has met its burden of persuasion on
this issue.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[i]f reasonable persons could reach
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary
judgment is improper." Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112, 206
P.3d 473, 476 (2009). In this case, the parties assert conflicting interpretations of, and draw
conflicting conclusions and inferences from the language of the Policy.
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the parties have failed to meet their burdens of persuasion, and because differing
conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the Policy in relation to the facts
presented, the parties' cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

~ay of April, 2010.

~1#
Steve Yerby
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid,
this ~ day of April, 2010, to:

Brent C. Featherston
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc.
Stephen D. Phillabaum
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, ET. AL.
421 West Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, Washington 99201
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc.
James G. Reid
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED
455 South Third Street
P.O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773
Attorneys for Employers Mutual Casualty Co.
Michael A. Ealy
Marc A. Lyons
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Attorneys for David and Kathy Donnelly
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-58R4
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE
APPEAL

v.

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, move this court for entry of an Order for
Permissive Appeal from the Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment entered on
April 7, 2010.
This motion is made on the grounds that the issues presented on cross-motions for
summary judgment involve controlling questions of law to which there are substantial grounds
for difference of opinion and for which an immediate appeal from the order denying crossmotions may materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation.
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This motion is further based on the record herein, including the documents and pleadings
on file and upon the arguments and authorities cited in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Permissive Appeal.
Ora] argument is requested.
DATED this

I bday of April, 2010.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
day of April, 2010, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by the method indicat~elow, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

[./(1'SMail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA99201

£.....--t1S Mai I
__ Ovemight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400
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RAMSDEN & LYONS. LLP
700 N011hwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
COCl1l' d'Alene, ID83816~1336
TeJephone: (208) 664·5818
Facsimile: (208) 664~5884
Michael A. Ealy. ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND'FOR TIiE COUNTY OF BONNER

CASE NO.CV-07~00885

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa' Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED MOTION FOR
PERMISSIVE APPEAL

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife;

Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy DOlUlelly, by and through their counsel of
record, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, move this cOtut for entry of an Order for
Permissive Appeal from the Order Denying Cross-Motions for Sunm131Y Judgment entet'ed on
April 7, 2010.

This motion is made on the grounds that the issues presented on cross-motions for
sunm1aty judgment involve conh'olling questions of law to which there are substantial grounds
for difference of opinion and for which an immediate appeal fi'om the order denying crossmotions may materially advance the ordedy resolution of [his litigation.
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This motion is further based on the record herein, including the documents and pleadings
on file and upon the arguments and authorities cited in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support
of Motion for Pemlissive Appeal.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

M day of April, 20 10.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Stephen D. PhilJabaum
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Hand Delivered
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Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Finn
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 263·0400
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Differing conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the insurance
policy. Therefore, based on the facts presented in this case, the patties' cross motions for
s\lmmary judgment arc denied.

I. INTRODUCTION
On November 12, 2009, Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter,

"Employers Mutual") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment
holding that under Employers Mutual's Commercial General Liability Policy (hereafter.
~cp.olj~Y!!)iEmpl.oy'ers,Mutual

has no duty or responsibility to pay any of the damages awarded to
..'
.. ...: .
David ~nd, Kathy DonneJJy'jn the uncleriyill8 litigation, Donnelly v: ~fmar Cons(ruc/ion•.1nc.• 61
'"

al., BOMer County Case No. CV-2006-044S.
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On December 21, 2009, David and Kathy DonneHy filed .a Motion for Summary
Judgment, requesting that Employers Mutual be ordered to pay the Donnellys' judgment. in
whole 01' jo part, on behalf of its insured, RimaI' Construction.
The parties' cross motions for summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on
January 20, 2010.

II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS
As it relates to the parties' cross motions for sumlnary judgment, a review of the court

tile reveals the followjng uncontested facts:

Plaintiff Employers Mutual filed this action against its insured. Defendant Rimar
Construction, Inc., (hereafter, "rumar") and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly. seeking to
avoid any d\lty to defend andlor indemnify Rimar based
Rimar.

011

the claims of the Donnellys against

This action was stayed pending completion of the underlying litigation in which

Employers Mutual provided a defense to Rimar in a suit prosecuted by the Donnellys.
A rrial in the underlying litigation resulted in a judgment in favor of the Donnellys
against Rimar. On August 14, 2008, the Court entered a "Judgment on Special Verdict"' in the
initial amount of $128,611.55, plus post judgment interest in favor of the Donnellys. On March
20,2009, the

CO\111

entered an ('Amended Judgment on Special Verdict" in the total amount of

$425.545.44, which includes the judgment amount of $128,611.55, pills attorney's fees in the
omount of' $277,062.00, and costs in the amount of SI9,871.89. The Amended Judgment was
properly recorded on March 30, 2009, in the Bonner County records, as Instrument No. 769117.
To date, neither Employers Mutual nol' Rimar has made any payment to the Donnellys in an
effort to satisfy the judgment.
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Once the underlying litigation was concluded, the Court lifted the stay of this action.
Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered between Employers Mutual, Rimar
Construction. and Ivon Rimar, in which the parties agreed that: (l) Employers Mutual has no
duty to indemnifY Rimar Constntction and Ivan Rimar as a result of any issues sUlTounding the
collection and enforcement of any judgments entered in the underl}'ing litigation; (2) Rimar
Conslruction and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims alleged in this declaratory judgment action would
be dismissed with prejudice; (3) Rimn Construction and Ivan Rimar release and discharge
Employers Muntal from aU liability that Employers Mutual may have to Rimar Constntction or
Ivan Rimar in relation to the underlying litigation and this declaratory judgment action; and (4)
Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar do not contest this declaratory judgment action and they
admit an of the allegations made by Employers Mutual in this action.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the standard for granting summary judgment.

Rule 56 provides, in part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, Bnd
admissions on file. together with the affidavits. if any, show (bat there is 110
genuine issue 8S to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter oflaw....
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this role, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in thjs rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If thc party does not so respond, summary judgmcnt, if
appropriate, shall he entered against the party.

I.R.C.P. 56 (c). (e).
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Bofse Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774.
215 P.3d 494 (2009). states:
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On appeal from the grent of a motion for summaI}' judgment) this Court's
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally
ruling on the motion. P.o. Ven'"res, /I7C. 11. LOltc/a Family Irrevocable Trust, 144
Idaho 233, 237. 159 P.3d 810, 874 (2007). Summary.judgment is appropriate "if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with (he affidavits, if
any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
is on the moving party. Porler ~. Bassel/, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212,
1216 (2008). However, if the nomnoving party fails to provide a sufficient
showing to establish the essential elemellts of his or hel" case. judgment shall be
granted to the moving party. Id This Court will liberally constme all disputed
facts ·in favor of the nonmoving party. and all reasonable inferences tbat can· be
drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id If
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicling
inferences from the evidence presented, then sumlnaty judgment is improper.
Jones v. HealthSolith Treasul'e Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109. 112.206 PJd 473,
416 (2009).
215 P.3d at 499.
IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS
A.

Employers Mutual's ArguDlents
Employers Mutual claims that the Policy provides no coverage for any of the damages

awarded to the DOMellys jn the underlying litigation. SpeCifically, Employers Mutual argues
that the damages which were awarded based upon rumar's breach of ale implied warranty of

workmanship arc not recoverable. Enlp!oyers Mutunl contends that the Contractual Liability
Exclusion in the Policy excludes contract based dnmnges from coverage.
Likewise, the damages that were awarded based upon Rimar's violation of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act are Ilot covered because those damages are not "property damage, n as
defined by the Policy. Altemfltively. those damages are excluded because they were expected or
intended by Rimar. and thUS. are subject to the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion.
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Employers Mumal also asserts that the attomey's fees and coun costs awarded to the
Donnellys are not covered because those costs and fees cannot be supplemental to allY other
award of damages, and thus, are not covered under the Supplemental Payments provision of the
Policy. Lastly, Employers Mutual contends that none of the damages awarded in the underlying
litigation are covered because Rimar, a party in privity with Employers Mutual, agreed in its
Settlement Agreement with the insurer that none of those damages are covered.
B.

The Donnelly!1 Arguments

The DOMellys maintain that the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship were not based on the contract, but were for property damage, Employers Mutual
is required to indemnify Rimar for property damage. Thus, Employers Mutual is legally
obligated to pay the judgment. Similady. the damages awarded for breach of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act were also for property damage.

The Donnellys point out thQt

Employers Mutual bas an independent duty to pay some of the judgment pursuant to the
Supplemenlal Payments provision of ~he Policy. The DonneUys believe they are also entitled to
recoverreasonsble attomey'S fees under Idaho Code § 41~1839. which governs the allowance of
attorney's fees in suits against insurers.
V. DISCUSSION
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Therefore. in order to prevail. each party
canies the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Porter v.

Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). In matters involving contracts of
inSlll'8llCe. "[t]he dividing line between legal and factual questions is not always a clear one ... "

Foster Y. Johnstone, 101 Idaho 61, 66,685 P.2d 802,807 (1984). In Perry v. Farm B.,,'eall "'lilt.
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Ins. Ca. a/IdalJo, 130 Idaho 100, 936 P,2d 1342 (et. App. 1997), tbe Idaho Court of Appeals
explains the distinction:
While questions of contract interploctation and meaning may become
questions of fae. only where there has been found to be ambiguity in the contract.
questions of application of insurance policy language to specific situations
necessarily must always be questions of facti to be decided on a C8se·by~case
basis, whether or not the provisions themselves are found to be ambiguous. Fosle,.
11. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806. Furthennot'e, an insurance
policy will generally be constnted so that the insurer bears the burden of proving
that tbe asserted exclusion is applicable. Vian;)I. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501
P.2d 706 (1972); Harman Y. NOl'thweslern MUlual Life Il1s. Co., 91 Idaho 719,
429 P.2d 849 (1961).

Id at 102-103, 936 P.2d at 1344-1345.
Concerning eacb party's motion, when atl inferences are resolved in favor of the adverse
party, there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the DonneJJys were

property damage or confract based damages. For a claim of propelty damage, Rimar (and its
insurer, Employers Mutual) would be obligated to pay. For damages based on the contract, the

Contractual Liability Exclusion may apply. Neither party has met its burden of persuasion on
this issue.

In mling on a motion for summary judgment, U[i]f reasonable persons could reach
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, tben summary
judgment is improper:' Jones v. Health$o"lh'Il'eas"re Valley Hosp.. 147 Idaho 109,

112~

206

P.3d 473, 476 (2009). In this case, the parties assert conflicting interpretations of, and draw

conflicting conclusions and inferences from the Janguage of the Policy.

VI. CONCLUSION
Because the parties have failed to meet their burdens of persuasion, and because differing
conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the Policy in relation to the facts
preliented, the parties' cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this .J!!)ay of April, 2010.

Steve Yerby
District Judge
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Allomeys!oJ" DavId and Kathy Donnelly

onOEa DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 8

336

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BONNER
l nic:T
r=IR . . T !"nlr"ltl
J

RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145

I

i

;:)

v

lJ

.. J

.'"

~-

~!

/

•

2010 JUN 21! A II: 5b

c

Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER
AND COUNTERCLAIM

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, pursuant to I.R.c.P. 15(a) and 57(b) and move this court for its order permitting them
leave to serve their [Proposed] Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim as
"-

attached hereto.
This motion is made on the following grounds:
(1)

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows the Court wide and liberal discretion

to allow the parties to amend their pleadings when justice so requires and the Donnellys are
properly joined parties to the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action under Rule 57(b) and, as
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - I
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third-party creditors, have standing to pursue a counterclaim as set forth in the case of Mutual of
Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989);
(2)

The Settlement Agreement entered into by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan

Rimar, individually, and attached as Exhibit J to the Affidavit of James G Reid dated November
9, 2009, is a fraudulent conveyance or purports to be a fraudulent conveyance of personal
property from RCI to EMC in contravention of the Donnellys' rights as judgment creditors and
was made in contravention of Idaho Code §§ 55-913(1)(a); 55-913(1)(b); and/or 55-914(1) and
has otherwise hindered, delayed or defrauded the Donnellys and has otherwise left RCI insolvent
and/or otherwise unable to satisfy the Donnellys' Amended Judgment and was intended to
prevent EMC and/or RCI from having to pay any monies to the Donnellys as a result of the
Donnellys' Amended Judgment against RCI;
(3)

EMC, RCI and the Donnellys are parties to this present action and it is in the

interest of justice and judicial economy to the court and to the litigants to bring the Donnelly's
counterclaims and cross claim in one (1) action as they arise out of and relate to the underlying
litigation of Donnelly v. Rimar et. al., Bonner County CV-2006-00445 and the judgments
entered therein;
(4)

At the time of the filing of this motion, the case is not presently set for trial and

this motion to amend is not made to cause any undue delay or prejudice to the plaintiff EMC
and/or defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.
This motion is further supported by the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Amend Answer and the Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof
Oral argument is requested.
III
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DATED this

I;

day ofJune, 2010.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

y,
1
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

1

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the (
day of June, 20 I 0, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

vUSMail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA99201

L4"Mail
_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (509) 625-1909

l./1Js Mail

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

_ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
_ _ Facsimile (208) 263-0400
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700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
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Telephone: (208) 664-5818
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Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

Plaintiff,
v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife;

[PROPOSED)
SECOND AMENDED ANSWER,
COUNTERCLAIM and CROSS
CLAIM

Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as
follows:

I. ANSWER
1.

Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set

forth in Plaintiff s Petition unless specifically admitted herein.
2.

In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 and I 6 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants

are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged therein
and therefore deny the same.
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3.

In"imswer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the

4.

In answer to Paragraph 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a

same.

contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder
of said Paragraph.
5.

In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar

performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph.
6.

In answer to Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit

only that Plaintiffs Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself.
Paragraphs.
7.

Defendants deny the remainder of said

In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 and 28 of

Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants deny the same.

II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
8.

Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained

III

Paragraphs 1-7, above.
9.

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

10.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean

hands, and in pari delicto.
11.

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel.

12.

Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent.

13.

Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party.

14.

The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc.

and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy.
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III. COUNTERCLAIM and CROSS CLAIM
A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
15.

At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company

("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State ofIdaho.
16.

At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and

was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting
services in the State of Idaho.
17.

At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly

("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real
property located in Bonner County, State ofIdaho.
18.

On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial

general liability policy no. 2DI-32-95-05 ("COL Policy") with the effective coverage dates
identified as October 1,2004, up and through October 1,2005.
19.

On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims

arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC
COL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV-06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation").
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly'S
favor as against RCI on or about July 9,2008.
20.

On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On

Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate
against RCI in favor of Donnelly.

Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an

Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant
Rimar Construction, Inc. I Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total
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amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,81'l.89.
21.

On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in

Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177.
22.

Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the

Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its
claim against RCI.
On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated this action seeking a declaratory

23.

judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part,
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12, 2007, this action
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later
lifted on or about July 17,2009.
24.

Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the

Donnellys are judgment creditors of RCI and have a claim, right or interest including a judgment
lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against RCI.
25.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under

the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and,
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights,
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnifY RCI, in whole or in part, for the
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the
entire judgment.
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To date, neither EMC nor RCI has "made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court

in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains
unsatisfied.

B. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
27.

The Defendants/Counterclaimants, David and Kathy Donnelly, re-allege

paragraphs 15-26 as ifset forth herein.
28.

On March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an Amended Judgment in the

total amount of $425,545.44 was awarded in favor of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly and
against Defendant RCI. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly
recorded in Bonner County, State of Idaho, as record instrument #769177. A true and correct
copy of the Amended Judgment, Bonner County Record Instrument # 769177 is attached hereto
as Exhibit A and is adopted by reference pursuant to !RCP 1O(c).
29.

Following entry of the Initial Judgment and Amended Judgment, the Donnellys

were and are judgment creditors of RCI.

The Amended Judgment recorded as a judgment lien

against the real property, if any, of RCI pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1110 and rendered the real
and personal property ofRCI liable to seizure pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-201.
30.

The Plaintiff, EMC, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the Initial

Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded in favor of the Donnellys and against its insured,
RCI, having tendered a defense to RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, in the Underlying
Litigation and having initiated this declaratory judgment action against the named Defendants
herein. As a result, EMC, knew or should have known that the Donnellys had a legal and/or
equitable right in the real and/or personal property of RCI liable to pay the Amended Judgment.
In particular, EMC knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended beneficiaries of
insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to RCI under EMC's Commercial General
Liability ("CGL") policies 2D 1-32-95-05 and 2D 1-32-95-06 with RCI.
31.

The Defendant, RCI, had actual and/or constructive" knowledge of the Initial

Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded against it having defended the Underlying Litigation
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through trial.

As a result, RCI knew, or should have known, that the Donnellys had a legal

and/or equitable right in the real and/or personal property ~of RCI liable to pay the Amended
Judgment.

In particular, RCI knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended

beneficiaries of insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to RCI under EMC's
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policies 2D 1-32-95-05 and 2D 1-32-95-06.
32.

On or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor of the

Donnellys, had a contract claim to certain policy benefits or monies against EMC pursuant to
EMC's CGL policies. In particular, RCI had a claim that EMC indemnify it, in whole or in part,
against the Donnellys' Amended Judgment pursuant to the terms of its CGL policies.
33.

In addition, on or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor

of the Donnellys, had a pending counterclaim seeking money damages against EMC. In part,
RCI's counterclaim against EMC included causes of action for insurance bad faith and breach of
contract.
34.

Sometime in September of 2009, EMC and RCI entered into a Settlement

Agreement with a stated effective date of August 17, 2009. In part, the Settlement Agreement
purports to be a transfer of RCI's property right in its contract claims against the EMC CGL
policy and its pending counterclaim to EMC.

A true and correct copy of the Settlement

Agreement produced by EMC as Exhibit J to the Affidavit of James G. Reid is attached hereto as

Exhibit B and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 1O(c).
35.

EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, entered into the Settlement Agreement

with no notice to David or Kathy Donnelly and the Donnellys are not parties to the Settlement
Agreement.
36.

On November 10, 2009, the Donnellys caused a Writ of Execution to issue from

the Clerk of the Bonner County Court under the Underlying Litigation case number to seek
collection against RCI on the Amended Judgment. Along with the Writ of Execution, a letter
with Instructions to the Sheriff was sent to the Bonner County Sheriff for the purposes of
collecting on the Amended Judgment. A true and correct copy of the letter with Instructions to
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the Sheriff without its attachments is attached hereto as Exhibit C and adopted by reference
pursuant to IRCP lO(c) and a true and correct copy of the Writ of Execution is attached hereto as
Exhibit D and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 10(c).

37.

Following execution on the Writ of Execution by the Bonner County Sheriff, the

Donnellys received a copy of a Memorandum dated November 24,2009, from counsel for RCI
to the Bonner County Sheriff that, in part, represented as follows: Please be advised that RIMAR
CONSTRUCTION,

INC.

owns no property, real or personal.

Further, RIMAR

CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy equipment, titled or untitled motor
vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other personal property of any description. A true
and correct copy of the Memorandum from RCI to the Bonner County Sheriff dated November
24,2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit E and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP (c).
38.

On or about December 7, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff returned the Writ of

Execution unsatisfied. A true and correct copy of the return on the Writ of Execution from the
Bonner County Sheriff s Office is attached hereto as Exhibit F and adopted by reference
pursuant to IRCP 1O(c). In particular, the Sheriff was unable to or could not levy on:
a.

Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's claims

to insurance benefits and/or monies from Employers Mutual Casualty Company Commercial
General Liability policy number 2DI-032-95-05 dated October 1, 2004 through October 1,2005
and policy number 2DI-32-95-06 dated October 1,2005 through October 1,2006; and
b.

Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's causes

of action and/orcounterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-00885.
39.

The Settlement Agreement by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar is

considered a fraudulent transfer to the Donnellys as judgment creditors of RCI, as the Settlement
Agreement purports to be a transfer made by RCI after the debt obligation to the Donnellys was
incurred and was made with (a) the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the Donnellys, or (b)
was made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value from EMC in exchange for the
transfer and, the transfer resulted in RCI having little or no assets remaining and/or left RCI
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otherwise insolvent and unable to satisfy the Donnellys' Amended Judgment in contravention of
Idaho Code §§ 55-913(I)(a); 55-913(b) and 55-914(l}
40.

As a result of the transfer by and betw'een EMC and RCI set forth in the

Settlement Agreement, the Donnellys have been damaged and are entitled to the remedy of
creditors as set forth in Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq. including the avoidance of the transfers
from RCI to EMC set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the attachment, levy and execution
on the transferred property in favor of the Donnellys in partial satisfaction of their Amended
Judgment.
41.

The Donnellys have retained the law firm of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and have

incurred attorney's fees and costs in defense and prosecution of this action.
NOW WHEREFORE, Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly pray for the following
relief:
1.

That the Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing

thereby;
2.

That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment fmding that under the

EMC CGL policies, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in
part, the Donnellys' Amended Judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including
post-judgment interest on the entire judgment amount;
3.

That the Settlement Agreement by and betw'een EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar be

avoided with regard to the transfer of property from RCI to EMC and that the court order
levy and execution on the transferred property and/or its proceeds in favor of Donnelly in
accord with Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq.;
4.

That

th~

Defendants Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as

incurred herein pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and
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5.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the

circumstances.
DATED this __ day of June, 2010.
RAMSDEN & LYONS

[fClD PI) 5t":.f)

J

By ____________________________
Michael A. Ealy, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
David P. Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint,ID 83864

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 263-0400

Michael A. Ealy
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AMENDJm·~Q~ON

l>~4N'I'lUMAR
CONS'tRUcmION, .INC.

:;RJMAR CON.S17fiUcrrON, "INC.,.8j1:IIoaIio
'Corporation~ WAN RIM.AR.

i

CV·06~OP44S·

SI?EGJA;L VB:J.ujICT WITH REOARD
TQ.C~~,.
.:: ..O~ PLAINTIFFs AND

, vs ••

•
...

"-"'--- .

.. , . ,

NO.

PONNEU.Yi Husband and o/ifej

;

,

..

.pAVlD DONNE~:Y and.AA'lllY

·.

I

DefendaIitslCounter.claim ~IiUiltiffs
.,

,.

4.

,
I

'ibis-,matter
, . was me-d:befate
. .~~wy
. commencing on lune ~.3., ~008 and the jury ha-ving

II

I

t

.

.

•

••

•

heanhh~ evidence. and havm8't~ndei'e(ia verdict on.July 9, 2Q.08, I~y' way ofSpeciaJ Verdict,

IT IS HER:BBY OR:l;$.$D,t.Ap.TiJDGED AND DECR.eaD::~at.judgment be entered as

.. .
•

follows:
,
~ t . .,;.'" . ~ .,:', :.;; -to. '1li!f \\1tlt t¢p'd ·to- the Donn~lI~s' claim 'ofbl'each ofcontrac~ against Rimar
. ~ . •. • '.... ~ l;.onsirJlPUoJl,.!Inc.,. the j1iIy'foun'd abreacb of ~ontract, ,but.aw.Brd~ Zero (SO.OO)' do.I1ars

:

.,

. ..
.

I
I

r
I

in dimlagt;s,

2. That with respect to the.:Donnellys' claim of e~pniss w8'l'tl$ty against Rimar
C:OiJs~tm()Q, ~q'j. the; j~ did not' find any sqch 'breach, ana tlierefo~ Judgment is
ren.a~~Ur.;tay.o.1ilQ~.Rim~:CqnstructionJ Inc.
3. That MtJi':tCsp'~ct"tQ·tbe bonncJlys' claim ofbrea~h ofimplied wli1ranty Qfworkmanship,
thej'ury to1ln~'s~ch ~brei~li' and awarded the"sum ofS,J26,61 i.5S, ~d Judgment is
.

·

,

r.

.

---"--"L..

,••

".!

,

to

_
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I·

entered in favor of the Donnellys in the amount of$126,611.55 againstRimar
Construction, Inc.
4. That with respect to the Donnellys' claims for violatio~s of the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act against Rimar Construction, Inc .• concerning the specific disclosures by a
general contractor, the jury detennined that the failure to make such disclosures
constituted a violation of the Consumer Protection Act and awarded $1,000.00 for the
failure to provide such disclosures, and Judgment is hereby entered in favor oftbe
DonneUys in the amount of$l,OOO.OO.

S. That with respect to other aUeged violations of the Consumer Protection Act brought by
. the DonneUys against Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that such a violation
occurred an4 awarded damages in the amOunt of$l,OOO.OO, and Judgment is hereby
entered in favor of the Donnellys in the amount of$l,OOO.OO.
6. That with respect to the Donnellys' claim for negligence against Rimar Construction Inc.
as an architect the jury found that Rimar Construction Inc. did not act as an architect and
therefore,

there is no liability under that theory and Judgmen~ is rendered in favor of

Rimar Construction, Inc. on the architectural negligence cause of action.
7. That with respect to the DonneUys' claim of alleged engineering negligence against
Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that Rimar Construction, Inc., did not act as an
engineer and therefore, found no liability. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of
Rimar Construction, Inc., on the engineering negligence cause of action.
8. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc. 's claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for
breach of contract, the Court has detennined that the Donnel1ys were excused from
perfonnance of the Contract, and that Rimar Construction, Inc. is not entitled to an award
of any damages.
9. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc. 's claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for
foreclosure of its mechanic's and materialmen's lien under I.C. 45-501 et seq., thejury
and Court have detennined that Rimar Construction Inc. failed to establish its right to
foreclose said lien. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of the Donnellys on the
lien foreclosure cause of action. The Claim of Lien filed as Bonner County Instrument
No. 695132, and the Lis Pendens :tiled as Bonner County Instrument No. 702306, are
therefore declared to be of no legal effect, and are hereby expunged.
AMENDED JUDGl\1ENT / RULE S4(b) CERTIFICATE
L:\d\dolUlcIl025129\OOOOllPlcadings\1udgment(6)·031909·MGS·SCN.docx
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10. That Plaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants David and Kathy DopneIly; as the prevailing
party against Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc., recover from Defendant Rimar
Construction, Inc. attorney's fees in the amount of $277.062.00 and costs in the amount
of $19,871.89. for a total recovery against Defendant Rimar conStruction, Inc. in the sum
of $425,545.44, which shall accrue interest at the legal rate as provided by Idaho Code
§ 28-22-104(2) from the date of entry ofjudgment•

.~~
~
STEVE VERBY,
District Judge

RULE 54(bl CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby
CERTIFIED, ~in accordance with Rule S4(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may
issue and an appeal mayjp ~en as

DATEDthis2fT_d;dayof

by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

009.
STEVE VERBY,
District .Tudge

AMENDED~G~T/RULES4(b)CERTnnCATE
L:\d\donncIl02SI29\OOOO 1\Plcadings\Judgmenl(6)-03 J909-MOS-SCN.docx
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

t:JJiday

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
of 'trJd~
.200---1 I caused to be served
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated be ow.and addressed to all counsel of
record as follows:
Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, m 83864
Fax: (208)265-1713
Chris H. Hansen
Anderson JuHan & Hull. LLP
250 South Fifth Street, Sfe 700
. PO Box 7426
Boise. ID 83707-7426
Fax: (208) 344-5510

~
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telccopy (FAX)

~
0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

0/

MichaeIO. Schmidt
WiWamD. Hyslop
Lukins & Annis, p.s.
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102
Coeur d'Alene. 10 83814-2971
Fax: (208) 664-4125

0
0
0

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail
TeJecopy (FAX)

~ U.S. Mail

Michael L. Haman
Haman Law Office PC
923 North 3rd Street
P.O. Box 2155
Fax: (208) 676-1683

0
0
0

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Telecopy (FAX)

/l.~v

£l~Z!Lub

AMENDED JUDGMENT I RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATE
L:\d\donncJl025129\OOOO 1\Plcadings\1udgmcnt(S}021809-MGS.MGS.docx
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Employers Mutual Cawmty Camp-MY, an Iowa QOTpofjltion (f.1tJ'oin
~rred to", ''!MOt?l

Rtrrmr ConstniOtion, 1110., an' IdAho eQI'Pj):mtlon~ ~nd lym Rfmar, M
JndMd1l1J.l (beroJn coUeQt1vely referred to all f'IUMARt , :
Effeotlve Dnto:

Aug\ll1t 17, 2()09.

RECITALS
At

DaVid and Kathy D.~y (hanlfillJOlI~otlvQir rc,ff,md to M "DONNBU.""

btQusbdc;ga1 aotlimaganst lUMARin the l\'fnf Judl~ ttistrioC COUI1 Qftha Stat~tQfrdaho.lll
,an4 for thtl County ofB()nuor, Caso No. CV-2oo6-0044S (this action s11alJbo refcmd to herbln lis
th(l·~!RLYlNG ACTION'i, maklns lJ4Voml"n_om .inst~ surro\U1dJn8 the

desfan and m11ddoJ of ahome 'Qwned by l'-ONNBLLY~ and

B.

At tHo relevant, ~eIJ lnvolvod in the Qlafms Alleged in tbo UND.rnu..Y~O

ACTlO1':(; a polloy IU'/d asnremcm oflmn~ranol) ~lited,betwoen:I~MC ~d ~ and
C.

'" <ilsputo ib.mwd. and QOl1tfnuod tQ IJXla~ bfltwom :sMC and'iuMA;R as to

: ..

~.

whether the policy afinam-ana. provided Iny OOV~O fot the'Qlalmf aIlogcdJn the:
UNDBRLYING ACT.lON, 'oue n.verthoJo,~ HMO pt'Pylc1<Jd ft oomploto d"tonse to RlMAA in the
PNDBRLYIN(t AC'l'lON;, and ,
0..

During tb, pondcm~y Of~lO tJNDBIU.YlNO ,ACTION,.BMC bro\lgb~ {oglll ~on

'asain:lt,lPMAA and l)ONNBtLY. to addreu Issues ofCQVOfiJG '\meier tho .{I01l0Y bl JIJIiWAnQO,

sma {lQt/O" being b1'Qusht before the first ludiQial 01a~ot Court oftho StAto of IdAho. in Rml' for
tho CQuntyofBonnOf, Case NOt CV~200'l~00885 (thls iJQtion bhall be- ~ to h~fn as th(l
'LDBCLAAATORY ACTlONj; and

EXHIBIT .5
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(

20S 342 4651·'

5.

·Tho lJNl)!RLYlNO ACTION did result fnjudsmtnt'bClnl mtor.d Jgainm

lUMAR. but only as to"l~fmm' ConstnJorio.rn ~D.d

F.

!Me and RlMAa b,v, !.lome te) an agrcemont. the t«ms and eonditions ofwhfob

1m' RDt JOrfb Ml'Clin, whereby the I>BCLARATORY ACTION wiU

be lbrevor molved as batw~

thorn. and whereby BMC wUl oQotfnuo to provido a. dofens. to lUMAR. in what rcmeins of the
UNI)!RLtING AC'J,'[ON.

J\.GURMENT

WHEREFOU the partl", aoicnowleqs~ the underntandfng3 oxpressed in ~be abQv$
Reoitel', IlIld for good IJlld v,Juablo tJollllldemt.iQn. the reelllfp~ and 6Uftlcfcncy of whfob ill bereby
mowleagcd, tho partlcs agree AS followsl

I. EriinfJ.g 9J:2a.ttlU. 'Inoident to this A~m.nt. tho foUo. promisoR arc mad"
(a) Ctm(iI.t!J.g~ PlJ1J.uil1l'/.vlu, ,4t;/len· 8MC ·~hftll ooJ)tinuo t<? provfdo to ~ a
full. and completo detenso ImCl JOBall'~rescntation as to all pendlng, unresolved ~d·romafnIng
m~teJli and fPtl§ Iuvolye4 In ~b, VNDBRLYJN(l ACTION, fnl;lludins·upon

Bppea'4provided

(I) BMC shan bavo no duty to Indomnify, d,flmd or bold hmmleuruMAR for and
1rom any and aU l$au~ and matters tmnQulldfnS the cplJ~tton and cIIlfol'lJomcnt ofany judgments

entered agalnst RlMAR in tho ON.PBRLYJNG ACTION; and
(U) »Me shan h~vo no ~My to fMcm1nJt}r. dctimd Of bold h;mnleal RlMAR for

IfIld from any and. aU olafms which could havo b,en brought, but were no!' by DONNELLY
asafn$t RIMAR in tho VNOlVtLYING ACTION, melvdfng but mrt Jumted to .ltau"ll1ent transfer
alI~tiOfl$ and tbt like.

l

j

,I

02:29:46p.m,

RINGERT (LAIlK

2083424657

08-17-2009

(b) StiQ«lated Dismissgl D(Counterclaims to DeclaralorV Action, RIl\4AR. hereby agrees
and stipu'lates to the dismissal. with prejuciic~. of any and all counte.rclaims~ whetber known or

unloiown •. and whetlIet.allegecf or'Uot•. lq~rit has or mig{1t have against EMC'in the
DE~LARATORY ACTION.

RIMAR shall further execute, orcausc to be e~ecut~d, such

additional documents'and pleadings necessal)l 10 effecti.tate the foregoing. tncluding but not.
limited to execution ofa pleading dismissing; its counterclaims alleged against EMC in the
DECLARATORY ACTION.
(c) lielease ofLiability k~,/U.MAR:. RIMAR forever relea~es and discharges EMC for and
.from any alldall actions. causes ofaetioDi; grie"an~ claims 'or demands for dalllages;.jncluding;
but not limited to,;attQmey ftc$, court costs, and litigation ~xpcnses. a.rising out of or which

oorild hav~ arisen OUT of .(i) the UNDERLYING ACTlON and' the SJibje~t matter llwolved. therein; and
{ii} the DECLARATOR.Y.ACTION and the subject matterillvolved therein; and

(iil} EMC's handlil1~ processJl)g, investigation, trealment and disposition ofth.~

.jnsuranj;~ claims "~nd demands wade, O'f.·wlucb could have been made, by RIMAR andlor
DONNELLY in relation to anyihi,ng r~]ated. In whole or in part, to the UNDERLYINO ACTION

or its subject matter.
(d) No Contesl Q/Dec{arntoryActioll. With respect "to the DECLARATORY ACTION.
RlMAR snail no Jo~~t ~ntest the same, RIMAR shaH n9t 0Pp'.ose in any way EMC's e"£fOI1$ to·

obtain ajudgmeint therein favorable to' EMC•. RlMAR shall adrnit.lhe anegat~9ns made in.the
DECLARATORY ACTION by .EMC, and ru;MAR ~hall confess to entry ofjudgment against
RlMAR in the DECLARATpRY ACTT.ON,pto\lided however that EMC and RIMAR shall each
Pa~ J~
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pc ob1igat~to satisfY tileir own attome.r fees andcourt costs incurred in tbe DECLARATORY

·-ACTION and EMC shalf take no effort to receive It judgment for attilrney fees and CQurt costs as"
against RIMAR in the PJ;CLARATORY ACTION~ RIMAR shall further e,ecute. qr cause to be
eieCute~ such

additional" documents.a~d plelldinga J:lec~ary to effectu&.e the foregoing.

,2. Represelltatioils•. The partienach represent that:
(a) at the time of execution oftbis Agreement. th~'Patty freeiy iind' voJuotarily assented to
being bound by the tenns'and cOnditions ofthis Agreement;
(b). at the time of exec;ution of this Agreement and during all times related to the
n~gotiationand drafting of this Agreement, the party bad capacity to a.c:! and

was knowl~geabJe

and aware of the dealings and. effeot of this Agreement;
~c) this:Agreementis nol bein&ex~cute4 for. an iJ/egal purpose aJid the terms and'
con~itioll~ of this a~eenlent do

not, contain any illegal subject matter;

'Ed)Jhe pa~'y. at the time of executiofl·of Ulis Agreement and during all "times ~18ted to the

negotiation and ~rafting of this Agreement, made no misrepres~ntations. false assertions of facts,
and did !'lot conceal any facts;
(e)'at ihe time of' execution ofthis Agreement and during all times. related to the
negotiation and.:drafiing of this Agreement, the partywas.acting voluntarily and not subject to
duress or coercion;
(f) ihe party is unaware of ~y mutual or unilateral mistakes related (0 the fonnntion or

execution of this Agreement;
(g) the party bas read and understandS the teflll~. flnd conqi,(ions ofihis Agreement alld

believes aU ofthelMo b'e fair ~4 .r~~onable;

Page :/...,.,SltTTLEN[ENT AGREEMENT
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(
(ll) tb~ P.1Il1Y rcoelved UdOqll8tq conaldelrati<tn in support of OXetlutiDn onIda Agreomont.
.

-

Thesa repmcntations imall mrvlvo tbe ""caution O.t'thill AgNtmle~t ami contlnQ" until the t~nns
and ~rlditfonf otthi, Asroement bivo been &UUled by Moh ])arty.

3. AJQwnIDtJ'BIaJ$ !!ld~tjtlD ofnUu@!t No pmy to tWa Aareement may ~lIrd'sn
any.d,ltts of that party under ~{It Agroemillt Without tho expro$S wriUon ooDlleni of all p~rdes to
tlli~ ~srcemMt and mlypurpo.t.ted.MsIsnment not ~mp.JyJng wlUl .JUs seotion .hatl be
.

-

QOfllliqm-ed invalid and ofno otlbof; NQ party to tbls Agreoment may dolegatct any dl,ltit' of that
PIll'lY under tbJs ~ont wffllout tho IIXPreii writwn C~Q"t otall paJ't:i1l3 to Jhlll' Agroemeni

and any. purported d~le..tfon not complying with tbis seotlon $hall be consldcml JnVliUd and of
no c:ffeot.

4.

I!!!U(01 !i~~d fluk.: Booh of1ho partfes.1o lhl;s Aare.mrmt agiw~ to perLbnn and ex~to

this A:smmcmt 'fn acoorchmoe v,:ith tho .highost standanI. of soor! faith, booc$ty In taot. Md tlIlr
d~Uns,

5.

QOQ,~cftQa.· In tbe went tbat ,n), word,. tQrm,

Of lansua.se contalnod In ()f Inoo1'pQm!.ed In'

Ud:. Contfflot shill1 be neecssmy to re$otve an ambiguIty OJ,' ~r df~asreemollt betwol)n the partica.
lbt wor-d, torm, 01' lansuagc Mall bo cons1Md or 1ntofP~ed aocardlng to .its pt£\(11 meanfng

within tho col1lext in whicb It fa us~. 1'0 asceriftin plam meaning, Weblte,fg 'fhlr(i New
/"tqJ'1Ullio1UJI D.lcJtQl1fl1,)! may "tie cOllaulted, to tho ~xol"aion of 1111 otber stmldlll'd dlctionurl08. It

plaIn meaning does not telJolv~ tho·ambfsulty Qr 'dillll8fecmont; th(' word. trmu, or langullg.., eball
b~ oohstmechimpty ano fairly and not tor. or ~ eltb~r oftho PMiQ lltmiCo b~ft\1S0 tpat

pmy Qr tba1 party'lilegal ropfllf'entativ~ dm.ftfo tho CO{1tfaot:6•. 1,"«01. In tll~ evont ora disPllto or dlsqn-eoment l'osar4lng pClliPrm,ooo. ~Kocut1cm.

Page 5 • SETTLEMENT A.GREBMENT
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(

interpretation, or anyotb~imatter roiafl'!4 to tba,.tbm1aUon (')f thltlllment o1tbis Agr(JemC!nt:

(a)'

ali.

f},fJa, 'The Jaws of 610 Stat" QfIdahO alulU SQvem all mattera, rolated to sJlO.b;

(b) 'lJ~z.lc" fJ/'.&am.~ Th" D(strlot Coun ofthc lfl'$t Judicial, ~fillioc ottbe Stato,of

Idtth(l. in and for the County ofBonner, sbRlI have oxoluslvo juriBdfotJon tQ boar amd ,rosfllv~

(0) ~J!illIIJJS!J9/Jr BRon of1ho parties:to tbftl Aatcemrmt exprlllQly consents to

porsonafJurI,sdfotfon 1I11d vemuo III thQ,DfIl1t1ot Court oflhlJ FfM Judioia! l)isirl~, of.he State! 01

Idaho. in and for the Co\1nty ot~Clnncr, md waives any objootfon to porsona) jmisdlction. or

vanuo. tllttt tiles purty might bflVO:
Cd) d!tQrMJ!I. I J!.w. 9D!l C.ewt ~t" It any party $eeka tho serviCe$ of an attomey
rO~ng such, the prcwUlnS party upon tripl. appSIIl. 01' other judiohil dfsPolihlon shan bo

entitled to tef~b~ement of olll'OaBonable attomey fees, Qe)ure ooGts, ;md IltlSfttiQn OKPe~oa

Jnoumd in onforoins this A$WmOllt ~d in oollectlng on any Judgment J.'9SUlting 1hw<lfroUl.,
oxcepf auch feos, cOlta, aad expOf1sosimrurted in pl.1raui\)8' an fuv.Ud Qr unonf9roeab/o PfQVblion
~f Ih{s Agreement.

7. ,MJscotraneoUII.

(I) C!J.lt~ Thfs ABI'cmTl4ltt may be ~ooutod in ,,,voral OO"Q~s. ollOh'of

whIcb shan be deomed IUJ Qrislnal, but all of wbfeh tatcf$R togoUt", shaIl oolU,ti.tmo one illd tho
same lnstrumCl'lt

(b) ~t{J(!fliJ11JUnr., If my tcmn Of provJafO.n QflhJ$ Aatoement Qr tbo Itpplicatfon oiit to /lilY

pmon or oiroumlltan~ Mall to any exf~nt bGl j~valid or un<mftlJ'Q~bJ" the remainder of1.!U:a.

Agreement and th~ applfoQ'(ion ofsuch tenu Qr pl'Ovfsiou to peracms Qf Cirow.n~tanc:es oih01' thai:l

.
;,

{

(

:il11

thoso to Which it is l1el« bmdld or-uJlonforooablo shall not be ,meted thentbY, and each term ()f!
provlilon of this Apement shllll bnaUd lU.ld enforcoabJo to ~ ~1ost ",tent permitted by law
and tn equity.
(~) bsfJilJU!o

As tho eontoxt may require 111 thl~ Apm.OR~ the use'llf any gendw'

,(male, female, or ntutor) ahallinolud. the other gouder, and till) eingul81 ahull inolude tho pluMl
lind the plural Ute singular.
(d) /!JJ..ll&c£

This Agreement shall bo binding upon lUld operate to tho benofit at all

partfea to this Agremnem attd tbolr mpcctfVG Mlrs, ~ucce~orSi legal ~a peraollll1
rept'OHnWivMt and Jlt?nuittod ~.
M~, The captions beading tho secticma otthis Agrooment ~e ili8crtlJd fol.'
oonvenff'riQe'of~tbJ'(lnoo only. and hi ItQ way de1lno.·Umjt, QonfStme or 4esorlbt Ute SQOPO or

intol'lt of any term", provilllQn. or scotkll1'oftlUl A8T<IOl1l~Qt,
(I) Xime. RliM ~ Tima til oftho tl8St.lQeo fn tQ{' Asrtement In all particulArS. All
t1m~ roforrt)(! to OJ' described

In tlds Agreemonl 311a11 h~IMftor ~ply to the tnlnSftQtlon unllSllR.

/fub,equcmt to tb. dato otthfiJ Ajreomonft the parties oxpres~ly agrel othorw~sa In writIng. Tho
term ·jdflYS" meanB calendar days unless tho t\trm.''bus'ntna dn)'lJ11 is \l~ed,
(~J.dJ!I9IIJ!C.QJIJII.. _~ch oftbe pard. Qoimowledge fbat tilt)' have hftd tho.

opportmtity t(l aon$ult with their l'C$pl)Qt{V.,l'SDl QQtlosel'pflQ/.' tq ~nd ~$IlrdiJ.lS tho fcm~atlon.,

"xecuifon, fID~ poriQrmanoe of thfJ A~mtmf,
(h) ~ The tlrtluro, of ofther of tho parties to flUB Agreement t~ insist I)ll the strict
per.fbmllU1o~ of any otUl8 ~vh~lcm; oftllie ~~nt shall not ba comtrued aliI\. waiver ahny,

$Ub~quent delhult of'the same or sImilar l1t!turo.l'IQr abdl it afti:lot ~Q pllni~' M8bt3 t() olalm
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(
$trice porfQmnmco 01 any Ofher porii9nB ofthill Asrefllle.nt.
8. ~1J1Jaw!.. All oftba partlos ~,tbis A8I'teltlane 1Jg'rea that the tmns and oondltf()J\s or

Qllli A~t and th~ <ijspaaltlotly ~ol"Uon.lfld othw matt." rtlfttod to tbJ~Uing 'the ~$

and conditions (lfthl,ApYomtDt'shI1JJ ~q. CONPlDl!NTlAL betwocm tho plil'tfM. and. MIln
not be dlBoJOIe« to anyono o1toopt to tho extent that.,(thor PIU'W fa Il'sally QQllgatod t(l d{soJQso. or

to tfll' extent thaf any party is ,requtredto dlsolo.se to ~f:fIll tliet'Tms Md c~nditlons.of'this
A,",emont. The pantOI mqdlaclQso tbe terms tmd o0n6ftiorta oft1lfll Apmont to a "'0\.130 or
~rotQS$fonaJ

a4vfsof1 providod web pel'SOn a~ to'~ bound by tbfs provisIon and lbat any

0"",011 oftftls provision by lhftt person shaU 'be a broaoh tmder this Agreemqnt by the J)lW(y the
pe~ Rpm_s,

Tho p/U'tfo. shAll safe_ all confiqentia] inf<mnatfon in ~oh manner as to

8Qsral'ltet ap.lnst its Inadvtrtent (lr nesJlpt dlsolo~ure. Thta APlUen' may be uscrd as
cvid'Poc In IUlY snbaequant l,rooceding in whioh MY ofUlopartfes to tfils AtP'oomont allege, A
brtlllOh of thiS A8l'NTIMt.
11/
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TfUS lNS'l'.R.UMSNT CONTAINS THB JlNAL AND CONCLUSM

J.\.GRlEM!N'l' BBT,'WPN THE PAR1US PiR,TAlNlNCrTO ~ S,UBJ!Cl'MATTn.
DBSCRlBJro IN ITt AND,SUP13RSBOBS AlLPlUplt AND CONTlSMPO~US

AORBBM!NTS,1ROMISSS, WR!SBNTATlONS AM) UNOJR.STANoJNGS. oRAL 'OR.
WlU"l'TaN. NO MO~lFlCATIONS OR AM'SNDMSNTS OF m1S AORBMNT-SRAU. BB
BINPINOtfNLBSS R1!DlJC!D.l'O 'WJ.U'rtNa AN.D SI.0N8D .BY '11m PARTY S.OtIOHT TO
!B.80OND.

EXICUTltD by tho ,parties' or tnmr duly authorb:ed representatives. to bo (lfibotivc as

PfovLdod abovo.
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN"
MARC A. LYONS"

P.O. BOX 1336

DOUGLAS S. MARFICE"

STREET ADDRESS:

COEUR D'ALENE. 10 B3816-1336

700 NORTHWEST BIND.

M ICHAE!. A. EALY"

COEUR D'ALENE, 10 83814

TERRANCE R. HARRIS"
APRIL M. LINSCOTT

TELEPHONE: (20B) 664-5818

RUDY /. VERSCHOOR

ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO

FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884

JENNIFER L. DAHLSTROM"

" LICENSED IN WASHINGTON

E-MAIL: flrm@ramsdenlyons.com

CH RISTOPHER D. GABBERT

WEBSITE: www.ramsdenlyons.com

VIRGINIA McNULTY ROBINSON

TH ERON /. DE SMET

WILLIAM F. BOYD. OF COUNSEl.

November 10, 2009

Bonner County Sheriff
Civil Section
4001 N, Boyer Road
Sandpoint, Idaho, 83864

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SHERIFF
Re:

Donnelly v. Rimar Cpnstruction, Inc.
Bonner County Case No. CV-06-0044S

Name of Defendants to be executed against: Rimar Construction, Inc.
Defendants Social Security# and/or date of birth: N/A
Mailing address of Defendant:
Rimar Construction, Inc.
11707 Culvers Drive
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Employer of Defendant including their address and phone number: N/A
Bank(s) to be served and their address:

1.

Mountain West Bank
201 E Superior Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864
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EXHIBIT C.

Bonner County Sheriff
November 10, 2Q09
Page 2

2.

Bank of America
405 N. 2nd Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

3.

Panhandle State Bank
414 Church Street
Sandpoint, ID 83864

Vehicle(s) to be picked up and their vehicle inquiry forms: None identified to date.
Misc. personal property (including description, serial#'s and location:
1.
Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's claims to
insurance benefits and/or monies from· Employers Mutual Casualty Company
Commercial General Liability policy number 2DI-32-9s-0s dated October 1, 2004
through October 1, 2005 and policy number 2D1-32-9s-06 dated October 1, 2005
through October 1, 2006.

2.
Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's causes of
action and/or counterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-0088s.
3.
Notice and attachment of any and all right and interest in judgment debtor's
contra!!tual right or claim to proceeds and/or monies from its contract to construct
buildings five and six at the Seasons at Sandpoint Condominiums located at or about
313 N. 1st Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho.
4.
Notice and attachment of any and all of judgment debtor's accounts
receivable(s) and/or right and interest in judgment debtor's contractual right or claim
to proceeds and/or monies earned from any contracts upon which it is owed or due
monies.
CHOOSE ONLY ONE
Request garnish wages at place of employment:
Request garnishment of Bank Account:
Request levy on personal property listed:

No
Yes
No

Additional information (Directions, etc.): As of November 10, 2009, the total judgment
owed by the judgment debtor inclusive of interest is $449,625.66. Judgment creditor
seeks levy and attachment on any and all real and/or personal property of the judgment
debtor found in satisfaction of the judgment. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy
of the Judgment on Special Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant
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Bonner County Sheriff
November 10, 2009
Page 3

Rimar Construction, Inc., dated August 14, 2008, and Amended Judgment on Special
Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc.,
dated March 20, 2009, and recorded March 30, 2009, Instrument #769177. Also
attached is a copy of the Idaho Secretary of State business entity information sheet for
Rimar Construction, Inc.

/6

Dated this - - - T I
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
Attorneys for PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OFTHE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
DAVID DONNELLY and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife,

Case No. CV-06-00445
WRIT OF EXECUTION

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
vs.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho
corporation,
DefendantlCounterclaimant.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER
GREETINGS:
WHEREAS on the 20th day of March, 2009, plaintiff recovered an initial Judgment on
Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. in
the initial amount of $128,611.55 plus interest at the legal rate (7.625%) as entered on August
14, 2008, and fmal Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs
and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. in the amended amount of $425,545.44 to accrue
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 1
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interest at the legal rate (7.625% to July 1, 2009 and 5.625% after July 1, 2009) as entered on
March 20, 2009 in the District Court of the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, against the
defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc., for the total sum of $449,625.66, plus interest accrued at the
legal rate from entry of the initial judgment on August 14,2008 up and until November 10, 2009
as follows:

Judgment Amount
Interest on
Judgment
InteresVYr
DayslYr
Per Day Rate
Days
Total Interest
Total with Interest
Fees and Costs
Total March 20,
2009

Note:

$128,611.55

$431,402.55

$440,594.97

0.07625
$9,806.63
365
$26.87
218

0.07625
$32,894.44
365
$90.12
102

0.05625
$24,783.47
365
$67.90
133

$5,857.11

$9,192.42

$9,030.69

~134.468.66

$440,594.97

$449,625.66

$24,080.2
2

$296,933.89
$431,402.55

Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 7.625% effective July 1, 2008
Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 5.625% effective July 1, 2009

AND, WHEREAS, that final Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to
Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. was duly filed in the Clerk's office
of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Bonner, on March 20, 2009 and that Judgment' was duly recorded as a judgment lien with the
Bonner County Recorder on March 30, 2009;
NOW, you, the Sheriff of Bonner County, are hereby required to satisfy said Judgment,
with t~e accrued interest

8B

aforesaid, out of the personal property of the defendant Rimar

Construction, Inc., the judgment debtor, or if sufficient property of said debtor cannot be found,
then out of the real property in Bonner County belonging to said judgment debtor on the date of
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 2
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'

..

service of this writ, and make return of this writ within sixty (60) days after the receipt,hereof,
with what you have done endorsed thereon.
WITNESS my hand and official seal this

n

day of

Marie Scott, Clerk

B

WRIT OF EXECUTION - 3
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~I oOcm bee2009.

ELSA JARZ ANDE MARKS

Fax:12082630759

Nov

24 2009

15:04

P.02

ELSAESSER J ARZABEK ANDERSON MARKs & ELLIOTT
CHARTERED

ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW
FORD ELSAESSER
JOSEPHE. J~'EK
BRUCEA.ANDE~O~

DOPCLAS B. ~......
CINDY ILLIOTT
JA.J\aS S. l\fACDONALD

102 SOUTH EUCLID AVENUE, SUITE 307
P. O. BOX 1049
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864-0855
TELEPHONE (208) 263-8517
FACSIMILE (208) 263-0759

ford@ejame.com
brucea@eJame.c:oUJ
dmarkJ@ejame.com
cludy@ejame.c:om
jamu@ejame.com
d1arue@ejame.com
lois@eJame.com

-ALSO LlCENSW IN COLORADO
tolJ.SO LrCllNSED IN WASUlNGTO,,"

DONNA LaRUE, CLA
PAAAU:OAL

LOIS La POINTE, RP
LEGAL ASSISTANT TO FORI> J!LSAliSS'ER.

MEMORANDUM
To:

Bonner County Sheriff
Attn: Chief Civil Deputy
400 1 North 'Boyer
Sandpoint, ID 83864

cc:

Larry Goins, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office
Mike Ealy, Esq., Ramsden & Lyons, LLP

From: Ford Elsaesser
Date: November 24, 2009
Re:

First District Court of Idaho for Bonner County
Case No; CV-06-0044S
David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc.

Dear Deputy:
Reference is made to a WRIT OF EXECUTION issued on November 10,2009, with
regard to the above-entitled matter.
Please be advised. that. R1MAR CONStRUCTION, INC. owns no .property, real or
personal. Further, RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy
equipment, titled or untitled motor vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other
personal property of any description. The only property owned by RIMAR
CONSTRUCTION, INC. was a bank account which was used to pay some tailing phone
bi11~ after the company sh:ut down. Those funds have already been garnished by your
office for the benefit of the judgment creditor.
I wanted to advise the Sheriff s Department of these facts so that any further action that is

~ or not taken, will be with the full kn:l::e of these

circEiHIBIT

~

ELSA JARZ ANDE MARKS

Fax:12082630759

Nov 24 2009

15:04

P.03

Bonner County Sheriff, Chief Civil Deputy
November 24; 2009
Page 2

Please contact me if you have any questions of any kind Please note that this judgment
has no effect or impact onlVAN RIMAR, personally, or on any other company with

which he is assoCiated.
Thank you.
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State of IDAHO
Bonner County Sheriff's Office
Civil Division
4001 N. Boyer Ave.
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Defendant
Disposition:
Rimar Construction
1707 Culvers Drj PO Box 6 Sandpoint, ID

83864

Disposition: SRU Served, returned unsatisfied
Garnishee
Mountain West Bank
201 E Superior St
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Served on: 13th day'of November, 2009
by Peasha, J
Served to: Cassidie Spinney
Manager
201 E Superior St
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Bank of America
402 N 2nd Ave
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009
by Peasha, J
Served to: Lynn Jennings
Assistant Manager
402 N 2nd Ave
Sandpoint, ID 83864
Panhandle State Bank
414 Church St
Sandpoint, ID 83864
by Peasha, J
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009
Served to: Kelly Glenn
Manager
Sandpoint, ID 83864
414 Church St
Plaintiff
Disposition:
David Michael Donnelly
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road Cocolalla, ID

83813

Attorney
Disposition:
Michael A Ealy Atty
PO Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID
Process Number: C09-01949

83814

Court Number: CV06-445

I, Daryl D Wheeler, Sheriff of Bonner County Sheriff's Office do hereby certify
that I received the foregoing Writ of Execution on the 12th day of November,
2009 .
Dated the 7th day of December, 2009
Fees:
Service:
Mileage;
Other
Total

75.00
1. 00
224.10
300.10

Daryl D ~ler, Sheriff
Bonner ounjy Sheriff's Office,
BY:

IDAHO

'I/Ir~~,~,._~".r...

Comments
11/17/09 Mailed instructions to defendant.
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07/08/10

141 002/009

RINGERT LAW

15:21 FAX 2083424657

STATE OF IDAHu
COUNTY OF BONNEr~
FIRST JUDICIAL DIS T.

JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, IS8 # 6579
RINGERT LAW CHARTERE:D

ZDlO .JUl -8 P 2: 2b

i

455 South Third Street

P. O. Box 2773
Boise, Idaho 83701·2773 :
Telephone: (208) 3424591
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657'
E-mail;dpc@ringertlaw.com:

hARiE ~~u j ;
CLERK DISTRICT COUfn

i

~

DEPUTY

Attorneys for Plaintiff
i

IN THE DISTRICT CQURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTV
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation;

Case No. CV-2007-00885

Plaintiff,
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME
AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING

vs.

I,'

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COMES NOW. Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, pursuantto I.R.C.P.
I'

7(b)(1) and 7(b)(3), and move$ this Court for an Order extending the time for Plaintiff to file
!

a responsive brief to

Def~ndant's

Reconsideration dated July

Memorandum in Support of its Motion for

~; 2010 and moves this Court for an Order continuing the
I:·

hearing scheduled for July 21,1'2010 on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration to a date
I:

convenient to Court and counsel.
I..
!:

This Motion is based upon the Memorandum filed in support hereof and upon the
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING- 1

!.
fir
II
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.07/08/10

IgJ 003/009

RINGERT LAW

15:21 FAX 2083424657

records and files in this proLeding.
Counsel certifies he Jttempted, but Was unable to obtain the agreement of opposing
counsel to the relief requ+d hereby. Counsel further certifies he has not previously
requested by motion a contTuance or extension of time in this action.
Oral argument is specifically requested via telephonic participation.
Respectfully

sUbmitt~ this 8th day of July, 2010.

RINGERT LAW CHARTERED

by:

MOTION FOR EXTENSION

dF
TIME AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING- 2
II:
I"I

!
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07/08/10

RINGERT LAW

15: 22 FAX 20834246,57

I4J 004/009

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This does hereby certify that oli the 8th day of July, 2010, he served the foregoing
document via facsimile as follows:
Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, WA 99201
(509) 625-1909
Marc A. Lyons
Michael A. Ealy
Ramsden & lyons
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
(208) 664-5884

MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING- 3

I·
I
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145

ZOIO JUL -8 A II: 2S

Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMP ANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

v.
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELLY, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants Donnelly, by and through their attorneys of record,
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) moves this Court for
reconsideration of its Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment of April 7,
2010, on the parties respective motions for summary judgment on the grounds set forth in the
Donnelly'S Memorandum in Support filed herewith.

DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 1
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This motion is based on the accompanying Memorandum in Support thereof and the
record on file herein, including the parties' prior Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and
the memoranda and affidavits filed in support thereof.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this

'7

day ofJuly, 2010.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

By __~~~~~~__~__________
Mi

DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7-'day of July, 2010, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
James G. Reid
, David P.· Claiborne
Ringert Clark Chartered
P.O. Box 2773
Boise,ID 83701-2773

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
_ Ijand Delivered
_0'_Faa(csimile (208) 342-4657

Stephen D. Phillabaum
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900
Spokane, W A 99201

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
~csimile (509) 625-1909

Brent C. Featherston
Featherston Law Firm
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

US Mail
__ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivered
V'Pacsimile (208) 263-0400

M

DEFENDANT D01\TNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT- 3
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP
700 Northwest Blvd.
P.O. Box 1336
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336
Telephone: (208) 664-5818
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145
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Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation,

CASE NO.CV-07-00885

DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR

v.

RECONSIDERATION

RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY
DONNELL Y, husband and wife;
Defendants.

COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of
record, and submit this memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration.

I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 20, 2010, the plaintiff, Employer's Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") and
the defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly ("Donnellys") made oral arguments in support of
respective cross motions for summary judgment. On April 7, 20 I 0, the court issued its Order
Denying Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment

The Donnelly'S bring this motion to

DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1
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reconsider the denial of their prior motion for summary judgment based on the reasons and
grounds set forth herein.

II.

UNDISPUTED FACTS (CONDENSED).

For the purpose of their Motion to Reconsider, the Donnellys incorporate by reference
their prior Statement of Undisputed Facts set forth in their Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment dated December 18, 2009. For ease of reference, a condensed set of
undisputed facts are repeated herein.
1.

From June 23, 2008 through July 9,2008, the Underlying Litigation of Donnelly

v. Rimar Construction, Inc., Bonner County CV-06-00445 was tried to a jury. (Reid Aff. 1119/09
Ex. F). On July 9, 2008, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of Donnelly awarding
damages in the total amount of $128,611.55. (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. 's E, F). By Special Verdict,
the jury awarded the Donnelly's $126,611.55 in damages for breach of the implied warranty of
workmanship; $1,000 in damages for failure to provide required disclosures pursuant to the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and $1,000 in damages for other violations of the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act. (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. E, pp. 8-9).
2.

On August 14, 2008, Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of

Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Judgment") was entered in the Underlying
Litigation in the total amount of $128,611.55 to accrue post-judgment interest pursuant to Idaho
Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. F).
3..

On February 13, 2009, an Order On Post-Trial Motions was entered in the

Underlying Litigation finding the Donnelly's to be prevailing parties in the Underlying
Litigation as against ReI and awarding further costs in the amount of$19,871.89 and attorney's

DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 2

379

fees in the am9unt of $277,062.00. (Reid Aff. 11/9/09 Ex. G).

The total cost award was

$296,933.89.
4.

On March 20, 2009, Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard to

Claims of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Amended Judgment") was
entered in the Underlying Litigation in the total amount of $425,545.44 to accrue post-judgment
interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. 11/9/09 Ex. H). On March 30, 2009,
the Amended Judgment was recorded in Bonner County as record instrument number 769177.
(Ealy Aff.l2118/09 Ex. J).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 11(a)(2)(B) IRCP governs motions for reconsideration and provides in pertinent
part as follows:
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen
(14) days after entry of the final judgment.
When considering a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to this
section, the trial court should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that
bear upon the correctness of an interlocutory order; the burden is on the moving party to bring
the trial court's attention to the new facts. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118
Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990).
This view of the effect of Rule 11(a)(2)(B) is consistent with the discussion of
reconsideration in J.! Caseco v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955). In that case,
the court noted:
A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional
facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the
chief virtue of reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3
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available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained and justice may be done as
nearly as may be.
Jd. at 229, 280 P.2d at 1070.

IV.

LEGAL ARGUMENTS

SUbject to the Donnellys pending Motion to Amend, the historical dispute between EMC
and the Donnellys has centered around two issues. The first issue is whether the jury's damage
award of$128,6l1.55 against RCI is covered as "property damage" under the EMC CGL policy
and, therefore, payable to the Donnellys as claimants and judgment creditors of RCI. The
Donnellys say "yes."

EMC says "no." Regardless of the answer to this first question, the

second issue is whether EMC has an independent and supplementary obligation to pay the
Donnellys attorney's fees and costs of $296,933.89 awarded and taxed as costs against RCI in
the Underlying Litigation. Again, the Donnellys say "yes" and EMC says "no." By this motion
to reconsider, the Donnelly's ask the court reconsider the Donnelly's prior motion for summary
judgment based on the grounds set forth below.

A.

WHETHER THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD OF $128,611.55 AGAINST RCI IS
COVERED AS "PROPERTY DAMAGE" UNDER THE EMC CGL POLICY
AND, THEREFORE, PAYABLE TO THE DONNELLYS AS CLAIMANTS AND
JUDGMENT CREDITORS OF RCI.
1.

Cross Motions Operate As A Stipulation To That No Genuine Issue of Fact
Exists to Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment.

By filing cross motions for summary judgment, the Donnellys and EMC were effectively
stipulating that there were no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude the court from
entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362,365 (1999)
(citations omitted). While filing cross motions alone doesn't necessarily establish that there
is no issue of genuine fact, it nevertheless operates as a stipulation that no genuine issues
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exist that would preclude entry of summary judgment. Therefore, on reconsideration, the
court can consider that the intent of the parties' cross motions was to effectively stipulate that
no genuine issue of fact existed that would otherwise preclude the court from entering
summary judgment.
In addition, the court can and should consider that the Donnellys have or intend to
waive any prior demand for jury trial that was raised in their prior Answer and Cross Claim.
Therefore, the court in this instant matter will necessarily be the finder of fact on any
contested factual issues.

2.

Allocation of the Jury Special Verdict Damage Award.

In issuing its Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the court found
that "there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the Donnellys
were property damage or contract based damages." (Order, pg. 6). In other words, the court
determined there remained a genuine question of fact regarding how to allocate the jury's
damage award in the Underlying Litigation for the purposes of determining whether the
damages were "covered" or "uncovered" under the EMC policy. Because the jury in the
Underlying Litigation was never asked to allocate its damage award in a manner that might
lend itself to a characterization as "covered" and/or "uncovered" damages, the court appears
to recognize the jury's damage award as a general verdict that may include "covered" and/or
"uncovered" damages.
A similar issue was faced in Idaho case of Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 730 P.2d
1037 (Ct. App. 1986). In Buckley, Kelly and Betsy Buckley suffered personal injuries in a
car wreck caused by the minor son of Chades and Donna Orem. Id. at 119, 730 P .2d at 1039.
While Kelly Buckley suffered extensive personal injuries, his wife's injuries were relatively
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minor. Id. Following a trial, the jury returned a Special Verdict awarding the Buckley's a
lump sum award of $115,000 for personal injuries -to both Kelly and Betsy and $10,000 to
Betsy for loss of consortium. Id.

A total judgment of $125,000 was thereafter entered

against the Orems. Id.
At the time of the accident, the Orems were insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company ("Nationwide"). Buckley, at 119, 730 P.2d 1039. Pursuant to Nationwide's auto
policy, the stated limits were $100,000 per person per occurrence. Id. Because the jury's
Special Verdict combined the personal injury award of Kelly and Betsy Buckley into one
lump sum of $115,000, this created an issue as to Nationwide's total liability to Kelly
Buckley under its $100,000 per person policy limit and whether it had to pay the total
judgment of$125,000. Id.
Following entry of the $125,000 judgment, the Orems filed certain post-trial motions
including a motion asking the trial court to allocate the damages between Kelly and Betsy
Buckley. Buckley, at 119, 730

P.2~

at 1039. The trial court denied the Orems post-trial

motion to allocate the verdict. Id. Before the Orems' time to appeal .had run, the trial court
allowed Nationwide to intervene in the action, in part, to contest its liability on the final
judgment to Orem. Id. Following its intervention, Nationwide and the Buckley's filed cross
motions for summary judgment, in part, seeking a determination of Nationwide's liability on
the final judgment. Id. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Buckley and
found Nationwide liable for the total judgment. Id. Nationwide appealed. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the case presented an issue of first
impression in Idaho. Buckley, at 125, 730 P.2d at 1045.

In doing so, the Court of Appeals

adopted what it characterized as the "majority rule" which it outlined as follows:
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This rule requires the party seeking recovery to first show the claim is
apparently within policy coverage. The insurer then bears the burden of
producing evidence showing- a substantial likelihood of overpayment should
the unallocated verdict be paid. It is then up to the claimant to prove that
overpayment would not occur by full payment of the verdict.

Id. at 122, 730 P.2d at 1042 (citing Universal Underwriters Insurance Corp. v. Reynolds, 129
So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1961) (further citations omitted). In making application of the majority
rule, the Court of Appeals recognized that the Buckley's had obtained an unapportioned
verdict for $115,000 and Nationwide had shown a substantial likelihood of overpayment to
Kelly Buckley based on its $100,000 per person policy limit. The Court of Appeals also
recognized that since the Buckley's could not prove all the damages awarded to Kelly came
within the policy limits, the Buckley's would lose unless they were relieved of their burden
of proof for other reasons. Buckley, at 123, 730 P.2d at 1043.
In addressing whether the Buckley's were relieved of their burden of proof, the Court
of Appeals relied on the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Duke v. Hoch. Id. at
122-23,730 P.2d at 142-1043 (citing Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973 (5 th Cir. 1972). In Duke,
Anthony Duke obtained a general judgment for $226,266 against his accounting firm and its
individual partners (herein "Hoch"). Duke, 468 F.2d at 975. At the trial, Hoch was defended
by its professional liability carrier, Home Indemnity Corporation ("Home"). Id. Thereafter,
Duke, as a judgment creditor of Hoch, sought to satisfy the judgment through a garnishment
action on the Home policy. Id. The garnishment action was tried without a jury to the same
district judge that presided over the underlying liability case. Id. The district judge rendered
a verdict for Home and Duke appealed.

14.
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At issue in the Duke case was whether Home was liable to pay damages for liability
on what was referred therein as the "trust account claim." Id. at 974-975. The tmst account
claim was based on the intentional conduct on the part of one of the individual accountants
and, therefore, characterized as an "uncovered" as opposed to "covered" claim under the
intentional conduct exclusion found in the Home policy. Id. at 975.
At the garnishment trial, the district court applied the majority rule and found that
sInce Home had proven the trust account claim was intentional conduct and, therefore
uncovered, and since Duke could not thereafter prove a precise portion of the unallocated
verdict for which Home would be further responsible, that Home had prevailed and was not
liable to pay any portion of the general verdict. Duke, at 974-975. The district judge never
considered whether, under the circumstances, Duke should be relieved of its burden of proof.
Id.
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted (as the district judge had) that,
under the circumstances, it was impossible for Duke to meet his burden of proof. Id. at 975.
Home conceded that impossibility and noted that it was seeking to take advantage of a "very
technical defense." Id. The Court noted that unless Duke was relieved of his burden, Home
would otherwise prevail. Id. In concluding that Duke was relieved of its burden, the Court
scrutinized the conduct and relationship between Home and Hoch defendants in the
underlying case. Id. at 977-984 (emphasis added).
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis with the following
observation.
The insurer undertaking the defense of a suit against its insured and having the
right to control the litigation must meet a high standard of conduct.
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'The right to control the litigation in all of its aspects carries with it the correlative duty to exercise diligence, intelligence,
good faith, honest and conscientious fidelity to the common
interest of the parties. . . . When the insurer undertakes the
defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent of its assured in
virtue of the contract of insurance between the parties, and when
a conflict arises between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as
principal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to closer scrutiny
than that of the ordinary agent, because of his adverse
interest. ' ...

Id. (quoting Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621,627 (10th Cir.
1942) (citations omitted). The Court noted that "[o]n the other side of the coin the insured is
bound under the cooperation clause." Id. at 978.

The Court recognized that Home had an

interest in the Duke verdict not being allocated. Duke, 468 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added).
The Court reasoned as follows:
Home, in control of the defense, has protected its interest and secured for itself
an escape from responsibility at the expense of the insureds, who remain
personally liable for the full judgment, unprotected even to the extent they
have paid for protection. Having gained that advantage, Home insists upon it.
The consequence to the insureds of a nonallocated verdict is the catastrophic
total loss of coverage. The risks to the insurer in requesting an allocated
verdict are of no such magnitude, if of any consequence at all.
Id., at 979.
In relieving Duke of his evidentiary burden, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
analysis is further paraphrased and condensed as follows:
Thus, at the merits trial Home's counsel was required to make known to the
insured the availability of a special verdict and the divergence of interest
between them and the insurer springing from whether damages were or were
not allocated. The record before us does not indicate that counsel did so.
Once Home's counsel disclosed the situation, the insureds, represented by their
own retained counsel, would be entitled to make the decision whether to seek
an allocated verdict. The presence of insured's own counsel did not dispense
with the necessity of insurer's counsel discharging his responsibility to
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disclose fully the precise situation before proceeding, as counsel having the
right to control the defense, with a course of action inuring wholly to the
insurer's benefit and wholly to the insureds' detriment.
Since on the present record the insurer failed to fully advise its insureds of the
divergence of interest between it and them with respect to the verdict, the
insureds must, subject to the possibility noted in part III, infra, be freed of the
impossible burden of proof placed on them. We discuss below in part III the
procedure on remand.
Id., at 980-9-83.

In remanding the matter back to the district court, the Court further

concluded as follows:
In the District Court a threshold question is whether at the merits trial insurer's
counsel, by some means not revealed by the present record, discharged his
responsibility of notifying the insureds of their interest in the form of the
verdict. If insurer cannot show that it did, the court will face the issue of
attempting retrospectively to allocate the damages awarded. In saying that
Duke is relieved of his burden, we refer to the "risk of non-persuasion." IX
Wigmore, The Law of Evidence § 2485 (3d ed. 1940). Duke continues to have
the burden of producing "a quantity of evidence fit .... to form a reasonable
basis for the [judgment]," id. § 2487, at 279 (italics omitted). The primary
source of evidence will be, of course, the transcript of the merits trial,
containing the evidence on which the jury based its verdict. The trial judge, as
trier of fact, will be in the position of establishing as best he can the allocation
which the jury would have made had it been tendered the opportunity to do so.
If it is impossible for the court to make a meaningful allocation based on only
the transcript, Duke should have the right to adduce additional evidence and
Home to present evidence in rebuttal.
Duke, 468 F.2d at 984.

The Court rejected Home's argument that its prior reservation of

rights was sufficient notification to its insureds. Id., 468 F.2d at 980.
In following the Duke holding, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Buckley, likewise
relieved the Buckley's of their impossible burden and, in remanding the matter back to the
trial court, concluded that:
If Nationwide cannot show that it informed the Orems of their interest
m the verdict form then the trial court should proceed retrospectively to
allocate the damages award, as best it can, and then to apply the policy limits
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to detennine whether Nationwide
unsatisfied judgment.

IS

liable for any additional part of the

Buckley, 112 Idaho at 125, 730 P.2d at 1045.
In this case, there is no dispute that EMC defended its insured, RCI (and Ivan Rimar),
through the Underlying Litigation in this matter and that RCI was defended by counsel
appointed by EMC. Although EMC is the plaintiff and has the initial burden of proof in this
action, the Donnelly's met any initial burden invoked by application of the majority rule cited
in Buckley and have initially shown that their liability claim against RCI was and is
"apparently" within EMC's policy coverage. In part, this is evidenced by the fact that EMC
undertook a defense of RCI based on the Donnellys claims being apparently covered under
the EMC policy. Otherwise, EMC would have simply denied the claim. In addition, this
apparent coverage served as the underlying factual and/or legal basis for the previous stay
entered in this action pending a trial of the Underlying Litigation. In other words, if there
was no apparent coverage, there was no apparent basis to stay this action pending a trial in
the Underlying Litigation.
Therefore, in application of the majority rule cited by Buckley, this necessarily left the
burden on EMC, in this action, to show a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the
Donnellys unallocated verdict be paid. However, unlike Nationwide in Buckley, EMC can't
meet this burden because the Special Verdict makes no allocation of the damages that would
otherwise allow EMC to show a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the unallocated
verdict be paid. This is because EMC's policy limit was $1,000,000 per occurrence and the
Donnellys initial judgment of $128,611.55 was well below and within EMC's stated policy
limit.
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In addition, to date there is no evidence in the record that EMC informed or otherwise
sought to inform RCI of its interest in the Special Verdict form in the Underlying Litigation
and the risks to RCI in the event it sought an unallocated verdict.

Both the Duke and

Buckley decisions recognize the patent unfairness in the application of the majority rule in
allowing· an insurer, like EMC, to control the defense of its insured and, in doing so,
potentially escape liability at the expense of its insured (and judgment creditor) by obtaining
an unallocated verdict that later places an impossible burden on the insured's (and judgment
creditor) to prove coverage.
In this case, the Donnellys are arguably in the same position as the plaintiffs
Anthony Duke and Kelly and Betsy Buckley having obtained a judgment against an insured
party and now having to fight with its liability insurer over the allocation of an unallocated
verdict as "covered" or "uncovered" in a later action.

The harshness in the majority rule

recognized in Duke and Buckley, is placing the burden on parties, like the Donnellys, to
allocate an unallocated verdict when, in reality, it is in the interest of the insurer (EM C) and
its insured (RCI) to seek such an allocation in the underlying litigation. That is particularly
true in this case where EMC controlled the defense of RCI and had a pending (albeit stayed)
declaratory judgment action at the time of the trial in the Underlying Litigation.
Therefore, the court in this case can find from the undisputed factual record that the
Donnellys have met any initial burden that would be placed on them to show their liability
claims were apparently within EMC's policy coverage and since EMC cannot, and has not,
met its burden to prove a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the unallocated
verdict be paid, the court can grant the Donnelly'S prior motion for summary judgment and
allocate the $128,611.55 verdict as payable under the EMC policy because it would clearly
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fall within EMC's $1,000,000 per occurrence policy limits.
In the alternative, should the court find that EMC has or

otherwis~

could show a

substantial likelihood of overpayment if the unallocated verdict was paid, then the court can
further apply the rationale of Duke and Buckley and relieve the Donnelly's of their burden to
prove coverage and place the burden on EMC to show that it informed RCI of its interest in
the Special Verdict form and, if so, the court can then allocate the damages "as best it can."
See Buckly v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 125, 730 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Ct. App. 1986) (notably the

Buckly court doesn't indicate how the trial court is to allocate the damages only stating that it
do it "the best it can"). In following Duke, this might include the court reviewing the
Underlying Litigation trial transcript containing evidence on which the jury based its verdict
so the court, as the finder of fact and "as best it can" can make the allocation the jury would
have made had it been given the opportunity to do so. See Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973, 984

B.

WHETHER EMC HAS A SUPPLEMENTARY OBLIGATION TO PAY THE
DONNELLYS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF $296,933.89 AWARDED
AND TAXED AS COSTS AGAINST RCI IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION.
1.

The Plain Language Of The EMC Policy.

The EMC policy is organized by "Sections." Section I is labeled "COVERAGES" and
includes four (4) capitalized and bold subparts labeled COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY
AND

PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY;

COVERAGE

B PERSONAL AND

ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILIY; COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS; and
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS-COVERAGES A AND B. (ld.) (emphasis added).
Coverage "A" is further organized by two (2) subparts labeled 1. Insuring Agreement and 2.
Exclusions. In simple terms, the exclusions found in subpart (2) operate to "take away" or
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exclude from the promise to insure or "cover" pursuant to the insuring agreement found in
subpart ( 1).
The Insuring Agreement found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 1 a. provides as follows:
We [EMC] will pay those sums [money] that the insured [RCI] becomes legally
obligated to pay [Special Verdict/Donnelly Judgment} as damages because of
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. [Donnelly
argues the special verdict was for "property damage" and, therefore, the
insurance applies}. We [EMC] will have the right and duty to defend the insured
[ReI] against any "suit" seeking those damages [Underlying Litigation).
However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking
damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does
not apply. [EMC already defended RCI in the Underlying Litigation].
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered
unless explicitly provided for under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and
B. [EMC provides no other "coverage" unless explicitly provided for under the
Supplemental Payments-Coverages A and B.}
The policy language found in Section I, Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B provides
as follows:

SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B
1. We [EMC] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate, settle, or any
"suit" against an insured we defend [i.e. EMC defended RCI in the Underlying
Litigation.) :
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit." [i.e. attorney's fees and
costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation.]
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of
the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the
court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance.
[i. e. All interest on the foil amount of the Donnelly judgment.}
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [i.e. The obligation to
make supplementary payments is an independent promise from the promise to pay
damages for bodily injury or property damage.}
(Reid Aff. ! 1/9/09 Ex. A. ) (emphasis added.)
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2.

The Rules Regarding the Construction of Insurance Policies.

In Idaho, insurance policies are interpreted under general rules of contract construction
subject to certain special rules of construction. Arregon v. Fanners Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145
Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008) (citation omitted.) In general, for a policy to be
ambiguous it must be reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. (citations omitted).
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion--typically not subject to negotiation
between the parties-a special rule of construction is "that any ambiguity that exists in the
contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Id. (citation omitted.)
Therefore, a policy provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly
construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citation omitted). This places the burden on the
"insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage."
Id. Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law. Id (emphasis added).

3.

Application of the Rules of Construction to the Language of the Policy.

Under the general rules of contract construction, the first issue is to detennine whether the
EMC policy language is ambiguous or not. Whether the policy language is ambiguous or not, is
a question of law for the court. Since the EMC policy is a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in
the policy must be construed against EMC. In its Order Denying Cross Motions For Summary
Judgment, while the court didn't specifically state whether it had found the EMC policy to be
ambiguous or unambiguous, it apparently found the parties' respective arguments over
application of the EMC policy language to result in some question of fact that otherwise
precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of either party. (Order at p. 6).
However, with due respect, should the court find tIre policy language to be unambiguous,
then that resolves any perceived questions of fact regarding application of the policy's
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unambiguous language. As applied in this case, the EMC policy unambiguously provides that
EMC has "[nJo other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered
unless explicitly provided/or under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B." (emphasis
in original). Assuming arguendo that EMC had "no other obligation or liability to payor
perform acts or services" under either Coverage A or B, that doesn't end the analysis on what
EMC has promised to pay. This is because the unambiguous remainder of the sentence provides
"unless explicitly provided/or under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B." Therefore,
even if EMC had no other obligation or liability to pay under either Coverage A or B, EMC has
to look to see if it made an "independent" promise-i.e. one "explicitly provided for under
Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B" to determine if it has made a supplementary
promise to pay.
There is no ambiguity in this policy language.

It is susceptible to only this one

reasonable construction. Therefore, as a matter of law, the court can find there is no ambiguity in
EMC's policy and, therefore, the promises made in the Supplementary Payments section of the
policy are "independent" from EMC's promises and/or exclusions from coverage found under
section I, Coverage A or B.
Having made this finding, as a matter of law, the court can than look at the unambiguous
language of the EMC Supplementary Payments language set forth above. There is no ambiguity
in EMC's supplementary promise to pay "[a]II costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit. ,,, The
only reasonable construction of this language is that EMC promised to pay the Donnel1ys
attorney's fees and costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation. There is no other
reasonable construction of this language. Therefore, as a matter of law, the court can find this
language to be unambiguous and give it is plain meaning and, thereby grant the Donnel1ys
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Id., at 389-392. In short, the Court found Philadephia's arguments to lack merit. Id. at 390.
In EMC v. Philadelphia, EMC was awarded $400,000 against Philadelphia based on the
same supplementary payments language that is found in its own policy at issue in this case. This
undercuts EMC's purported reliance on the Mintarsih decision and demonstrates the error EMC
invites in attempt to circumvent the persuasive, if not controlling, authority of Mutual of
Enumclaw v. Harvey, infra. In this case EMC defended RCI through trial in the Underlying
Litigation in full recognition that-regardless of whether EMC had a duty to indemnify RCI or
not following a jury verdict-- the Donnelly'S could prevail and, therefore, be awarded their
attorney fees and costs to be taxed as costs against RCI. EMC can't be heard to complain thatregardless of whether EMC had a duty to indemnify RCI or not-it made an independent and
supplementary promise to pay "[a]ll costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit''' and, therefore,
has obligated itself to pay the Donnelly's attorney fees and costs as a prevailing party in the
Underlying Litigation.
The court should reconsider that it is an undisputed fact that there is no language in the
EMC's policy that conditions its promise to make supplementary payment of all the costs taxed
against its insured in the suit as first "dependent" on their being coverage under some other
section of its policy.

EMC's argument-that its promise to pay the costs taxed against its

insured in the suit is contingent or otherwise dependent on a coverage determination--defies the
plain and unambiguous language of its own policy and offends common sense. EMC's own
reliance on the unambiguous supplementary payments language in the EMC v. Philadelphia
underscores this point.
Therefore, the court can reconsider that the plain application-ill EMC's supplementary
payments language doesn't create any questions of fact because the policy language itself is
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unambiguous and, therefore, capable of only one reasonable construction. That construction, as
a matter of law, is that EMC promised to pay the $296,933.89 in attorney's fees and costs that
were taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation regardless of whether or not it had any other
duty to cover or otherwise indemnify RCI under the policy. In addition, to the extent EMC's
arguments purport to create some ambiguity in the policy, any such ambiguity should necessarily
be construed against EMC and in favor of the Donnellys. Further, to the extent EMC concedes
that its policy language is unambiguous, then it relies solely on the Mintarsih decision as a basis
for "public policy" arguments that can be addressed by the court, as a matter of law. For the
reasons set forth in the Donnellys prior motion for summary judgment and herein, it would
indeed be poor public policy for the courts in this state to ignore the plain and unambiguous
language found in adhesionary insurance policies, like EMC's, to reach a result that places the
financial interest of insurers ,like EMC, over that of its insured's, like RCI, and its insured's
claimants and judgment creditors, like the Donnellys.
Therefore, the Donnellys ask the court to reconsider its earlier denial of their motion for
summary judgment and find that, as a matter of law, the EMC policy is unambiguous and,
therefore, the court can give the policy language its plain meaning. The Donnellys ask the court
to find that, as a matter of law, the unambiguous and plain language of the EMC policy is
susceptible to only one reasonable construction/interpretation. The Donnellys ask the court to
find that, as a matter of law, the by plain application of the unambiguous policy language, EMC
has made an independent and supplementary promise to pay the attorney fees and costs taxed
against RCI in the Underlying Litigation regardless of whether RCI had any other liability to pay
sums or perform acts under the policy. The Donnellys ask the court, as a matter of law, to reject
EMC's public policy argument and reconsider the persuasive authority of Mutual of Enunclaw v.
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Harvey, injra., and, at a minimum, grant them partial summary judgment finding EMC has a
duty to pay the Donnelly's attorney fees and costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation
along with an obligation to pay interest pursuant to EMC's plain and unambiguous promise to
pay "[a]l1 interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment
and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the court the part of the judgment that is
within the applicable limit of insurance."

CONCLUSION
The Donnellys respectfully ask the court to reconsider it prior Order Denying CrossMotions for Summary Judgment and, in reconsideration of this motion and the Donnellys prior
Motion for Summary Judgment, grant the Donnellys summary judgment, in whole or in part, as
a matter of law.
/1-'

DATED this ~day of July, 2010.
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP

BY __++-r~~~__~~~_________
Mi
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly
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